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Publications published in 2012

27 December 2012
COMMENTARIES
20 December 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
Annexes
20 December 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 December 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 December 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 December 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
4 October 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 2
  • André Sapir
  • Martin F. Hellwig
  • Marco Pagano
Details
Abstract
A European banking union is necessary to ensure the stability of the European financial system. This paper assesses the EU Commission's proposals for legislation to create a banking union in Europe. The EU Commission's proposal for a regulation creating a single supervisory mechanism is strongly supported. At the same time, a European resolution authority is essential for the credibility of the single supervisory mechanism.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
20 September 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
Annexes
20 September 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 September 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 September 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
20 September 2012
RISK DASHBOARD
23 July 2012
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 1
  • Martin F. Hellwig
  • André Sapir
  • Marco Pagano
  • Viral Acharya
  • Leszek Balcerowicz
  • Arnoud Boot
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier
  • Claudia M. Buch
  • Ieke van den Burg
  • Charles Calomiris
  • Daniel Gros
  • Dario Focarelli
  • Alberto Giovannini
  • Andreas Ittner
  • Dirk Schoenmaker
  • Charles Wyplosz
Details
Abstract
The report discusses a variety of issues involving difficulties in the banking sector, with a view to ascertaining the appropriate institutional infrastructure in the context of the European Union and the euro area. Forbearance on the part of banks dealing with delinquent borrowers is problematic if it is designed as a way to game creditors and supervisors. Supervisors should not tolerate excessive forbearance; failure to intervene early tends to increase the costs of the crisis. Macro-prudential concerns should not induce the authorities to delay clean-ups of banks in difficulties. To minimise the macroeconomic fallout from banking problems and to reduce the temptation for authorities to delay and hide problems in banking, it is necessary to have a viable resolution regime that leaves room for authorities to reduce the systemic fallout from resolution. The Advisory Scientific Committee calls for the establishment of strong European bodies responsible for banking supervision and bank resolution. A European competence is necessary to ensure that cross-border concerns are given appropriate weight in supervision and resolution.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
12 July 2012
COMMENTARIES
22 June 2012
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 1
  • Elias Bengtsson
  • Julie Ansidei
  • Daniele Frison
  • Giles Ward
Details
Abstract
Money market funds (MMFs) are investment funds whose primary objectives are to maintain the principal value of the funds and offer a return in line with money market rates, while providing daily liquidity to their investors. In Europe, MMFs manage approximately EUR 1 trillion in assets, with three countries (France, Ireland and Luxembourg) representing an aggregate market share of over 90%. MMFs were at the heart of dramatic episodes of the financial crisis of 2007-08, prompting regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to extensively review the regulatory framework applicable to them. In Europe, new guidelines were adopted in 2010, imposing strict standards in terms of the credit quality and maturity of underlying securities and better disclosure to investors. Although these initiatives are considered to have considerably improved MMF regulation, discussions are still ongoing, both in the United States (US) and at the international level, as to how to reduce the systemic risks associated with MMFs and, in particular, their vulnerability to runs. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has identified MMFs as a key component of the shadow banking system and has asked the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to submit policy recommendations by July 2012 for further regulatory reform of such funds. The purpose of this occasional paper is to provide a first assessment of the systemic importance of MMFs within the European context, as well as of the main areas of risk, policy implications and the possible role for the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
JEL Code
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
31 May 2012
ANNUAL REPORT
29 March 2012
COMMENTARIES
29 February 2012
COMMENTARIES

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