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Publications published in 2024

18 December 2024
REPORTS
5 December 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
Annexes
5 December 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
5 December 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
4 December 2024
REPORTS
4 November 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 148
  • Leonie Bräuer
  • Harald Hau
Details
Abstract
Over the past decade, European investment funds have substantially increased their investment in dollar-denominated assets to more than 3.8 USD trillion, which should give raise to substantial currency hedging if US investor have reciprocal currency exposures in their international portfolios. Using comprehensive new contract level data (EMIR) for the period 2019-2023, we explore how the FX derivative trading by European funds compares to a feasible theoretical benchmark of optimal hedging. We find that hedging behaviour by all fund types is often partial, unitary (i.e., with a single currency focus), and sub-optimal. Overall, the observed FX derivative trading does not significantly reduce the return risk of the average European investment funds, even though optimal hedging strategies could without incurring substantial trading costs.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F31 : International Economics→International Finance→Foreign Exchange
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
4 October 2024
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Annexes
4 October 2024
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4 October 2024
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29 August 2024
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 15
  • Thorsten Beck
  • Vasso Ioannidou
  • Enrico Perotti
  • Antonio Sánchez Serrano
  • Javier Suarez
  • Xavier Vives
1 August 2024
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 26
  • Antonio Sánchez Serrano
  • Isabel Andersen
Details
Abstract
We present a methodology based on quarterly sectoral accounts to build a map of the euro area financial system. The map can be used to visualise existing cross-sectoral interconnections and exposures, to analyse how the main bilateral positions have evolved over time, and to understand how past episodes of financial stress affected balance sheet structures and inter-sectoral flows. We find that the euro area financial system was essentially bank-centric when it entered the global financial crisis, and only afterwards has the importance of investment funds, government debt and central banks increased substantially. In particular, investment funds are used by euro area economic agents to gain exposure to the rest of the world and vice versa. We also document weak dynamics since the global financial crisis in lending between euro area banks and non-financial corporations. Next, we look at the financial system during the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, a further four episodes of financial stress (sovereign debt crisis, the US taper tantrum, the Brexit referendum, the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and the monetary policy tightening between 2005 and 2007. While there are differences across them, we unveil interesting common features. The map can be useful in determining which sectors are resilient enough to absorb losses and whether they can serve as transmitters of stress. Finally, turning to liquidity, bank deposits, money market fund shares and securities financing transactions are key to ensure a smooth supply of liquidity and should continuously be on the radar of policymakers.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
Annexes
19 July 2024
ANNUAL REPORT
27 June 2024
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Annexes
27 June 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
27 June 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
13 June 2024
NBFI MONITOR REPORT
Annexes
13 June 2024
NBFI MONITOR REPORT
16 April 2024
REPORTS
3 April 2024
REPORTS
28 March 2024
RISK DASHBOARD
Annexes
28 March 2024
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28 March 2024
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25 March 2024
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 25
  • André Ebner
  • Christiane Westhoff
Details
Abstract
We set out a stylised framework for the policies enacted to address the risks posed by systemically important institutions (SIIs) and to counter the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem, examining conceptually how far supervisory and resolution policies are complementary or substitutable. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) TBTF reforms comprise (i) a higher loss-absorbing capacity in the form of regulatory capital buffers for SIIs, (ii) more intensive and effective supervision and (iii) a recovery and resolution regime, including sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity in the form of capital and eligible liabilities, to deal with distressed or failing institutions. These reform strands are part of a fundamentally integrated concept, but were largely developed and implemented independently of each other. Therefore, they may fall short of fully taking interdependencies into account, rendering policies less effective and consistent than an integrated approach, which we outline as an alternative. The analysis discusses the regulatory interplay, its implications for policymaking based on the FSB TBTF reforms for banks and its operationalisation in the Basel framework at the global level and in the European Union.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
1 March 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 147
  • Ismael Alexander Boudiaf
  • Martin Scheicher
  • Immo Frieden
Details
Abstract
This paper studies market liquidity in interest rate swaps (IRS) before and during the global tightening of monetary policy. IRS constitute the single largest derivatives segment globally. Banks and Pension Funds extensively rely on IRS to hedge interest rate risk. Hence, providing an understanding of this market and the drivers of market liquidity is a key research question in the current market context. We use price and volume data from around 338.000 trades in the most active long-horizon swap contract denominated in EUR to construct seven liquidity measures. Taking a comprehensive approach, we ap-ply linear regressions to determine the drivers of variation in liquidity. Our liquidity measures are significantly related to monetary policy, market-wide fixed income liquidity, EURIBOR rate volatility and Dealer behaviour. Indicators for generic market stress such as VIX which are often documented in the literature are not strongly connected to IRS trading conditions.
JEL Code
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
15 February 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 146
  • Manuel A. Muñoz
  • Oscar Soons
Details
Abstract
The bulk of cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty and only a fraction of the population choosing to hoard cash. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Only consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic about bank stability hold cash. The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value lowers the storage cost of public money and induces partial bank disintermediation, which is nevertheless mitigated by an increase in relative maturity transformation. This has heterogeneous welfare consequences across the population. While cash holders always benefit by switching to CBDC, each of all other consumers may be better off or not depending on the probability of a bank run, her (and all others’) belief about such probability and the degree of technological superiority of CBDC.
JEL Code
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
1 February 2024
REPORTS
15 January 2024
REPORTS

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