Publications published in 2018
- 13 December 2018
- RISK DASHBOARD
- 26 November 2018
- REPORTS
- 26 November 2018
- REPORTS
- 15 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 86Details
- Abstract
- We study systemic illiquidity using a unique dataset on banks’ daily cash flows, short-term interbank funding and liquid asset buffers. Failure to roll-over short-term funding or repay obligations when they fall due generates an externality in the form of systemic illiquidity. We simulate a model in which systemic illiquidity propagates in the interbank funding network over multiple days. In this setting, systemic illiquidity is minimised by a macroprudential policy that skews the distribution of liquid assets towards banks that are important in the network.
- JEL Code
- D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 15 October 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 85Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the relation between the credit-to-GDP ratio and macroeconomic trends. We estimate a long run equation on a sample of EU countries; our findings suggest that the macroeconomic factors with which the credit ratio associates most strongly are economic development, the investment share in GDP, and inflation. We then obtain projections for past and future trends. First, we study the evolution of the credit ratio in the past. We find that most of the increase starting in 1985 is associated with economic development and falling inflation, while the decrease of investment may have slowed down this trend. Second, we offer a forward-looking estimate of the structural credit ratio, defined as the long run, or sustainable, component. We offer band estimates based on two alternative assumptions on future economic outcomes, which can be interpreted as a structural and a cyclical view of current macroeconomic dynamics. Estimates of structural credit ratios based on this method are useful to policy makers having to decide on the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer, especially when assessing the sustainability of credit growth.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 4 October 2018
- RISK DASHBOARD
- 1 October 2018
- ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 7Details
- Abstract
- The emergence and accumulation of non-performing loans (NPLs) on banks’ balance sheets is commonly considered a microprudential issue. NPLs come to the attention of macroprudential authorities when they weaken a significant part of the financial system, threatening its stability or impairing one or more of its core functions, such as the provision of credit to the real economy. On a conceptual level, various imperfections may call for policy actions on the management of NPLs. These include unaddressed externalities, economies of scale and coordination failures, institutional distortions (stemming from the accounting, regulatory and tax treatment of NPLs or the judicial and market structures needed for their efficient resolution) and moral hazard vis-à-vis the providers of the banks’ safety net.
- 18 September 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 84Details
- Abstract
- Financial networks are an important source of systemic risk, but often only partial network information is available. In this paper, we use data on bank-firm credit relationships in Japan and conduct a horse race between different network reconstruction methods in terms of their ability to reproduce the actual credit networks. We then compare the different reconstruction methods in terms of their implied systemic risk levels. In most instances we find that the observed credit network significantly displays the highest systemic risk level. Lastly, we explore different policies to improve the robustness of the system.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 10 September 2018
- NBFI MONITOR REPORT
- 16 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 83Details
- Abstract
- This paper characterizes the optimal banking union with endogenous participation in a two-country economy in which domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize the funding of bail-outs. Raising public funds to conduct a bail-out entails the deadweight loss of distortionary taxation. Bank bail-ins create disruption costs in the economy. When country asymmetry is large, resolution policies exhibit reduced contributions to the public backstop and forbearance in early bank intervention in the fiscally stronger country, facilitating bail-outs in this country.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 16 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 82Details
- Abstract
- Over the last few years, national macroprudential authorities have developed different strategies for setting the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate in the banking sector. The existing approaches are based on various indicators used to identify the current phase of the financial cycle. However, to our knowledge, there is no approach that directly takes into consideration banks’ prudential behavior over the financial cycle as well as cyclical risks in the banking sector. In this paper, we propose a new profit-to-provisioning approach that can be used in the macroprudential decision-making process. We construct a new set of indicators that largely capture the risk of cyclicality of profit and loan loss provisions. We argue that banks should conserve a portion of the cyclically overestimated profit (non-materialized expected loss) in their capital during a financial boom. We evaluate the performance of our newly proposed indicators using two econometric exercises. Overall, they exhibit good statistical properties, are relevant to the CCyB decision-making process, and may contribute to a more precise assessment of both systemic risk accumulation and risk materialization. We believe that the relevance of the profit-to-provisioning approach and the related set of newly proposed indicators increases under IFRS 9.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 2 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 81Details
- Abstract
- I examine the relevance of contagion in explaining financial distress in the US banking system by identifying the component of bank level probabilities that is due to contagion. Identification is achieved after controlling for macrofinancial and bank specific shocks that have similar consequences to contagion. I use a Bayesian spatial autoregressive model that allows for time-dependent network interactions, and find that bank default likelihoods depend, to a large extent, on peer effects that account on average for approximately 35 per cent of total distress. Furthermore, I find evidence of significant heterogeneity amongst banks and some institutions to be systemically more important that others, in terms of peer effects.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
C11 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Bayesian Analysis: General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 2 August 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 80Details
- Abstract
- In this paper we estimate a Bayesian vector autoregressive model with factor stochastic volatility in the error term to assess the effects of an uncertainty shock in the Euro area. This allows us to treat macroeconomic uncertainty as a latent quantity during estimation. Only a limited number of contributions to the literature estimate uncertainty and its macroeconomic consequences jointly, and most are based on single country models. We analyze the special case of a shock restricted to the Euro area, where member states are highly related by construction. We find significant results of a decrease in real activity for all countries over a period of roughly a year following an uncertainty shock. Moreover, equity prices, short-term interest rates and exports tend to decline, while unemployment levels increase. Dynamic responses across countries differ slightly in magnitude and duration, with Ireland, Slovakia and Greece exhibiting different reactions for some macroeconomic fundamentals.
- JEL Code
- C30 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→General
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
- 19 July 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 79Details
- Abstract
- While some credit booms are followed by economic underperformance, many are not. Can lending standards help separate good credit booms from bad credit booms contemporaneously? To observe lending standards internationally, I use information from primary debt capital markets. I construct the high-yield (HY) share of bond issuance for a panel of 38 countries. The HY share is procyclical, suggesting that lending standards in bond markets are extrapolative. Credit booms with deteriorating lending standards (rising HY share) are followed by lower GDP growth in the subsequent three to four years. Such booms deserve attention from policy makers.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 19 July 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 78Details
- Abstract
- We use a factor model and elastic net shrinkage to model a high-dimensional network of European CDS spreads. Our empirical approach allows us to assess the joint transmission of bank and sovereign risk to the non-financial corporate sector. Our findings identify a sectoral clustering in the CDS network, where financial institutions are in the center and non-financial entities as well as sovereigns are grouped around the financial center. The network has a geographical component reflected in different patterns of real-sector risk transmission across countries. Our framework also provides dynamic estimates of risk transmission, a useful tool for systemic risk monitoring.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
C38 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Classification Methods, Cluster Analysis, Principal Components, Factor Models
C55 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Modeling with Large Data Sets?
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 9 July 2018
- ANNUAL REPORTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +
- 5 July 2018
- RISK DASHBOARD
- 2 July 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 77Details
- Abstract
- This paper contrasts the investment behavior of different financial institutions in debt securities as a response to past returns. For identification, I use unique security-level data from the German Micro-database Securities Holdings Statistics. Banks and investment funds respond in a pro-cyclical manner to past security-specific holding period returns. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds act counter-cyclically; they buy when returns have been negative and sell after high returns. The heterogeneous responses can be explained by differences in their balance sheet structure. I exploit within-sector variation in the financial constraint to show that tighter constraints are associated with relatively more pro-cyclical investment behavior.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 2 July 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 76Details
- Abstract
- Macroprudential policy is a relatively new policy field. Its goal is to preserve financial stability and to prevent the build-up of systemic risk that may have adverse effects for the functioning of the financial system and for the real economy. New institutions have been tasked with the implementation of macroprudential policies, and new policy instruments have been introduced. Nonetheless, uncertainty about the state of the financial system and the effects and effectiveness of these policy instruments is high. This uncertainty entails two risks: the risk of acting too late (inaction bias) and the risk of choosing an inappropriate instrument or inadequate calibration. In this paper, we argue that both risks can be mitigated if macroprudential policy is embedded in a structured policy process. Such a policy process involves four steps: defining policy objectives for macroprudential policies, choosing intermediate objectives and appropriate indicators, linking instruments to these indicators through ex-ante evaluation studies, and analyzing the effects of these policies through ex-post evaluation studies. We argue that the infrastructure for this policy process can be further improved by providing data for policy evaluation, establishing or strengthening legal mandates for policy evaluation, establishing mechanisms for international cooperation, and building up repositories of evaluation studies.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 18 May 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 75Details
- Abstract
- Financial intermediaries often provide guarantees that resemble out-of-the-money put options, exposing them to tail risk. Using the U.S. life insurance industry as a laboratory, we present a model in which variable annuity (VA) guarantees and associated hedging operate within the regulatory capital framework to create incentives for insurers to overweight illiquid bonds (“reach-for-yield”). We then calibrate the model to insurer-level data, and show that the VA-writing insurers’ collective allocation to illiquid bonds exacerbates system-wide fire sales in the event of negative asset shocks, plausibly erasing up to 20-70% of insurers’ equity capital.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
- 15 May 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 74Details
- Abstract
- Euro area governments have committed to break the doom loop between bank risk and sovereign risk. But policymakers have not reached consensus on whether and how to reform the regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures. To inform policy discussions, this paper simulates portfolio reallocations by euro area banks under scenarios for regulatory reform. Simulations highlight a tension in regulatory design between concentration and credit risk. An area-wide low-risk asset—created by pooling and tranching cross-border portfolios of government debt securities— would resolve this tension by expanding the portfolio opportunity set. Banks could therefore reinvest into an asset that has both low concentration and low credit risk.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 23 April 2018
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 15Details
- Abstract
- Existing stress tests do not capture feedback loops between individual institutions and the financial system. To identify feedback loops, the European Systemic Risk Board has developed macroprudential surveys that ask banks and insurers how they would behave in a macroeconomic stress scenario. In a pilot application of these surveys, we find evidence of herding behaviour in the banking sector, notably concerning credit retrenchment. Results show that the consequences can be large, potentially undoing the initial effects of banks’ remedial actions by worsening their solvency position. In contrast, insurers’ responses to the survey provide little evidence of herding in response to macroeconomic stress. These results highlight the usefulness of macroprudential surveys in identifying feedback loops.
- JEL Code
- E30 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→General
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 April 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 73Details
- Abstract
- I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks’investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quanti…ed using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 20102016. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks’funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 29 March 2018
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 14Details
- Abstract
- This ESRB Occasional Paper complements the publication of indicators on central counterparties (CCPs) in the ESRB's Risk Dashboard as part of its monitoring framework. It provides a methodological background to the development of the individual measures and discusses different aspects that should be considered when designing a monitoring framework for CCPs. The paper also highlights a number of areas in which more granular data are required in order, for example, to monitor the interconnectedness of CCPs within the broader financial system.CCPs play a key role in financial markets, as they reduce counterparty credit risk. This role is now heightened following post-crisis reforms of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. Since CCPs may be viewed as systemically important institutions, it is crucial to ensure that they are regulated and monitored effectively. The ESRB has, therefore, sought to strengthen the framework used to analyse developments at CCPs in the EU from a macroprudential perspective.Each monitoring framework relies on the availability of suitable data. It is therefore positive that CCPs publish data on a quarterly basis under the CPMI-IOSCO public quantitative disclosure framework. These data provide a rich source of information covering several aspects of CCPs' functioning and are the basis of the indicators the ESRB has developed to analyse developments in central clearing in the EU.The indicators are designed to provide a macroprudential view over time of CCPs' resources, liquidity and collateral policies, margin and haircut requirements, interoperability arrangements as well as market structure and concentration at CCP level. The indicators cover all CCPs that are authorised within the EU, although the values of individual measures across CCPs should be analysed and interpreted with caution, bearing in mind that there are significant differences between individual CCPs’ business models, membership structures and products cleared.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 29 March 2018
- RISK DASHBOARD
- 13 March 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 72Details
- Abstract
- Central clearing is a major part of the policy response to the financial crisis of 2008, aiming to reign in counterparty credit risk in derivatives markets. I perform an empirical study of the incentives for voluntary central clearing of OTC derivative contracts in Europe. Central clearing acts as insurance against counterparty credit risk related to derivative contracts, and is legally mandated for a specific subset of standardized derivative contracts, with a significant portion of the other contracts eligible for voluntary clearing. I show that there exist significant economies of scale in central clearing, in terms of both the size of each contract, and the scale of total clearing activity. I also show that maturity of the contract and international frictions affect voluntary clearing of different types of derivative contracts in different ways, linked to the conventional maturity and payout structures of various types of contracts. Finally, I show that significant amount of clearing happens only for credit and interest rate derivatives, while equity, foreign exchange, and commodity derivatives are rarely centrally cleared. The results validate theoretical literature, and guide future modeling of derivative markets.
- JEL Code
- C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 1 March 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 71Details
- Abstract
- The Irish banking system has in recent years experienced a large build-up in Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) during the crisis followed by a sharp reduction in the 2013-2017 period. In this article I present a recent history of the ongoing resolution of the mortgage arrears crisis in Ireland. Using a large and close to exhaustive panel data set of Irish mortgages from 2008 to 2016, I present a number of new findings on loan transitions between delinquency states, the importance of legacy effects of the crisis in explaining recent entry to arrears, the role of mortgage modification in the reduction in arrears balances, the extent of borrower-lender engagement and the financial vulnerability that remains in pockets of the Irish mortgage market.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 1 March 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 70Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates how the asset-return variance risk premium changes leverage. I find that the premium lowers leverage by increasing risk-neutral bankruptcy probability and costs in a model where asset returns have stochastic variance with risk premium. Empirically, the model calibrations verify significant reduction in optimal leverage, closer to observed leverage than the model without the premium. In model-free regressions, I also document negative correlation between leverage and the variance premium. The most negative correlation is among investment-grade firms with low asset beta and historical variance but high variance premium because their assets have high exposure to market variance premium.
- JEL Code
- G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 27 February 2018
- REPORTS
- 19 February 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 69Details
- Abstract
- Rather than taking on more risk, US insurers hit hard by the crisis pulled back from risk taking, relative to insurers hit less hard by the crisis. Capital requirements alone do not explain this risk reduction: insurers hit hard reduced risk within assets with identical regulatory treatment. State level US insurance regulation makes it unlikely this risk reduction was driven by moral suasion. Other financial institutions also reduce risk after large shocks: the same approach applied to banks yields similar results. My results suggest that, at least in some circumstances, franchise value can dominate, making gambling for resurrection too risky.
- JEL Code
- G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 16 February 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 68Details
- Abstract
- I propose and estimate a dynamic model of financial intermediation to study the different roles of the condition of banks’ and firms’ balance sheets in real activity. The net worth of firms determines their borrowing capacity both from households and banks. Banks provide risky loans to multiple firms and use their diversified portfolio as collateral to borrow from households. This intermediation process allows additional funds to flow from households to firms. Banks require net worth for intermediation as they are exposed to aggregate risk. The net worth of banks and firms are both state variables. In normal recessions, firm and bank net worth play the same role, so their sum determines the allocation of capital. During financial crises, shocks to bank net worth have an additional effect beyond that in standard financial frictions’ models. This mechanism works through intermediation and affects activity, even if shocks redistribute net worth from banks to firms. I estimate my model and find that the new mechanism accounts for 40% of the fall in output and 80% of the fall in bank net worth during the Great Recession. Finally, the model is consistent with the different dynamics of the share of bank loans in total firm debt and credit spreads during the recessions of 1990, 2001, and 2008.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 29 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 67Details
- Abstract
- This paper contributes to the debate concerning the benefits and disadvantages of introducing a European Sovereign Bond-Backed Securitisation (SBBS) to address the need for a common safe asset that would break destabilising bank-sovereign linkages. The analysis focuses on assessing the effectiveness of hedges incurred while making markets in individual euro area sovereign bonds by taking offsetting positions in one or more of the SBBS tranches. Tranche yields are estimated using a simulation approach. This involves the generation of sovereign defaults and allocation of the combined credit risk premium of all the sovereigns, at the end of each day, to the SBBS tranches according to the seniority of claims under the proposed securitisation. Optimal hedging with SBBS is found to reduce risk exposures substantially in normal market conditions. In volatile conditions, hedging is not very effective but leaves dealers exposed to mostly idiosyncratic risks. These remaining risks largely disappear if dealers are diversified in providing liquidity across country-specific secondary markets and SBBS tranches. Hedging each of the long positions in a portfolio of individual sovereigns results in a risk exposure as low as that borne by holding the safest individual sovereign bond (the Bund).
- JEL Code
- D47 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Market Design
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
- 29 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 66Details
- Abstract
- Brunnermeier et al. (2017) propose the introduction of sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS) in the euro area. It and other papers address how the securitisation would insulate senior security holders from actual default-related losses. This article generalises the assessment by using the VAR-based Diebold & Yilmaz (2012) spillover index methodology to assess potential attenuation of the spillover of shocks in holding-period returns across asset markets from the introduction of SBBS. This is made possible by employing SBBS yields estimated from historical euro area member state sovereign bond yields using Monte Carlo methods, as described in Schönbucher (2003). The econometric results show that (i) SBBS tranching protects senior SBBS holders by reducing the spillover of shocks from the higher-risk peripheral member states to it; (ii) spillovers from high risk sovereigns to a weighted portfolio are much higher than those to the senior SBBS; (iii) a smaller junior SBBS tranche, and the introduction of a mezzanine security, reduces spillover from it to the senior SBBS; and (iv) rolling window analysis indicates that the spillover of shocks from the junior tranche to the senior tranche declines during a period of financial stress.
- JEL Code
- C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
- 29 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 65Details
- Abstract
- The risk reducing benefits of the sovereign bond-backed security (SBBS) proposal of Brunnermeier et al. (2016) have been assessed in terms of the likely losses that different kinds of holders would suffer under simulated default scenarios. However, the effects of mark-to-market losses that may occur when there is rising uncertainty about defaults, or when self-fulfilling destablising dynamics are prevalent, have not yet been examined. We apply the “VAR-for-VaR” method of Manganelli et al. (2015) and the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) approach of Brownlees and Engle (2012, 2017) to estimated yields of SBBS to assess how ex ante exposures and marginal contributions to systemic risk are likely to play-out for different SBBS tranches under various securitisation structures. We compare these with exposures/MES of single sovereigns and a diversified portfolio of sovereigns. We find that the senior SBBS has extremely low ex ante tail risk and that, like the low-risk sovereigns, it acts as a hedge against extreme market-wide yield movements. The mezzanine SBBS has tail risk exposure similar to that of Italian and Spanish bonds. Yields on SBBS appear to be adequate compensation for their risks when compared with single sovereigns or a diversified portfolio.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E53 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
- 29 January 2018
- REPORTSAnnexes
- 29 January 2018
- REPORTS
- 16 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 64Details
- Abstract
- In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales, aimed mainly at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones, and these increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones of similar size and riskiness, and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
- 16 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 63Details
- Abstract
- The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to study the determinants of banks’ net interest margin with a particular focus on the role of maturity transformation, using a new measure of maturity mismatch; second, to analyse the implications for banks of the relaxation of a binding prudential limit on maturity mismatch, in place in Italy until the mid-2000s. The results show that maturity transformation is an important driver of the net interest margin, as higher maturity transformation is typically associated with higher net interest margin. However, there is a limit to this positive relationship as ‘excessive’ maturity transformation — even without leading to systemic vulnerabilities — has some undesirable implications in terms of higher exposure to interest rate risk and lower net interest margin.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 15 January 2018
- REPORTS