22 December 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 33
- Marco D'Errico
- Stefano Battiston
- Tuomas A. Peltonen
- Martin Scheicher
- Abstract
- We develop a framework to analyse the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market as a network of risk transfers among counterparties. From a theoretical perspective, we introduce the notion of flow-of-risk and provide sufficient conditions for a bow-tie network architecture to endogenously emerge as a result of intermediation. This architecture shows three distinct sets of counterparties: i) Ultimate Risk Sellers (URS), ii) Dealers (indirectly connected to each other), iii) Ultimate Risk Buyers (URB). We show that the probability of widespread distress due to counterparty risk is higher in a bow-tie architecture than in more fragmented network structures. Empirically, we analyse a unique global dataset of bilateral CDS exposures on major sovereign and financial reference entities in 2011 −2014. We find the presence of a bow-tie network architecture consistently across both reference entities and time, and thatt the flow-of-risk originates from a large number of URSs (e.g. hedge funds) and ends up in a few leading URBs, most of which are non-banks (in particular asset managers). Finally, the analysis of the CDS portfolio composition of the URBs shows a high level of concentration: in particular, the top URBs often show large exposures to potentially correlated reference entities.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
22 December 2016
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22 December 2016
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22 December 2016
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22 December 2016
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21 December 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 32
- Gustavo Peralta
- Ricardo Crisóstomo
- Abstract
- This paper presents a comprehensive model of financial contagion encompassing both direct and indirect transmission channels. We introduce direct contagion through a 2-layered multiplex network to account for the distinct dynamics resulting from collateralized and uncollateralized transactions. Moreover, the spillover effects of fire sales, haircut prociclicality and liquidity hoarding are specifically considered through indirect transmission channels. This framework allows us to analyze the determinants of systemic crisis and the resilience of different financial network configurations. Our first experiment demonstrates the benefits of counterparty diversification as a way of reducing systemic risk. The second experiment highlights the positive effect of higher initial capital and liquidity levels, while stressing the potentially counterproductive impact of rapidly increasing the minimum capital and liquidity ratios, particularly in times of stress. The third experiment examines the possibility of controlling the maximum haircut rates, although the impact of this measure is modest compared to other alternatives. Finally, our last experiment evidences the fundamental role played by fire sales and market liquidity in either leading or mitigating systemic crises.
- JEL Code
- C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
21 December 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 31
- Matteo Crosignani
- Miguel Faria-e-Castro
- Luís Fonseca
- Abstract
- We study the design of lender of last resort interventions and show that the provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes purchases of high-yield short-term securities by banks. Using a unique security-level data set, we find that the European Central Bank’s three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation incentivized Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds that could be pledged to obtain central bank liquidity. This “collateral trade” effect is large, as banks purchased short-term bonds equivalent to 8.4% of amount outstanding. The resumption of public debt issuance is consistent with a strategic reaction of the debt agency to the observed yield curve steepening.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
6 December 2016
COMMENTARIES
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
28 November 2016
REPORTS
17 November 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 30
- Abstract
- I identify new patterns in countries’ economic performance over the 2007-2014 period based on proximity through distance, trade, and finance to the US subprime mortgage and Eurozone debt crisis areas. To understand the causes of the cross-country variation, I develop an open economy model with two transmission channels that can be shocked separately: international trade and finance. The model is the first to include a government and heterogeneous firms that can default independently of one another and has a novel endogenous cost of sovereign default. I calibrate the model to the average experiences of countries near to and far from the crisis areas. Using these calibrations, disturbances on the order of those observed during the late 2000s are separately applied to each channel to study transmission. The results suggest credit disruption as the primary contagion driver, rather than the trade channel. Given the substantial degree of financial contagion, I run a series of counterfactuals studying the efficacy of capital controls and find that they would be a useful tool for preventing similarly severe contagion in the future, so long as there is not capital immobility to the degree that the local sovereign can default without suffering capital flight.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
F40 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→General
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
F44 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Business Cycles
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
14 November 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 29
- Markus Behn
- Carsten Detken
- Tuomas A. Peltonen
- Willem Schudel
- Abstract
- We estimate a multivariate early-warning model to assess the usefulness of private credit and other macro-financial variables in predicting banking sector vulnerabilities. Using data for 23 European countries, we find that global variables and in particular global credit growth are strong predictors of domestic vulnerabilities. Moreover, domestic credit variables also have high predictive power, but should be complemented by other macro-financial indicators like house price growth and banking sector capitalization that play a salient role in predicting vulnerabilities. Our findings can inform decisions on the activation of macroprudential policy measures and suggest that policy makers should take a broad approach in the analytical models that support risk identification and calibration of tools.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
20 October 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 26
- Abstract
- This paper studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting. I show that, in a large class of economies, knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal, or should be increased or decreased. These variables are: the sensitivity to the exemption level of the interest rate schedule offered by lenders to borrowers, the borrowers’ leverage, the borrowers’ bankruptcy probability, and the change in bankrupt borrowers’ consumption. An application of the framework to US data suggests that the optimal bankruptcy exemption is higher than the current average bankruptcy exemption, but of the same order of magnitude.
- JEL Code
- D52 : Microeconomics→General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium→Incomplete Markets
E21 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Consumption, Saving, Wealth
D14 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Household Saving; Personal Finance
20 October 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 28
- Abstract
- This paper studies the role of the financial sector in a↵ecting domestic resource allocation and cross-border capital flows. I develop a quantitative, two-country, macroeconomic model in which banks face endogenous and occasionally binding leverage constraints. Banks lend funds to be invested in tradable or non-tradable sector capital and there is international financial integration in the market for bank liabilities. I focus on news about economic fundamentals as the key source of fluctuations. Specifically, in the case of positive news on the valuation of non-traded sector capital that turn out to be incorrect at a later date, the model generates an asymmetric, belief-driven boom-bust cycle that reproduces key features of the recent Eurozone crisis. Bank balance sheets amplify and propagate fluctuations through three channels when leverage constraints bind: First, amplified wealth e↵ects induce jumps in import-demand (demand channel). Second, changes in the value of non-tradable sector assets alter bank lending to tradable sector firms (intra-national spillover channel). Third, domestic and foreign households re-adjust their savings in domestic banks, and capital flows further amplify fluctuations (international spillover channel). A common central bank’s unconventional policies of private asset purchases and liquidity facilities in response to unfulfilled expectations are successful at ameliorating the economic downturn.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
20 October 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 27
- Abstract
- Procyclicality of collateral haircuts and margins has become a widely proclaimed behavior and is currently discussed not only by academic literature but also by regulatory authorities in Europe. Procyclicality of haircuts is assumed to be a trigger of liquidity spirals due to its tightening effect of collateral portfolio values in times of market distress. However, empirical evidence on this topic is quite sparse and the discussions are primarily driven by insights derived from theoretical models. Nonetheless, oversight bodies are discussing macroprudential haircut add-ons in order to curb with the potential effects of procyclicality in distressed periods. Based on a unique data set provided by a large European Central Counterparty we construct a measure of systemic illiquidity of bond collaterals and analyze the relationship between haircuts, the development of periods with explosive behavior and systemic illiquidity. We estimate the noise of bond yields to measure systemic illiquidity with and without considering haircuts. We then apply an explosive roots bubble detection technique to identify irrational periods of each of these two time series and to a combination of both. Finally, we propose a quantitative trigger and design for macroprudential haircut add-ons. Our results confirm that (1) bond collateral markets face irrational, i.e. bubble-like illiquidity during periods of systemic distress. The results indicate that (2) haircuts are not amplifying or increasing with systemic illiquidity. (3) The proposed haircut add-on mechanism exhibits desirable features to mitigate systemic illiquidity during lasting periods of distress.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
6 October 2016
REPORTS
6 October 2016
REPORTS
29 September 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
29 September 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
29 September 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
29 September 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
22 September 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 11
- Jorge Abad
- Iñaki Aldasoro
- Christoph Aymanns
- Marco D'Errico
- Peter Hoffmann
- Sam Langfield
- Martin Neychev
- Tarik Roukny
- Linda Rousová
- Abstract
- Policy is only as good as the information at the disposal of policymakers. Few moments illustrate this better than the uncertainty before and after the default of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent decision to stand behind AIG. Authorities were forced to make critical policy decisions, despite being uncertain about counterparties’ exposures and the protection sold against their default. Opacity has been a defining characteristic of over-the-counter derivatives markets – to the extent that they have been labelled “dark markets” (Duffie, 2012). Motivated by the concern that opacity exercerbates crises, the G20 leaders made a decisive push in 2009 for greater transparency in derivatives markets. In Europe, this initiative was formalised in 2012 in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which requires EU entities engaging in derivatives transactions to report them to trade repositories authorised by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). Derivatives markets are thus in the process of becoming one of the most transparent markets for regulators. This paper represents a first analysis of the EU-wide data collected under EMIR. We start by describing the structure of the dataset, drawing comparisons with existing survey-based evidence on derivatives markets. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections, focusing on the three largest derivatives markets (interest rates, foreign exchange and credit).
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 23
- Sergey Chernenko
- Adi Sunderam
- Abstract
- We study liquidity transformation in mutual funds using a novel data set on their cash holdings To provide investors with claims that are more liquid than the underlying assets, funds engage in substantial liquidity management. Specifically, they hold substantial amounts of cash, which they use to accommodate inflows and outflows rather than transacting in the underlying portfolio assets. This is particularly true for funds with illiquid assets and at times of low market liquidity. We provide evidence suggesting that mutual funds’ cash holdings are not large enough to fully mitigate price impact externalities created by the liquidity transformation they engage in.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 22
- Abstract
- This paper provides evidence for regulatory arbitrage within the class of asset-backed securities (ABS) based on individual asset holding data of German banks. I find that banks operating with tight regulatory constraints exploit the low risk-sensitivity of rating-contingent capital requirements for ABS. Unlike unconstrained banks they systematically pick the securities with the highest yield and the lowest collateral performance among ABS with the same regulatory risk weight. This reaching for yield allows constrained banks to increase the return on the capital required for an ABS investment by a factor of four.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 21
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Sam Langfield
- Marco Pagano
- Ricardo Reis
- Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
- Dimitri Vayanos
- Abstract
- The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies—diversification and seniority—can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 25
- Abstract
- This paper develops a theory of the secondary market trading of financial securitities in which endogenous asset market dynamics generate periods of growing aggregate credit volumes and falling credit standards even in the absence of “financial shocks.” Falling credit standards in turn lead to excess risk exposure in the aggregate, precipitating future crises. The credit cycle is triggered by low interest rates, and longer booms lead to sharper crises. Saving gluts and expansionary monetary policy thus lead to financial fragility over time. Pro-cyclical regulation of secondary market traders, such as asset managers or hedge funds, can improve welfare even when such traders are not levered.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
19 September 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 24
- Daniel Garcia-Macia
- Alonso Villacorta
- Abstract
- We analyze the optimality of macroprudential policies in an environment where the role of the banking sector is to efficiently allocate liquid assets across firms. Informational frictions in the banking sector can lead to an interbank market freeze. Firms react to the breakdown of the banking system by inefficiently accumulating liquid assets by themselves. This reduces the demand for bank loans and bank profits, which further disrupts the financial sector and increases the probability of a freeze, inducing firms to hoard even more liquid assets. Liquidity panics provide a new rationale for stricter liquidity requirements, as this policy alleviates the informational frictions in the banking sector and paradoxically can end up increasing aggregate investment. On the contrary, policies encouraging bank lending can have the opposite effect.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
8 August 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 20
- Abstract
- Research on interbank networks and systemic importance is starting to recognise that the web of exposures linking banks balance sheets is more complex than the single-layer-of-exposure approach. We use data on exposures between large European banks broken down by both maturity and instrument type to characterise the main features of the multiplex structure of the network of large European banks. This multiplex network presents positive correlated multiplexity and a high similarity between layers, stemming both from standard similarity analyses as well as a core-periphery analyses of the different layers. We propose measures of systemic importance that fit the case in which banks are connected through an arbitrary number of layers (be it by instrument, maturity or a combination of both). Such measures allow for a decomposition of the global systemic importance index for any bank into the contributions of each of the sub-networks, providing a useful tool for banking regulators and supervisors in identifying tailored policy instruments. We use the dataset of exposures between large European banks to illustrate that both the methodology and the specific level of network aggregation matter in the determination of interconnectedness and thus in the policy making process.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
C67 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Input?Output Models
27 July 2016
NBFI MONITOR REPORT
27 July 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 10
- Laurent Grillet-Aubert
- Jean-Baptiste Haquin
- Clive Jackson
- Neill Killeen
- Christian Weistroffer
- Abstract
- Owing to the disruptive events in the shadow banking system during the global financial crisis, policymakers and regulators have sought to strengthen the monitoring framework and to identify any remaining regulatory gaps. In accordance with its mandate, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has engaged in developing a monitoring framework to assess systemic risks in the European Union (EU) shadow banking sector. This assessment framework provides the basis for the EU Shadow Banking Monitor, which will be published each year by the ESRB. The framework also feeds into the ESRB’s Risk Dashboard, internal risk assessment processes and the formulation and implementation of related macro-prudential policies. The ESRB’s Joint Advisory Technical Committee (ATC)-Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC) Expert Group on Shadow Banking (JEGS) has accordingly engaged in: conducting a stocktake of relevant available data and related data gaps; defining criteria for risk mapping in line with the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in this area; deriving indicators using this methodology for the purposes of the ESRB’s risk monitoring and assessment. Shadow banking can be broadly defined as credit intermediation performed outside the traditional banking system. This is consistent with the definition used at the global level by the FSB. Against this background, this paper describes the structure of the shadow banking system in Europe and discusses a range of methodological issues which must be considered when designing a monitoring framework. The paper applies both an “entity-based” approach and an “activity-based” approach when mapping the broad shadow banking system in the EU. In turn, the analysis focuses primarily on examining liquidity and maturity transformation, leverage, interconnectedness with the regular banking system and credit intermediation when assessing the structural vulnerabilities within the shadow banking system in Europe. This approach appears the most appropriate for the purpose of assessing shadow banking related risks within the EU financial system. On this basis, the paper complements the EU Shadow Banking Monitor by providing further methodological detail on the development of risk metrics. The paper presents the analysis underpinning the construction of risk metrics for the shadow banking system in Europe and highlights a number of areas where more granular data are required in order to monitor risks related to certain market activities and interconnectedness within the broader financial system.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
25 July 2016
ANNUAL REPORT
25 July 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 19
- Abstract
- This paper examines whether banks’ liquidity and maturity mismatch decisions are affected by the choices of competitors and the impact of these coordinated funding liquidity policies on financial stability. Using a novel identification strategy where interactions are structured through decision networks, I show that banks do consider their peers’ liquidity choices when determining their own. This effect is asymmetric and not present in bank capital choices. Importantly, I find that these strategic funding liquidity decisions increase both individual banks’ default risk and overall systemic risk. From a macroprudential perspective, the results highlight the importance of explicitly regulating systemic liquidity risk.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
19 July 2016
REPORTS
13 July 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 18
- Abstract
- This paper examines the investment behavior of different financial institutions in debt securities with a particular focus on their response to price changes. For identification, we use security-level data from the German Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics. Our results suggest that banks and investment funds may destabilize the market by responding in a pro-cyclical manner to price changes. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds buy securities when their prices fall and vice versa. While investment funds and banks sell securities that are trading at a discount and whose prices are falling, they buy securities that are trading at premium and whose prices are rising. The opposite is the case for insurance companies and pension funds. This counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurance companies and pension funds may stabilize markets whenever prices have been pushed away from fundamentals. Since our results suggest that institutions with impermanent balance sheet characteristics may exacerbate price dynamics, it is of crucial importance for financial stability to monitor the investor base as well as the balance sheets of both levered and non-levered investors.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
12 July 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 17
- Markus Behn
- Marco Gross
- Tuomas A. Peltonen
- Abstract
- We develop an integrated Early Warning Global Vector Autoregressive (EW-GVAR) model to quantify the costs and benefits of capital-based macroprudential policy measures. Our findings illustrate that capital-based measures are transmitted both via their impact on the banking system’s resilience and via indirect macro-financial feedback effects. The feedback effects relate to dampened credit and asset price growth and, depending on how banks move to higher capital ratios, can account for up to a half of the overall effectiveness of capitalbased measures. Moreover, we document significant cross-country spillover effects, especially for measures implemented in larger countries. Overall, our model helps to understand how and through which channels changes in capitalization affect bank lending and the wider economy and can inform policy makers on the optimal calibration and timing of capital-based macroprudential instruments.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
30 June 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
30 June 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
30 June 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
30 June 2016
RISK DASHBOARD
28 June 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 16
- Abstract
- This paper analyzes the effect of bank recapitalizations on lending, funding and asset quality of European banks between 2000 and 2013. Controlling for market implied capital shortfall of banks, we find that banks that receive a sufficiently large recapitalization increase lending, attract more deposits and clean up their balance sheets. In contrast, banks that receive a small recapitalization relative to their capital shortfall reduce lending and shrink assets. These results suggest recapitalizations need to be large enough to lead to new lending.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
28 June 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 15
- Abstract
- This paper measures the joint default risk of financial institutions by exploiting information about counterparty risk in credit default swaps (CDS). A CDS contract written by a bank to insure against the default of another bank is exposed to the risk that both banks
default. From CDS spreads we can then learn about the joint default risk of pairs of banks. From bond prices we can learn the individual default probabilities. Since knowing individual and pairwise probabilities is not sufficient to fully characterize multiple default
risk, I derive the tightest bounds on the probability that many banks fail simultaneously.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
28 June 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 14
- Claire Célérier
- Boris Vallée
- Abstract
- This study investigates the rationale for issuing complex securities to retail investors. We focus on a large market of investment products targeted exclusively at households: retail structured products in Europe. We develop an economic measure of product complexity in this market via a text analysis of 55,000 product payoff formulas. Over the 2002–2010 period, product complexity increases, risky products become more common, and product headline rates diverge from the prevailing interest rates as the latter decline. The complexity of a product is positively correlated with its headline rate and risk. Complex products appear more profitable to the banks distributing them, have a lower expost performance, and are more frequently sold by banks targeting low-income households. These empirical facts are consistent with banks strategically using product complexity to cater to yield-seeking households.
- JEL Code
- I22 : Health, Education, and Welfare→Education and Research Institutions→Educational Finance, Financial Aid
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
D18 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Consumer Protection
D12 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
9 June 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 13
- Matthieu Gomez
- Augustin Landier
- David Sraer
- David Thesmar
- Abstract
- We show that the cash-flow exposure of banks to interest rate risk, or income gap, affects the transmission of monetary policy shocks to bank lending and real activity. We first use a large panel of U.S. banks to show that the sensitivity of bank profits to interest rates increases significantly with measured income gap, even when banks use interest rate derivatives. We then document that, in the cross-section of banks, income gap predicts the sensitivity of bank lending to interest rates. The effect of income gap is larger or similar in magnitudes to that of previously identified factors, such as leverage, bank size or even asset liquidity. To alleviate the concern that this result is driven by the endogenous matching of banks and firms, we use loan-level data and compare the supply of credit to the same firm by banks with different income gap. This analysis allows us to trace the impact of banks’ income gap on firm borrowing capacity, investment and employment, which we find to be significant.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
3 June 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 12
- Arnold Polanski
- Evarist Stoja
- Abstract
- We define tail interdependence as a situation where extreme outcomes for some variables are informative about such outcomes for other variables. We extend the concept of multiinformation to quantify tail interdependence, decompose it into systemic and residual interdependence and measure the contribution of a constituent to the interdependence of a system. Further, we devise statistical procedures to test: a) tail independence, b) whether an empirical interdependence structure is generated by a theoretical model and c) symmetry of the interdependence structure in the tails. We outline some additional extensions and illustrate this framework by applying it to several datasets.
- JEL Code
- C12 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Hypothesis Testing: General
C14 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
C52 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
2 May 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 11
- Carlo Altavilla
- Marco Pagano
- Saverio Simonelli
- Abstract
- Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the causes and effects of banks’ sovereign exposures during and after the euro crisis. First, in the vulnerable countries, the publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to sovereign stress by increasing their domestic sovereign holdings more than other banks, suggesting that their choices were affected both by moral suasion and by yield-seeking. Second, their exposures significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending. This amplification of the impact on lending cannot be ascribed to spurious correlation or reverse causality.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
2 May 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 10
- Charles Boissel
- François Derrien
- Evren Örs
- David Thesmar
- Abstract
- How do crises affect Central clearing Counterparties (CCPs)? We focus on CCPs that clear and guarantee a large and safe segment of the repo market during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We start by developing a simple framework to infer CCP stress, which can be measured through the sensitivity of repo rates to sovereign CDS spreads. Such sensitivity jointly captures three effects: (1) the effectiveness of the haircut policy, (2) CCP member default risk (conditional on sovereign default) and (3) CCP default risk (conditional on both sovereign and CCP member default). The data show that, during the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, repo rates strongly respond to movements in sovereign risk, in particular for GIIPS countries, indicating significant CCP stress. Our model suggests that repo investors behaved as if the conditional probability of CCP default was very large.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
2 May 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 9
- Anne-Laure Delatte
- Julien Fouquau
- Richard Portes
- Abstract
- Previous work has documented a greater sensitivity of long-term government bond yields to fundamentals in Euro area stress countries during the euro crisis, but we know little about the driver(s) of regimeswitches. Our estimates based on a panel smooth threshold regression model quantify and explain them: 1) investors have penalized a deterioration of fundamentals more strongly from 2010 to 2012; 2) a key indicator of regime switch is the premium of the financial credit default swap index: the higher the bank credit risk, the higher the extra premium on fundamentals; 3) after ECB President Draghi’s speech in July 2012, it took one year to restore the non-crisis regime and suppress the extra premium.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
20 April 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 8
- Filippo Ippolito
- José-Luis Peydró
- Andrea Polo
- Enrico Sette
- Abstract
- By providing liquidity to depositors and credit line borrowers, banks are exposed to doubleruns on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, pre-shock interbank exposure is (unconditionally) unrelated to post-shock credit line drawdowns. However, conditioning on firm observable and unobservable characteristics, higher pre-shock interbank exposure implies more post-shock drawdowns. We show that is the result of active pre-shock liquidity risk management by more exposed banks granting credit lines to firms that run less in a crisis.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
12 April 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 7
- Alexander Schäfer
- Isabel Schnabel
- Beatrice Weder di Mauro
- Abstract
- The declared intention of policy makers is that future bank restructuring should be conducted through bail-in rather than bail-out. Over the past years there have been a few cases of European banks being restructured where creditors were bailed in. This paper exploits these events to investigate the market reactions of stock prices and credit default swap (CDS) spreads of European banks in order to gauge the extent to which it is expected that bail-in will indeed become the new regime. We find evidence of increased CDS spreads and falling stock prices most notably after the bail-in in Cyprus. However, bail-in expectations appear to depend on the sovereign’s fiscal strength, i. e., reactions are stronger for banks in countries with limited fiscal space for bail-out. Moreover, actual bail-ins lead to stronger market reactions than the legal implementation of bank resolution regimes, supporting the saying that actions speak louder than words.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
24 March 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 6
- Agustín S. Bénétrix
- Philip R. Lane
- Abstract
- This paper first documents the foreign currency exposures of Switzerland in the 2002-2012 period. We find that the large scale of the Swiss international balance sheet means that movements in the Swiss Franc generate large cross-border valuation
effects. Second, we examine the Swiss Franc holdings of the rest of the world and highlight differences in exposures between advanced and emerging economies.
- JEL Code
- F31 : International Economics→International Finance→Foreign Exchange
O24 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Development Planning and Policy→Trade Policy, Factor Movement Policy, Foreign Exchange Policy
24 March 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 5
- Puriya Abbassi
- Rajkamal Iyer
- José-Luis Peydró
- Francesc R. Tous
- Abstract
- We analyze securities trading by banks during the crisis and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. We use a proprietary dataset that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005-2012 in conjunction with the credit register from Germany. We find that – during the crisis – banks with higher trading expertise (trading banks) increase their investments in securities, especially in those that had a larger price drop, with the strongest impact in low-rated and long-term securities. Moreover, trading banks reduce their credit supply, and the credit crunch is binding at the firm level. All of the effects are more pronounced for trading banks with higher capital levels. Finally, banks use central bank liquidity and government subsidies like public recapitalization and implicit guarantees mainly to support trading of securities. Overall, our results suggest an externality arising from fire sales in securities markets on credit supply via the trading behavior of banks.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
24 March 2016
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11 March 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 4
- Tatiana Didier
- Ross Levine
- Sergio L. Schmukler
- Abstract
- How many and which firms issue equity and bonds in domestic and international markets, how do these firms grow relative to non-issuing firms, and how does firm performance vary along the firm size distribution (FSD)? To evaluate these questions, we construct a new dataset by matching data on firm-level capital raising activity with balance sheet data for 45,527 listed firms in 51 countries. Three main patterns emerge from the analysis. (1) Only a few large firms issue equity or bonds, and among them a small subset has raised a large proportion of the funds raised during the 1990s and 2000s. (2) Issuers grow faster than non-issuers in terms of assets, sales, and employment, i.e., firms do not simply use securities markets to adjust their financial accounts. (3) The FSD of issuers evolves differently from that of non-issuers, tightening among issuers and widening among non-issuers.
- JEL Code
- F65 : International Economics→Economic Impacts of Globalization→Finance
G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G31 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Capital Budgeting, Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies, Capacity
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
L25 : Industrial Organization→Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior→Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
11 March 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3
- Anatoli Segura
- Javier Suarez
- Abstract
- We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006 yields that lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion, while the lengthening induced by the NSRF would be too drastic.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
23 February 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2
- Dirk Schoenmaker
- Peter Wierts
- Abstract
- Financial supervision focuses on the aggregate (macroprudential) in addition to the individual (microprudential). But an agreed framework for measuring and addressing financial imbalances is lacking. We propose a holistic approach for the financial system as a whole, beyond banking. Building on our model of financial amplification, the financial cycle is the key variable for measuring financial imbalances. The cycle can be curbed by leverage restrictions that might vary across countries. We make concrete policy proposals for the design of macroprudential instruments to simplify the current framework and make it more consistent.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
23 February 2016
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1
- Abstract
- This paper examines the cyclical behaviour of country-level macro-financial variables under EMU. Monetary union strengthened the covariation pattern between the output cycle and the financial cycle, while macro-financial policies at national and area-wide levels were insufficiently counter-cyclical during the 2003-2007 boom period. We critically examine the policy reform agenda required to improve macro-financial stability.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E65 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
11 February 2016
ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT - No. 6
- Daniel Gros
- Philip R. Lane
- Sam Langfield
- Sini Matikainen
- Marco Pagano
- Dirk Schoenmaker
- Javier Suarez
- Abstract
- Keeping global warming below 2°C will require substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades. To reduce emissions, economies must reduce their carbon intensity; given current technology, this implies a decisive shift away from fossil-fuel energy and related physical capital. In an adverse scenario, the transition to a low-carbon economy occurs late and abruptly. Belated awareness about the importance of controlling emissions could result in an abrupt implementation of quantity constraints on the use of carbon-intensive energy sources. The costs of the transition will be correspondingly higher. This adverse scenario could affect systemic risk via three main channels. First, a sudden transition away from fossil-fuel energy could harm GDP, as alternative sources of energy would be restricted in supply and more expensive at the margin. Second, there could be a sudden repricing of carbon-intensive assets, which are financed in large part by debt. Third, there could be a concomitant rise in the incidence of natural catastrophes related to climate change, raising general insurers' and reinsurers' liabilities. To quantify the importance of these channels, policymakers could aim for enhanced disclosure of the carbon intensity of non-financial firms. The related exposures of financial firms could then be stress-tested under the adverse scenario of a late and sudden transition. In the short-term, joint research efforts of energy experts and macroeconomists could help to better quantify macroeconomic risks and inform the design of scenarios for stress testing. In the medium-term, the availability of granular data and dedicated low-frequency stress tests will provide information about the impact of the adverse scenario on the financial system.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
26 January 2016
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 9
- Laurent Clerc
- Alberto Giovannini
- Sam Langfield
- Tuomas A. Peltonen
- Richard Portes
- Martin Scheicher
- Abstract
- An epidemiologist calculating the risk of a localised epidemic becoming a global pandemic would investigate every possible channel of contagion from the infected region to the rest of the world. Focusing on, say, the incidence of close human contact would underestimate the pandemic risk if the disease could also spread through the air. Likewise, calculating the quantity of financial system risk requires practitioners to understand all of the channels through which small and local shocks can become big and global. Much of the empirical finance literature has focused only on “direct” contagion arising from firms’ contractual obligations. Direct contagion occurs if one firm’s default on its contractual obligations triggers distress (such as illiquidity or insolvency) at a counterparty firm. But contractual obligations are not the only means by which financial distress can spread, just as close human contact is not the only way that many infectious diseases are transmitted. Focusing only on direct contagion underestimates the risk of financial crisis given that other important channels exist. This paper represents an attempt to move systemic risk analysis closer to the holism of epidemiology. In doing so, we begin by identifying the fundamental channels of indirect contagion, which manifest even in the absence of direct contractual links. The first is the market price channel, in which scarce funding liquidity and low market liquidity reinforce each other, generating a vicious spiral. The second is information spillovers, in which bad news can adversely affect a broad range of financial firms and markets. Indirect contagion spreads market failure through these two channels. In the case of illiquidity spirals, firms do not internalise the negative externality of holding low levels of funding liquidity or of fire-selling assets into a thin market. Lack of information and information asymmetries can cause markets to unravel, even following a relatively small piece of bad news. In both cases, market players act in ways that are privately optimal but socially harmful. The spreading of market failure by indirect contagion motivates policy intervention. Substantial progress has been made in legislating for policies that will improve systemic resilience to indirect contagion. But more tools might be needed to achieve a fully effective and efficient macroprudential policy framework. This paper aims to frame a high-level policy discussion on three policy tools that could be effective and efficient in ensuring systemic resilience to indirect contagion – namely macroprudential liquidity regulation; restrictions on margins and haircuts; and information disclosure.
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
4 January 2016
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