# Working Paper Series
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Credit default swap spreads and
systemic financial risk

by
Stefano Giglio

ESRB
European Systemic Risk Board
European System of Financial Supervision

Abstract

This paper measures the joint default risk of financial institutions by exploiting information about counterparty risk in credit default swaps (CDS). A CDS contract written by a bank to insure against the default of another bank is exposed to the risk that both banks default. From CDS spreads we can then learn about the joint default risk of pairs of banks. From bond prices we can learn the individual default probabilities. Since knowing individual and pairwise probabilities is not sufficient to fully characterize multiple default risk, I derive the tightest bounds on the probability that many banks fail simultaneously.

1 Introduction

The market for credit default swaps (CDS), contracts that insure against a default event, is an over-the-counter market dominated by large financial intermediaries. These banks buy and sell insurance against the default of a variety of entities, like firms and countries; often, they also insure against the default of other large banks.

Since the bank that sells the CDS contract can default, the buyer of the CDS is exposed to counterparty risk. In particular, suppose that bank A sells a credit default swap against bank B. The CDS price then reflects the individual probability that B defaults as well as the joint probability that A and B default: the purchaser of the CDS may not receive the promised insurance payment from A, if when B defaults A defaults as well. Such counterparty risk can significantly lower the CDS spread (the value of the insurance) when the risk of joint default of the two banks is high – as during systemic risk episodes. At the same time, the price of bank-issued bonds is not affected by counterparty risk: bond prices reflect only individual default probabilities.

Bond prices together with the prices of CDSs written by banks against other banks, therefore, contain information about individual and pairwise default risk of these financial institutions. In this paper, I show how to combine CDS and bond price data to infer the probability of joint default of several banks and ultimately measure systemic risk in financial markets. This represents an improvement over traditional measures that only use CDS or bond data separately, since it allows to observe direct information about the joint default probabilities across banks.

While using bond and CDS data together gives us more information about joint default risks, individual and pairwise probabilities alone do not completely pin down the probability that *many* banks default together, which is what constitutes systemic risk. To construct a measure of systemic risk, strong functional form assumptions are usually imposed on the joint distribution function of defaults. In this paper, instead, I show how to construct bounds on the probability that several banks default together, derived without imposing any assumption about the shape of the joint distribution function. In particular, I show how the problem of finding the maximum and minimum probability of joint default of several banks consistent with the observed bond and CDS prices can be reformulated as a linear programming problem, which can be easily solved numerically even when the number of banks considered is large. In addition, the linear programming approach allows me to compute the contribution to systemic risk of each individual institution, at the upper and lower bound of joint default risk.

Using CDS and bond data from 2004 to 2010, I compute the tightest bounds on the probability that at least r out of 15 large financial institutions default within a month, for different values of r ranging from 1 to 4. The bounds on systemic risk that I calculate reveal

features of the evolution of systemic risk that are missed by most other measures that do not have *direct* information on joint default risks.

First, systemic risk measures based on either bond prices or CDS prices (but not both together) indicate a sharp increase in systemic risk already in 2007.[1] Figure 1 reports two (very simple) examples of such measures, the average CDS spread and the average bond yield spread[2] of the 15 largest financial institutions. Using information on joint default risk, I can actually exclude a large increase in systemic default risk before Bear Stearns' failure in March 2008. Only after March 2008 systemic risk increases sharply, reaching a peak in early 2009. Therefore, the combination of bonds and CDS prices allows us to better measure the timing of the rise in systemic risk.

More generally, using my methodology I can decompose some of the observed spikes in CDS and bond spreads (visible in Figure 1) into *idiosyncratic* versus *systemic* risk. For example, I can exclude that the spike in CDS spreads observed in the month before Bear Stearns' collapse corresponded to an increase in systemic risk. Similarly, only part of the rise in spreads observed in the month after Lehman's default can be due to an increase in systemic risk. In the paper I show that only by considering *all* the information contained in individual bond and CDS spreads one can decompose the idiosyncratic and systematic part of the spreads' movements. Simpler measures that do not use all information in bonds and CDSs will miss these patterns and mistake idiosyncratic risk for systemic risk during those episodes.

Besides obtaining informative results about the *level* of systemic risk during the crisis, the approach allows us to compute the individual contribution to systemic risk of each bank, as well as the joint default probabilities of subsets of banks. From this analysis, we learn that more than one month before their simultaneous collapse, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were already indicated (by bond and CDS prices) as the pair of banks with the highest possible probability of joint default. In addition, Lehman Brothers appears from the estimates as the bank whose contribution to systemic risk was highest all the way since March 2008.

The approach to measuring systemic risk employed in this paper differs from other systemic risk measures that also use bond or CDS data, but only extract *individual* default probabilities from CDS spreads or bond prices – ignoring counterparty risk. To fully characterize the *joint* distribution function of defaults, they make strong assumptions about the shape of this distribution, for example imposing multivariate normality of returns.[3] All the

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[1] For example, Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009).

[2] The bond yield spread is defined as the bond yield minus the yield of the Treasury bond of corresponding maturity.

[3] If some additional parameters need to be specified after choosing a certain copula (for example correlations), these are usually estimated from historical data. Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009), Avesani, Pascual and Li (2006) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) are prominent examples of this approach.

information about tail events these measures employ comes only from the individual default probabilities. In Section 4.4, I compare my results with a measure of systemic risk obtained from a standard multivariate normal model, that uses bond spreads to extract individual default probabilities. The comparison shows that the strong functional form assumptions may lead to underestimating systemic risk in some periods; in other periods, instead, the normal model overestimates systemic risk, because it ignores the additional restrictions on systemic risk derived from the pricing of counterparty risk in CDS spreads. In fact, in the paper I show that ignoring the effect of counterparty risk in CDS spreads can actually bias the results of these measures, since in periods of high systemic risk, counterparty risk lowers the observed CDS spreads – which will then be interpreted as a lower amount of default risk.[4]

The market-based approach of this paper (that uses information about future defaults embedded in current market prices) has also several advantages over non-market-based approaches to measure systemic risk. Relative to reduced-form measures that estimate the joint default probabilities using historical data on returns,[5] the bounds constructed in this paper have the advantage of immediately incorporating new information as soon as it is reflected in prices. In addition, the bounds – based on forward-looking market prices – do not need to rely on a few data points to estimate the *tails* of the distributions, as reduced-form historical returns measures do. Relative to structural measures of default based on the Merton (1974) model,[6] the measure I construct requires less stringent assumptions about the liability structure of financial institutions.

Three limitations affect the empirical construction of the bounds. First, the presence of an unobserved liquidity process in the bond market confounds the estimation of individual default probabilities. Second, for every bank, I observe only an average of the CDS quotes across counterparties, rather than counterparty-specific quotes. Third, I obtain bounds on risk-neutral, not objective, probabilities of systemic events.[7] Risk-neutral probabilities are interesting since they reveal the markets' combined perception of the probability and severity of these states of the world. In addition, they can be considered upper bounds on the objective default probabilities, as long as default states are states with high marginal utility.

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[4]An alternative approach, followed by Longstaff and Rajan (2008) and Bhansali, Gingrich and Longstaff (2008), looks directly at the price of tranches of portfolios of CDSs. To measure the joint default risk of large financial intermediaries, we would need to observe the prices of tranches of portfolios of CDSs of the main financial institutions, while in practice we observe portfolios of more than a hundred firms, both financials and nonfinancials (like the CDX).

[5]Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) are recent examples of measures based on historical returns data.

[6]For example, Lehar (2005) and Gray et al. (2008) apply the Merton (1974) model to estimating joint default probabilities.

[7]Anderson (2009) underlines the differences between the two by comparing risk-neutral default processes obtained from CDS spreads with objective processes obtained using historical data on defaults.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the bounds allow us to learn significant information about the evolution of systemic risk during the financial crisis.

The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing the role of counterparty risk in CDS contracts in section 2, section 3 shows how to construct the optimal probability bounds. Section 4 presents the empirical results on the evolution of systemic risk during the financial crisis, and section 5 concludes.

2   CDSs and Counterparty Risk

2.1   The CDS Market – an Introduction

In a typical CDS contract, the protection seller offers the protection buyer insurance against the default of an underlying bond issued by a certain company, called the reference entity. The seller commits to buy the bond from the protection buyer for a price equal to its face value in the event of default by the reference entity (or other defined credit event). In some cases, the contract is cash settled, so that the seller directly pays the buyer the difference between the face value and the recovery value of the bond.[8] The buyer pays a quarterly premium, the *CDS spread*, quoted as an annualized percentage of the notional value insured. If default occurs, the contract terminates. If default does not occur during the life of the contract, the contract terminates at its maturity date.

While in general these contracts are traded over the counter and can be customized by the buyer and the seller, in recent years they have become more standardized, following the guidelines of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The CDS market is quite liquid, at least for the 5-year maturity contract, with low transaction costs to initiate a contract with a market maker on short notice, and with numerous dealers posting quotes (see Blanco et al. (2005) and Longstaff et al. (2005)). Reliable quotes for the 5-year maturity CDS can be obtained through several financial data providers (e.g. Bloomberg, Markit).

The CDS market has grown quickly in the last few years. Notional exposures grew from about \$5 trillion in 2004 to around \$60 trillion at its peak in 2007, and despite the financial crisis, the total notional exposure (total amount insured) is still around \$40 trillion. The high liquidity of the CDS market has made it the easiest way to adjust exposures to credit risk, and has been the primary reason for its growth. As a consequence, rather than trading in the bond market or canceling agreements already in place, adjustments of credit exposures have mostly been achieved by simply entering new CDS contracts, possibly offsetting existing ones. At the center of this network of CDS contracts, a few main dealers operate with very high

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[8]See Appendix C for more details on the contract.

gross and low net exposures, emerging as the main counterparties in the market. For example, Fitch Ratings (2006) states that in 2006 the top 10 counterparties accounted for about 89% of the total protection sold. With the crisis, the market concentrated even more after some of its key players disappeared.

2.2 Counterparty Risk

Traded over the counter, a CDS contract involves counterparty risk: the protection seller may go bankrupt during the life of the CDS and therefore might not be able to comply with the commitments arising from the contract.[9] When the counterparty goes bankrupt, the contract terminates and a claim arises equal to the current value of the contract. A buyer of a CDS contract is then exposed to the risk that when the seller defaults, the credit risk of the reference entity is higher than it was when the contract was originated. In this case, the buyer has a claim against the bankrupt counterparty, which might be difficult to recover in full. The larger the increase in the CDS spread of the reference entity (its credit risk) when the seller defaults, the larger the amount the seller owes the buyer. In the extreme case, in which the bankruptcy of the seller occurs simultaneously with the default of the reference entity, the payment due to the buyer would be equal to the full notional value of the CDS, and the buyer would have a very large claim against the bankrupt counterparty. The buyer risks not to get paid exactly in the one state where the CDS contract is supposed to pay off, thus greatly reducing the ex-ante value of the insurance.

The CDS buyer can be exposed to a large loss even without a simultaneous default of the reference entity and the seller. For example, the reference entity might default *after* the seller defaults, but the default risk of the reference already jumps when the seller goes bankrupt. In this case the amount the buyer has to claim against the bankrupt seller can be very high. Alternatively, the buyer might suffer a large loss if the default of the reference entity triggers the subsequent default of the counterparty, for example if the latter is not adequately hedged. All these cases – collectively referred to as *double default* cases – are relevant for the value of the CDS to the buyer even though the two defaults do not occur simultaneously: in all these cases the buyer finds herself with a large amount owed by the bankrupt counterparty.

The value of the CDS protection crucially depends on how much of this claim the buyer can expect to recover from the counterparty in bankruptcy. Like other derivatives, CDS claims are protected by "safe harbor" provisions. These provisions exempt claimants from the automatic

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[9]The role of counterparty risk in CDS spreads has been studied by Hull and White (2001), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow and Yu (2001), and more recently by Arora, Gandhi and Longstaff (2012) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2012). To mitigate counterparty risk, which stems mainly from the over-the-counter nature of the contract, there are now several proposals to create a centralized clearinghouse. For a detailed discussion, see Duffie and Zhu (2011).

stay of the assets of the firms, so that the buyers can immediately seize any collateral that has been posted for them, as discussed below. Additionally, positions across different derivatives with the same counterparty can be netted against each other. The latter fact potentially increases the recovery in case of counterparty default, but only if the buyer finds herself with large enough out-of-the-money positions with the seller, when the seller defaults, to offset the counterparty exposure arising from the CDS contract.

For all amounts that remain after netting and seizing posted collateral, the buyer is an *unsecured* creditor in the bankruptcy process, and as such is exposed to potentially large losses (Roe 2011).

2.3   The Pricing of Counterparty Risk: a Simple Example

A simple two-period example of the pricing of bonds and CDSs can be useful to understand the role of counterparty risk for CDS prices. Suppose that N dealers issue zero-coupon bonds with a face value of \$1 maturing at time 1, and consider the CDS contract written at time 0 by each of them against the default of each other. Call A_i the event of default of institution i at time 1. Call $P(A_i)$ the probability of default of bank i, and $P(A_i \cap A_j)$ the probability of joint default of i and j at time 1. All probabilities are risk-neutral. Call R the expected recovery rate on the unsecured bond in case of default, and suppose that in the event of joint default the CDS claim recovers a fraction S. Note that $S \geq R$ since as an unsecured creditor the buyer of CDS protection would obtain R in bankruptcy court, but netting and collateralization mean that she might recover part of the amount even before going to court. Finally, assume that the risk-free rate between periods 0 and 1 is zero.

In this setting, the price of the bond issued by i, p_i, is determined as:

$$p_i = (1 - P(A_i)) + P(A_i)R \tag{1}$$

If there is no counterparty risk in the CDS contract, the insurance premium z_i, or CDS spread, paid at time 0 to insure that bond is:

$$z_i = P(A_i)(1 - R)$$

since the CDS pays the amount *not* recovered by the bond $(1 - R)$ in case of default. An arbitrage relation then links the bond and the CDS (Longstaff et al. (2005)): $z_i = 1 - p_i$.

Consider now the case in which there is counterparty risk in the CDS contract. Then, the spread paid to buy insurance from j against i's default will be:

$$z_{ji} = [P(A_i) - P(A_i \cap A_j)] (1 - R) + P(A_i \cap A_j)(1 - R)S$$

$$= [P(A_i) - (1 - S)P(A_i \cap A_j)] (1 - R) \qquad (2)$$

since the buyer of protection obtains the full payment $(1 - R)$ if the reference entity defaults alone, and only a fraction S of it otherwise. The spread z_{ji} decreases with the probability of joint default $P(A_i \cap A_j)$; the arbitrage relation with the bond is broken. Note that the effect of counterparty risk, $(1 - S)P(A_i \cap A_j)$, could be as large as the default risk itself, $P(A_i)$. Only if defaults are independent we would have $P(A_i \cap A_j) = P(A_i)P(A_j)$, but this is unlikely to be the case for financial intermediaries even at short horizons, as visible during financial crises.

Importantly, equation (2) shows that by *only* looking at CDS spreads it is not possible to distinguish the component of the CDS spread that comes from the risk of the reference entity, $P(A_i)$, from the joint default risk with the counterparty, $P(A_i \cap A_j)$, since the spread z_{ji} depends on both. Therefore, unless one makes additional assumptions, it is not possible to detect counterparty risk in CDSs using CDS data alone. For example, Arora et al. (2012) study the cross-section of CDS prices across counterparties under the assumption that given a reference entity i, counterparty risk of i with each counterparty j is captured by $P(A_j)$, not by $P(A_i \cap A_j)$ as the theory would predict.[10]

From equation (2) we also see that ignoring counterparty risk biases the estimates of default probability extracted from CDS spreads downwards. In particular, measures of systemic risk obtained by averaging the CDS spreads of banks (as in Figure 1) depend *negatively* on averages of $P(A_i \cap A_j)$ across i and j. If joint default risk increases, these measures would then decrease, and erroneously suggest a decrease in systemic risk.

2.4   Collateral Agreements and Counterparty Risk

In order to protect buyers against counterparty risk, some (but not all) CDS contracts involve a collateral agreement. The presence of collateral improves the recovery of the contract in case of counterparty default (in the notation of the example presented above, it increases S). Under the standard collateral agreement, a small margin is posted at the inception of the contract. Subsequent collateral calls are tied to changes in the value of the CDS contract, as well as to the credit risk of the seller.

While helpful in reducing counterparty exposure, collateral agreements cannot eliminate

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[10]In the empirical analysis of Section 4, in which I allow for individual and joint default probabilities to move independently, I find that this assumption is often violated: the pairwise probabilities behave quite differently from the individual ones.

counterparty risk. No CDS contract can be collateralized at all times to cover the full claim potentially arising from a double default, since the event of double default cannot be fully anticipated, and posting large amounts of excess collateral would be very costly. In practice, the *gap* between the amount of collateral posted at each point in time and the claim that can arise in case of double default can be very large. First, according to the ISDA Margin Survey 2008, only about 66% of the nominal exposure in credit derivatives, of which CDSs are the most important type, had a collateral agreement at all in 2007 and 2008;[11] in addition, collateral agreements were employed much less frequently when the counterparty was a large dealer. Second, margins were often posted at a less than daily frequency: only 61% of all trades executed by large dealers had daily collateral adjustment, most of which concentrated in inter-dealer trades. For 26% of trades by large dealers margins were not adjusted regularly. Finally, often collateral posted was *lower* than the current value of the position. Even the CDS buyer that most aggressively called for collateral during the crisis, Goldman Sachs, wasn't always fully covered on its CDS exposures with other large dealers (in particular, AIG).[12] More generally, the sudden nature of default events imposes counterparty risk even when the *current* value of the positions is fully covered by collateral: the jump-to-default risk will not be eliminated by collateral.

The Lehman bankruptcy is an interesting example of the limits of collateralization. Before the weekend of September during which Lehman collapsed and two other large financial institutions were bailed out (Merrill Lynch and AIG), low CDS spreads were suggesting a small risk of bankruptcy of those institutions. The joint shock to the three institutions was certainly not anticipated, and the amount of collateral posted before the collapse was small. For example, someone who bought a 5-year Lehman CDS a month before its default would have been in the money, on Friday September 12th, by about 15 cents on the dollar; this would have been the amount of collateral in her possession if the contract was fully collateralized. The next day, once Lehman defaulted, she would have been owed by her counterparties 92 cents on the dollar, an amount much higher than the collateral posted. As it turned out, thanks to the government bailout of Merrill Lynch and AIG, a double default event did *not* materialize. However, these events show that the risk of simultaneous collapse of several banks is relevant, and that standard collateralization practices would not have prevented large losses to buyers of CDS contracts, had the government decided not to intervene.

It is worth discussing here a recent study of counterparty risk pricing by Arora et al. (2012), who have access to proprietary data that report the quotes posted by different counterparties.

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[11]This number went up to 93% in 2011 as collateralization became more widely used.

[12]The documents reported in Appendix A refer specifically to a large amount ($22bn) of CDS protection bought by Goldman from AIG on super-senior tranches of CDOs, but arguably similar practices were used on all credit derivatives instruments.

They document that dealers with high CDS spreads posted quotes systematically lower than the other dealers for the same reference entity, and especially so after Lehman's bankruptcy. However, they also report that for most reference entities, the difference is small, in the order of a few basis points. This suggests that counterparty risk may only be partially incorporated into CDS prices; however, it is important to take into account the following considerations.

First, the study looks at the relation between the price quoted by each dealer and its *marginal* – or individual – default risk, as captured by the CDS spread against the counterparty. However, what matters for CDS pricing is the *joint* default risk of the reference entity and the counterparty; the results I present in the paper (see for example Section 4.3) show that there can be a significant difference between marginal and pairwise default risk, and this may translate into a weak observed relation between marginal default risk and the quotes posted by the dealers. Second, the study looks at the cross-sectional variation of quotes across counterparties around the daily average (i.e., controlling for day fixed effects): therefore, the exercise filters out all components of counterparty risk which are common to all dealers. Given that the financial crisis affected several large financial institutions at the same time, this common effect could be quite large, if not dominant. The bounds I construct are based only on the *average* quote and therefore do not depend on the cross-sectional dispersion around it at all: on this respect, the results obtained in this paper complement those in Arora et al. (2012). Finally, in this paper I allow – but do not impose – counterparty risk to explain part of the difference between bond yields and CDS spreads. To the extent that in fact counterparty risk was *not* priced in these securities, this will be reflected in the empirical results.

To conclude, the presence of collateral agreements improves but does not solve the problem of counterparty risk related to double default: the amount owed by the CDS seller in case of double default may be very large, and for the reasons specified above it may easily exceed the collateral posted. Appendix A reports more evidence on the limits of collateralization. The Appendix also shows that buyers of CDSs were aware of this residual counterparty risk even before the crisis hit[13], and frequently believed that the best way to reduce their remaining counterparty exposure was to buy additional CDS protection *against their counterparty*, which directly increased the cost of buying CDS protection.

3   Construction of the probability bounds

This section shows how to construct probability bounds on systemic risk for a network of banks in which bond and CDS prices are observed, starting with a simple 3-bank example.

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[13]For example, Barclays Capital issued a report in February 2008, "Counterparty Risk in Credit Markets", precisely on the effect of counterparty risk on CDS prices.

3.1 Introductory example: 3 banks

Consider a two-period setting, and suppose that the financial sector consists of only three intermediaries – banks 1, 2 and 3. Protection against the default of $i \in I \equiv \{1, 2, 3\}$ must be bought from a bank $j \in I \backslash i$, i.e. one of the other two intermediaries. By inverting the pricing formulas (1) and (2), if we observe all bond prices p_i and all CDS spreads z_{ji}, we can learn the marginal default probabilities of each bank as well as the pairwise default probabilities for each pair (i, j) of banks. For example, from bond and CDS spreads we might obtain:

$$P(A_i) = 0.2 \ \ \forall i$$
$$P(A_1 \cap A_2) = P(A_2 \cap A_3) = 0.07, \ \ P(A_1 \cap A_3) = 0.01 \tag{3}$$

We can measure systemic risk by studying P_r, the probability of joint default of *at least* r financial intermediaries:

$$P_1 = P(A_1 \cup A_2 \cup A_3) \tag{4}$$
$$P_2 = P((A_1 \cap A_2) \cup (A_2 \cap A_3) \cup (A_1 \cap A_3)) \tag{5}$$
$$P_3 = P(A_1 \cap A_2 \cap A_3) \tag{6}$$

Information about individual and pairwise probabilities is insufficient to fully characterize P_r. Figure 2 presents an example, a Venn diagram in which areas represent default probabilities. The area of each event is the same across the two panels, so the marginal probabilities of default are the same. The same is true for the pairwise default probabilities (0.07, 0.07, 0.01): they also are equal across the two panels. However, P_3, the intersection of all three events, is positive (0.01) in the left panel and zero in the right panel; similarly, P_1 and P_2 are different across panels.

Knowledge of marginal and pairwise probabilities, however, allows us to put bounds on other probabilities, and in particular on systemic risk P_r. For example, because we know $P(A_1 \cap A_2 \cap A_3) \leq P(A_1 \cap A_3)$, we can immediately establish $P_3 \leq 0.01$. Finding the other bounds is more complicated. The object of the rest of this Section is to show how to find the tightest possible ones.[14]

3.2 N banks and Linear Programming representation

I now show how to construct the tightest possible bounds for systemic default probabilities P_r (the probability that at least r out of N banks default) given a set of individual and pairwise probabilities, using linear programming.

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[14]For this example, they are $0.45 \leq P_1 \leq 0.46$, $0.13 \leq P_2 \leq 0.15$, $0 \leq P_3 \leq 0.01$.

Suppose that we know a set of marginal and pairwise default probabilities of the type: $P(A_i) = a_i$, $P(A_i \cap A_j) = a_{ij}$. Then, for any r, we could find the tightest upper bound on P_r conditional on our information set by looking for the probability system that solves the problem:

$$max\, P_r \qquad (7)$$

s.t.

$$P(A_i) = a_i$$

$$...$$

$$P(A_i \cap A_j) = a_{ij}$$

We solve the corresponding minimization problem to find the tightest lower bound.

In general, finding a solution to problem (7) is a difficult task, as it requires us to search in the space of all possible probability systems. However, as shown by Hailperin (1965) and Kwerel (1975), probability bound problems of this type can be transformed into linear programming (LP) problems. LP problems are difficult to solve analytically, but easy to solve numerically even as the scale of the problem gets large. Additionally, the linearity of the problem guarantees that the global optimum is always achieved when it exists.

The LP approach to probability bounds is summarized by the following proposition, based on Hailperin (1965):

Proposition 1. *The solution to problem (7) can be found as a solution to the linear programming problem:*

$$max_p\, c'p \qquad (8)$$

s.t.

$$Fp = b$$

$$p \geq 0,\ i'p = 1$$

where p is the unknown vector and i is a vector of ones, and where the vectors c, b and the matrix F depend only on the available information, i.e. on the values $a_i, ..., a_{ij}$. The lower bound is obtained by solving the corresponding minimization problem.

I now describe the main intuition behind the linear programming approach. In Appendix B, I provide a detailed description of the algorithm. Start from the basic default events $\{A_1, ..., A_N\}$, and consider the finest partition V of the sample space generated from these events through union and intersection. This partition will have 2^N elements. For example, Figure 3 reports the 8 elements of the partition for the case $N = 3$. Calling $\overline{A}$ the complement of A, the partition V will contain: $\{\overline{A}_1 \cap \overline{A}_2 \cap \overline{A}_3\}$, $\{\overline{A}_1 \cap \overline{A}_2 \cap A_3\}$, etc.

Knowing the probabilities of these 8 elementary events is enough to know the probability of *any* union or intersection of the original events A_1, A_2 and A_3 and their complements. For example, $Pr\{A_1 \cap A_2\} = Pr\{A_1 \cap A_2 \cap \overline{A}_3\} + Pr\{A_1 \cap A_2 \cap A_3\}$.

Together, the probabilities of the elements of V therefore represent the whole probability system generated by the basic default events. Since V contains 2^N elements, it is also possible to represent this probability space by a vector p with 2^N elements, each corresponding to the probability of an elementary event in V. To do this, we only need to choose a mapping between the elements of p and the elements of V. For example, the mapping shown in the figure associates the first element of p to $Pr\{\overline{A}_1 \cap \overline{A}_2 \cap \overline{A}_3\}$, the second element of p to $Pr\{\overline{A}_1 \cap \overline{A}_2 \cap A_3\}$, and so on.

It follows that we can express the probability of any union or intersection of the basic events as a specific sum of elements in p: if A' is an event obtained by union or intersection of the basic default events, we will have $Pr\{A'\} = c'p$ for some vector c. In our example:

$$P(A_1 \cap A_2) = [0\,0\,0\,0\,0\,0\,1\,1] \cdot p$$
$$P_2 \equiv P((A_1 \cap A_2) \cup (A_2 \cap A_3) \cup (A_1 \cap A_3)) = [0\,0\,0\,1\,0\,1\,1\,1] \cdot p$$
$$P_3 \equiv P(A_1 \cap A_2 \cap A_3) = [0\,0\,0\,0\,0\,0\,0\,1] \cdot p$$

The objective function and all constraints of problem (7) can then be written as linear functions of a vector p. We can join all of them in matrix form and write: $Fp = b$. Finally, when solving the maximization problem we also require that p actually represents a probability system. For this purpose, we need that all probabilities of the elementary events in V are nonnegative ($p \geq 0$) and they sum to 1, since V represents a partition of the sample space ($i'p = 1$, where i is a vector of ones). Given these linear constraints on p, we can then maximize over the unknown vector p.

3.2.1 Probability bounds with inequalities and linear combinations of the constraints

In the previous Section I showed how to construct probability bounds when we have marginal and pairwise probability constraints of the form $P(A_i) = a_i, ..., P(A_i \cap A_j) = a_{ij}$. A linear programming representation can be derived in two additional cases:

a) When we have linear *inequality* constraints in addition to equality constraints. Inequalities of the form $P(A_i) \leq a_i$ will be represented by inequality constraints of the form $d'p \leq a_i$.

b) When we have constraints in terms of *linear combinations* of the marginal and pairwise probabilities. For example, the constraint $\frac{1}{2}(P(A_i \cap A_j) + P(A_i \cap A_h)) = b$ can also be represented in the LP problem by a linear constraint on p. To see why, take the two vectors

c_{ij} and c_{ih} such that $c'_{ij}p$ represents $P(A_i \cap A_j)$ and $c'_{ih}p$ represents $P(A_i \cap A_h)$. Then, $\frac{1}{2}\left(P(A_i \cap A_j) + P(A_i \cap A_h)\right) = b$ is represented by $\frac{1}{2}c'p = b$, with $c = c_{ij} + c_{ih}$.

The fact that the LP approach still works in these two cases is important because, as I show below, the availability of data for bonds and CDSs only allows us to obtain linear constraints of the form a) and b).

3.3 Construction of the bounds with bond and CDS data

3.3.1 Reduced-form pricing models for bonds and CDSs

In order to estimate marginal and pairwise default probabilities using observed prices, I specify a pricing model for bonds and CDSs that takes into account not only default risk, but also other important determinants of prices. I employ, with few modifications, the reduced form pricing model of Duffie (1998), Lando (1998), Duffie and Singleton (1999), and Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005).

The starting point for the model is the specification of the risk-neutral dynamics of the risk-neutral hazard rate (intensity process) of default for firm i, h_t^i, and of a liquidity process γ_t^i that affects the bonds of firm i:

$$dh_t^i = \sigma^i \sqrt{h_t^i} dZ_{h_i t}$$

$$d\gamma_t^i = \eta^i dZ_{\gamma_i t}$$

where h_t^i will always be nonnegative, while the liquidity process may potentially be positive or negative. Z_{h_i} and Z_{γ_i} are standard Brownian motions. The fact that CDS spreads, which depend in large part on h_t^i, are extremely persistent – for all banks, a Dickey-Fuller test does not reject the null of unit root – provides a justification for representing h_t^i as a martingale. I also model γ_t^i as a random walk following Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005).

As shown by Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), the price at time 0 of a fixed coupon bond issued by a bank i with maturity T, recovery rate R and coupon c is determined as (subscript i is omitted from the formula):

$$P(c, R, T) = E\left[c\int_0^T exp(-\int_0^t r_s + h_s + \gamma_s ds)dt\right]$$

$$+E\left[exp(-\int_0^T r_s + h_s + \gamma_s ds)\right] + E\left[R\int_0^T h_t exp(-\int_0^t r_s + h_s + \gamma_s ds)dt\right] \quad (9)$$

where the expectation is taken under the risk-neutral measure. The first term is the present value of the coupons; the second term is the present value of the principal payment at time T; the last term is the present value of the amount recovered in case of default. Following Longstaff et al. (2005), a closed-form solution for the bond (see Appendix C) can be obtained assuming independence under risk-neutral probabilities of the processes for the risk free rate, Z_h and Z_γ. In the model specified above, the price of a bond at time t only depends on the *current* values of γ_t^i and h_t^i, in addition to the volatility of the two processes η and σ, and of course T, R and c.

The parameter γ_t^i, the per-period cost of holding the bond, captures the liquidity premia in bond prices as in Duffie (1999).[15] While in theory many other factors can affect the bond-CDS *basis* (defined as the difference between CDS spreads and bond yields), like delivery option and restructuring clauses in CDSs, they typically have a small effect, as discussed in Appendix C. Liquidity premia in bond markets, instead, have a first order effect on the bond price and, consequently, on the bond/CDS basis, and need to be taken into account explicitly.[16] Liquidity premia in CDS markets may also be relevant; as I discuss below, γ_t^i can also be interpreted as capturing the *difference* in liquidity premia between bonds and CDSs, in the case liquidity premia are present in both.[17]

The pricing formula for a CDS is obtained starting from the same reduced-form model, with the addition that counterparty risk is explicitly considered. I assume that, conditional on the contract still being active at time $t + s$, if the seller does not default within the next period but the reference entity defaults, the payment is made in full. If instead both the reference entity and the seller default in the same period, the buyer recovers only a fraction of the promised amount. The process for the *joint* default of banks i and j is governed by:

$$dh^{ij} = \sigma^{ij}\sqrt{h^{ij}}dZ_{h_{ij}}$$

I allow the joint default intensity h^{ij} to vary separately from the two individual default probabilities over time, h^i and h^j, therefore capturing time variation in the short-term default correlations. As a consequence, contrary to a large part of the literature, I do *not* assume that defaults are independent at short horizons. In the estimation, I impose that h^{ij} is not higher than h^i and h^j (see below). Calling S the recovery rate of the CDS contract in case of double

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[15]This parameter may also be interpreted as the opportunity cost that arbitrageurs with limited capital incur when buying bonds on the margin, as in the model of Garleanu and Pedersen (2011).

[16]For example, see Bao et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2007), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2007), Huang and Huang (2012), or Longstaff et al. (2005).

[17]Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen (2011) have argued for the presence of liquidity premia in CDS spreads. Generally, the CDSs of the particular financial institutions considered here remained within the most traded CDSs of all even during the crisis (Fitch Ratings), so CDS liquidity premia are likely small for these institutions.

default of the seller and the reference entity, the spread of the CDS written by j against i, z_{ji}, solves:

$$E[z_{ji} \int_0^T exp(- \int_0^t r_s + (h_s^i + h_s^j - h_s^{ij})ds)dt]$$

$$= E[\int_0^T exp(- \int_0^t r_s + (h_s^i + h_s^j - h_s^{ij})ds) \left\{ \left[h_t^i - h_t^{ij}\right] (1 - R) + h_t^{ij}S(1 - R)\right\}dt] \qquad (10)$$

The left-hand side of the formula represents the present value of payments to the protection seller; they only occur as long as neither a credit event occurred nor the counterparty defaulted. The right-hand side represents the expected payment in case of default. In each period, conditional on both firms surviving until then, there is a probability $(h_t^i - h_t^{ij})dt$ that the reference entity defaults while the counterparty has not defaulted, so that the payment of $(1 - R)$ is made in full. With probability $h_t^{ij}dt$ there is a double-default event, and only a fraction S of that payment is recovered.

In the bond and CDS pricing model presented so far, the spread of a CDS written by j against institution i depends positively on the credit risk of i, h^i, and negatively on the joint default risk h^{ij}. The yield of a bond issued by i depends positively on both the credit risk of i, captured by h^i, and the liquidity premium γ^i. The *basis*, or the difference between the CDS spread and the bond yield, will be determined by a combination of counterparty risk h^{ij} and liquidity premium γ^i.

Finally, to extract probabilities from observed prices I need to make assumptions about the recovery rates R and S. As discussed in Section 2, due to the status of CDSs in bankruptcy and to the presence of collateral, S is at least as large as R. As a baseline case, I assume $S = R = 30\%$, which corresponds to the case in which little or no collateral is posted on the CDS contract. Section 4.5 explores the robustness of the results to different assumptions about R and S, as well as the case of stochastic recovery rates correlated with the default events.

As presented so far, the reduced-form model cannot be directly estimated because of the presence of the unobserved liquidity process γ_t. In addition, equation (10) is *not* linear in the probabilities h^i, h^j and h^{ij}, so that we cannot directly use it in the linear programming formulation. I now make additional modeling assumptions that allow me to estimate the bounds using the linear programming approach with the available data.

3.3.2 Obtaining linear inequalities on $P(A_i)$ from bonds: $P(A_i) \leq \overline{h}_t^i$

In the model presented above the price of a bond at time t depends on the current values of h_t^i and γ_t^i and on the variances of the two processes, σ^2 and η^2 respectively. Here, I employ approximate pricing formulas for bonds that ignore the convexity terms related to σ^2 and η^2. I do this for two reasons. First, the liquidity process is unobservable, so it would be very difficult to estimate η^2 (its variance). Second, this approximation allows me to extract the marginal and joint default probabilities using only the information in the cross-section of bonds and CDSs, separately for each time t. This means that I can estimate the bounds separately day by day, which is computationally convenient. To gauge how good this approximation is, I estimate σ^2 using CDS prices to proxy for h_t^i (ignoring counterparty risk) for all banks, and I show by simulation that for a typical 5-year bond the approximation error from ignoring the convexity terms is less than 0.1% of the correct price of the bond.[18]

In estimating the hazard rates from bonds and CDS prices, I discretize all pricing formulas to a monthly frequency. In what follows, I refer to h_t^i as the marginal probability of default during month t estimated from the discretized model, and similarly h_t^{ij} will correspond to be the joint probability of default during month t. As discussed in Section 2, a month is the appropriate horizon to employ when thinking about counterparty risk: from the point of view of the buyer of a CDS, *double default* risk (captured by h_t^{ij}) does not only arise from the exactly simultaneous default of the two banks. Rather, the joint default of two banks within a relatively short horizon of time (here taken to be a month) may produce large losses for a CDS buyer.

After ignoring the convexity terms and discretizing at the monthly horizon, the price of the bond at time t will be:

$$P_t(c, R, T) = c \left(\sum_{s=1}^{T} \delta(t, t+s)(1 - h_t^i)^s (1 - \gamma_t^i)^s \right)$$

$$+ \delta(t, t+T)(1 - h_t^i)^T (1 - \gamma_t^i)^T + R \left(\sum_{s=1}^{T} \delta(t, t+s)(1 - h_t^i)^{s-1}(1 - \gamma_t^i)^{s-1} h_t^i \right) \quad (11)$$

where $\delta(t, t+s)$ is the risk-free discount factor from t to $t+s$.

While this approximation of the bond price is very tractable, it still depends on the liquidity parameter γ^i which we do not observe and is difficult to estimate. Without knowing γ^i, we cannot extract h^i from bond prices. However, if we impose a *lower bound* on γ_t^i – a much easier task than estimating it – we can obtain an *upper bound* on h_t^i and therefore still construct

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[18]In particular, I calibrate the bond with 5 years maturity and at a level of hazard rate at the 90th percentile of those observed during the financial crisis.

the bounds on systemic risk: as I discussed in section 2, we can use the corresponding linear inequality as a constraint in the linear programming problem.

To see how we can obtain an upper bound on h_t^i, note that the price of a bond is decreasing in both γ_t^i and h_t^i: a low bond price can be explained by either high γ_t^i (high liquidity premia) or by high h_t^i (high credit risk). The maximum h_t^i compatible with an observed price corresponds to the minimum possible γ_t^i. Once we fix a lower bound for γ_t^i, call it $\underline{\gamma}_t^i$, to find an upper bound on h_t^i we can simply estimate the level of h_t^i that prices the bonds issued by firm i when $\gamma_t^i = \underline{\gamma}_t^i$. Call this estimated upper bound $\overline{h_i^t}$.

Separately at each time t and for each firm i, I estimate $\overline{h_i^t}$ using equation (11) by minimizing the mean absolute pricing error among the cross-section of outstanding bonds, after imposing $\gamma_t^i = \underline{\gamma}_t^i$.[19] The upper bound on the marginal probability h_t^i (or, equivalently, $P(A_i)$) obtained in this way can be used directly as a constraint in the LP problem (to compute the time-t bounds):

$$P(A_i) \leq \overline{h}_t^i \tag{12}$$

Naturally, the upper bound depends on the specific lower bound on γ chosen, $\underline{\gamma}_t^i$. I examine three plausible lower bounds on γ_t^i.

The weakest possible assumption is just that $\gamma_t^i \geq 0$, for all t and i: a large literature has established that bond liquidity premia are definitely not negative. A second possibility is to assume that liquidity premia were, during the crisis, at least as high as they were in 2004 (the beginning of my sample). Assume that γ_t^i can be decomposed into the product of two components: $\gamma_t^i = \alpha_i \lambda_t$. α_i is fixed over time but varies by firm and is scaled to capture the average liquidity premium of bank i in 2004 (equivalently, $\lambda_t = 1$ in 2004). λ_t captures the common movement in liquidity premia for financial firms. If we believe that counterparty risk played a minor role in CDS pricing back in 2004, we can estimate α_i directly from the average bond/CDS basis in 2004[20], and impose $\gamma_t^i \geq \alpha_i$.

Finally, my preferred approach obtains a time-varying lower bound for the liquidity process by comparing the financial institutions in the sample to non-financial institutions with high credit rating, and therefore with the lowest margins and cost of funding. A CDS written by a financial institution on a safe non-financial firm, j, is much less likely to be affected by the risk of double default. If the two defaults are close to independent, the bond/CDS basis of these nonfinancial firms will essentially only reflect liquidity premia. Under this assumption, for a set J of nonfinancial firms with high credit rating, I estimate γ_t^j for each t and j from the

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[19]The average bond pricing error is below 2% of the price in 90% of the periods t, and below 5% in 95% of the cases. All results are robust to the use of mean squared pricing error as a loss function.

[20]I take the average of the basis in 2004 as opposed to the basis on, say, 1/1/2004, to reduce noise. The basis was not volatile during that period, so the exact window used to define α_i makes little difference to the results. It also makes very little difference if one uses the basis in any other period before mid 2007.

bond/CDS basis. I then decompose γ_t^j as $\gamma_t^j = \alpha_j \lambda_t^*$, and extract the common component for non-financial firms λ_t^*, again normalized so that $\lambda_t^* = 1$ in 2004.[21] The margin requirements and other liquidity-related costs for the bonds of these firms arguably increased less during the crisis than for bonds issued by financial firms, so $\lambda_t^* \leq \lambda_t$. I then obtain a third possible constraint on the liquidity process of financial firms: $\gamma_t^i \geq \alpha^i \lambda_t^*$. If liquidity premia change in a way that is correlated with systemic risk, this approach will capture it and allow us to obtain tighter bounds.

One important advantage of imposing only a lower bound on γ_t^i is that most results go through if we instead interpret γ_t^i as the *relative* liquidity of bonds and CDSs. While credit default swaps are more liquid than bonds, they may nonetheless incorporate some liquidity premia. As long as the assumptions on the lower bound for γ_t^i are valid when interpreted in terms of relative liquidity (for example: $\gamma_t^i \geq 0$ corresponds to bonds being always less liquid than CDSs, and so on), the bounds computed here will be valid.

In some cases, the calibrated liquidity premium can be larger than the observed bond-CDS basis (in other words, after adjusting the bond yield for the liquidity component, it becomes lower than the CDS spread: the liquidity-adjusted basis is positive). For example, when the liquidity process is calibrated to fully explain the average basis in 2004, around half of the banks will have a positive liquidity-adjusted basis in each given day during that year. When this happens, I reduce the effect of liquidity up to the point where the liquidity-adjusted bond yield is not any more below the CDS spread: all the bond-CDS basis is explained by liquidity, and counterparty risk goes to zero. This phenomenon occurs less frequently as the financial crisis unfolds and the basis widens for more banks.

3.3.3 Obtaining average linear constraints from CDS

The CDS pricing formula (10) is not linear in the marginal and pairwise default probabilities, h_t^i, h_t^j and h_t^{ij}. To be able to use the CDS information in the linear programming problem, the formula needs to be approximated to be linear in the default probabilities. I employ an approximation to the CDS pricing formula, described in detail in Appendix C, that allows me to write:

$$z_t^{ji} \simeq (h_t^i - (1 - S)h_t^{ij})(1 - R) \tag{13}$$

which is linear in the marginal and pairwise probabilities, so it can be used as a constraint in the LP problem. As reported in the Appendix, the approximation is extremely good, with approximation errors below 0.3% of the true CDS spread for a wide range of parameter values. Again, I will use the discretized version of this formula, in which z_t^{ji} represents the monthly

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[21]This can be done under the assumption that γ_t^j is observed with independent proportional noise ϵ_t^j, i.e. we observe $\tilde{\gamma}_t^j = \gamma_t^j \epsilon_t^j$; we can then estimate the series λ_t^* for each t using OLS on the logs.

CDS spread, and h_t^i and h_t^{ij} are the monthly default probabilities. Note also that when imposing this constraint in the LP problem, the optimization will automatically ensure that $0 \leq h_t^{ij} \leq min\{h_t^i, h_t^j\}$ for all t, so that the probability system is always internally consistent.

Note also that I don't observe the spread z_t^{ij} for each *pair* of banks i and j. Rather, for each reference entity i, I only observe (from Markit or Bloomberg) the *average* CDS quote among its N-1 counterparties:

$$\bar{z}_t^i = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} z_t^{ji}$$

from which I can obtain the linear constraint between marginal and pairwise probabilities

$$\bar{z}_t^i = \left\{ h_t^i - (1-S) \left[\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} h_t^{ij} \right] \right\} (1-R) \tag{14}$$

Therefore, only information about *average* counterparty risk is available for the estimation of the probability bounds. Note that (14) is still a *linear* constraint on the marginal probabilities h_t^i (or $P_t(A_i)$) and the pairwise ones h_t^{ij} (or $P_t(A_i \cap A_j)$), so that as described above it can be used as a constraint in the linear programming problem.

Finally, I do not observe the exact set of counterparties that contribute quotes each day to the data providers. For this reason I compute bounds for the group of 15 largest dealers by volume and trade count, which are likely to represent the sample of firms from which the quotes come from.[22] To find the most active dealers during the crisis, I employ a list of the Top 15 dealers by activity in July 2008 provided by Credit Derivatives Research. While Bear Stearns could not be a part of that list (it had already been bought by JP Morgan), Fitch Ratings (2006) shows that it was an important player in the CDS market in 2006, and therefore I include it in the sample. I drop HSBC for lack of enough bond data, so that in the end my sample includes 15 banks, 9 American and 6 European (listed in Table 1). After March 15th 2008 Bear Stearns disappears, and after September 12th 2008 both Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch drop out of the group. I assume that each of these large dealers has the same probability of contributing a quote, and I explore alternative hypotheses in Section 4.5.

To conclude, to estimate the bounds I maximize and minimize, separately for every time t, the probability that *at least r out of N* banks default together (P_r) subject to:

1) the N linear inequality constraints on the individual default probabilities, obtained from the cross-section of bonds of each bank, eq. (12)

2) the N *average* linear constraints on the pairwise default probabilities of the form (14), obtained from the N observed CDS prices (one for each bank as a reference entity).

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[22]The market is extremely concentrated, and the top 10 dealers account for more than 90% of the volume of CDS sold.

3.3.4 Bond and CDS data

The data cover the period from January 2004 to June 2010 with daily frequency. For each of the 15 institutions considered, I obtain clean closing prices[23] from Bloomberg for senior unsecured zero and fixed coupon bonds with maturity less than 10 years. Given that the maturity of CDSs is 5 years, it would also be possible to use only outstanding bonds of remaining maturity close to 5 years when comparing bonds and CDSs. However, for many European firms we do not have enough bonds around the 5-year maturity for all periods, so that we need to use a wider window. The quotes provided by Bloomberg are indicative, not necessarily actionable. However, if the bond is TRACE-eligible, Bloomberg reports the closing price from TRACE, which corresponds to an actual trade. I exclude callable, putable, sinking, and structured bonds, since their prices reflect the value of the embedded options. I remove all bonds for which I have price information for less than 5 trading days.

I consider bonds denominated in five main currencies: USD, Euro, GBP, Yen, CHF. Since Bloomberg data on European bonds is fairly limited, I integrate them with bond pricing data from Markit whenever it adds at least 5 observations to the price series of each bond. As the reference risk-free rate, I use government zero-coupon yields obtained from Bloomberg. As discussed in Section 4.5, results are robust to using swap rates.

Table 1 reports some statistics on the availability of bond data. For each institution, we can see the average daily number of valid bond prices available, in total and by year. The Table shows that for some European dealers, bond data is scarce especially in the early part of the sample.

I obtain data on the 5-year CDS contract (the only liquid maturity throughout the sample period) from Markit.[24] Markit reports spreads that are obtained by averaging the quotes reported by different dealers, after removing stale prices and outliers.[25]

Table 2 reports summary statistics on CDS spreads. While CDS spreads between 2004 and 2010 are usually quite low, on the order of 50bp (0.5%), they reach levels higher than 1000bp (10%) in some periods. On the right side of Table 2, I report statistics for the *basis* $z_i - (y_i - r^F)$, where z_i is the CDS spread, y_i is the 5-year interpolated bond yield and r^F the 5-year Treasury rate. As expected, the basis is usually negative, because the CDS spread

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[23]Clean prices adjust the price for the coupon accrued between actual coupon payment dates, as if coupons were paid continuously. This corresponds to the pricing model I employ for bonds and CDSs.

[24]All results are robust to using Bloomberg - CMA data instead. Note that I do not observe bid and ask quotes for CDS spreads, but only mid quotes. Ask quotes might be more appropriate to capture the effect of counterparty risk; however note that using mid quotes will if anything overestimate the basis and result in a less tight but still correct upper bound on systemic risk, so all the results remain valid.

[25]Removing outliers, while helpful to reduce noise coming from erroneous prices, can potentially bias the reported CDS spread away from the average spread if the distribution of quotes is skewed. This in particular can be a concern if the distribution of quotes is left-skewed, i.e. most dealers have low counterparty risk but a few dealers have higher counterparty risk, as the observed CDS spread would be biased upwards.

is lower than the corresponding bond yield spread. Only in a few cases the basis becomes positive.

4   Empirical Results

4.1   Bounds on the level of systemic risk

I start by presenting the empirical results under my preferred liquidity assumption, that calibrates the liquidity process using the bond/CDS basis of nonfinancial firms. In the notation of Section 3, I assume $\gamma_t^i \geq \alpha_t^i \lambda_t^*$, where λ_t^* is a time-varying component estimated from nonfinancial firms that allows to capture at least some of the variation in liquidity premia over the crisis.[26]

Figure 4 presents the bounds on the probability that at least r financial institutions default within a month, P_r, for r between 1 and 4. The upper and lower bounds on the probability that at least one bank defaults, P_1, vary significantly over time. The width of the bounds is less than 1% before 2008, and increases to about 3% in 2009. For all $r > 1$, the lower bound on P_r is 0. The upper bound, however, is relatively tight, and displays noticeable time variation between 2007 and 2010. For example, the maximum monthly probability that at least 4 banks default is at most a few basis points before March 2008, and rises up to about 1% at the peak in 2009.

All the bounds in the Figure suggest an increase in systemic risk up to early 2009, followed by a decrease starting in May 2009 after the positive results from the stress tests on these banks (in which the main banks were deemed by the Fed to be resilient to severe systemic risk scenarios). Systemic risk picks up again at the very end of the sample (June 2010), following worries about the stability of the European banking system.

While the bounds on different degrees of systemic risk – from P_1 in the top panel to P_4 in the bottom panel – often move in similar ways during the crisis, significant differences emerge during specific periods. Before Bear Stearns' collapse in March 2008, the probability that at least one bank defaults increases noticeably, but this spike does not appear for the maximum probability that many banks default (bottom three panels) until the day Bear Stearns collapses. Similarly, during the month after Lehman Brothers' collapse in September 2008 we observe a spike in maximum systemic risk, but the spike is smaller for $r > 1$ than

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[26]The estimated process for λ^* – normalized to be 1 in 2004, capturing proportional movements in liquidity – increases by up to 5 times between 2007 and 2008, then decreases back to levels at or below 1 after May 2009. To compute λ^* I look at the nonfinancial firms that compose the CDX IG index (the main CDS index of investment-grade bonds), restricting to those with credit rating of A1 or higher (according to Moody's). I have enough bond and CDS data for 8 of them: Boeing, Caterpillar, John Deere, Disney, Honeywell, IBM, Pfizer, Walmart.

it is for $r = 1$. For these periods, the bounds suggest an interesting *decomposition* of the movements of bond yields and CDS spreads into idiosyncratic and systemic risk: systemic risk (the probability that many banks default) was not spiking as much as idiosyncratic risk (as captured by P_1, the probability that at least one bank defaults).

The results in Figure 4 are obtained under the most stringent calibration of the liquidity process among the three presented in Section 3.3.2. In that calibration, a time-varying lower bound for liquidity (extracted from nonfinancial firms) explains a portion of the bond-CDS basis of financial institutions; this limits the part of the basis that can be due to counterparty risk, therefore tightening the upper bound on systemic risk. The main results of the analysis, and in particular the decomposition between idiosyncratic and systemic risk, are present even under weaker assumptions about γ. Figure 5 reports the bounds obtained under the three different liquidity calibrations discussed in Section 3.3.2. The top panel reports, for reference, the bounds on P_1 under the preferred liquidity calibration, the same as in Figure 4. The bottom three panels report the bounds on P_4 under the three liquidity calibrations discussed in Section 3.3.2: nonnegative liquidity premia, liquidity premia at least as high as 2004, and liquidity premia calibrated to nonfinancials.

Comparing the bottom three panels we can see that while making more stringent liquidity assumptions does tighten significantly the upper bound on P_4, the main decomposition of idiosyncratic and systemic risk is present even under the weakest calibration $\gamma_t^i \geq 0$ (second panel of the Figure). This decomposition between idiosyncratic and systemic risk holds very strongly in the months around Bear Stearns, in which none of the bottom three panels show a peak similar to the one we observe for P_1 in the top panel. A similar result holds, less strongly, for the month after Lehman's collapse.

The bounds on systemic risk reported in Figure 4 give the following account of the financial crisis. Up to the collapse of Bear Stearns, bond and CDS prices indicate that systemic risk was low. The upper bound on P_4, the probability that at least 4 banks default together, does *not* indicate a sharp increase in systemic risk at the beginning of 2008, contrary to what several other measures of systemic risk suggest, e.g. the average CDS spread.[27] As confirmed by the top panel of Figure 4, the observed increase in bond yields and CDS spreads in early 2008 is due to idiosyncratic, not systemic risk. After jumping in March 2008, systemic risk increased smoothly up to April 2009. After Lehman's collapse in September 2008, the probability that at least one (other) bank would default shows a large spike for a whole month. However, a smaller spike is observed for the probability that many banks default. Systemic risk then declines in 2009 and 2010.

The main patterns of this decomposition can be traced back to the raw data depicted

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[27]See Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) or Segoviano and Goodhart (2009).

in Figure 1. Episodes of high idiosyncratic risk but low systemic risk are those in which the bond yields and CDS spreads tend to spike but the difference between the two (the bond/CDS basis) does not. For example, this clearly applies to the events of March 2008: the average basis (dotted line) is low all the way until *after* Bear Stearns' collapse on March 15th, then it jumps. Since the methodology presented in this paper extracts information on counterparty risk, and therefore pairwise default risk, from the bond/CDS basis, periods in which bond yields and CDS spreads spike but the basis does not cannot be interpreted as episodes of high systemic risk. As a consequence, the bounds interpret the small basis observed consistently up to March 2008 as indicating low counterparty (and systemic) risk; after the basis widens in March 2008, the maximum amount of systemic risk increases dramatically. The intuition for this result is simple: if agents were worried about the joint default risk of these banks they should have required a much higher discount for these CDSs than we observe, since these were exactly the banks that were selling protection against each other. This effect is even stronger once we take into account that part of the basis is due to liquidity, not counterparty risk. The methodology presented in this paper allows us to capture and aggregate optimally all this information.

These empirical results are also consistent with the common view of the events of the financial crisis. Before Bear Stearns collapsed, market participants were aware of the possibility that banks could fail. However, a joint default event of multiple banks within a short horizon was seen as unlikely, and therefore counterparty risk for a buyer of CDS protection was perceived to be low.[28] Bear Stearns' collapse showed that defaults of these large banks could happen suddenly, in a way that would not allow buyers to cover their counterparty exposures in time. Only then the basis starts to widen. Similarly, while people observed Lehman's sudden default in September 2008, they also observed the government saving Merrill Lynch and AIG in the next two days – thus avoiding a multiple default event. Markets learned that the government might let a bank fail but was unlikely to let many banks fail - hence the larger spike in P_1 than in P_2, P_3 and P_4.

All these results were derived for risk-neutral probabilities. But importantly, if this decomposition between idiosyncratic and systemic risk holds for risk-neutral probabilities, it should hold even more strongly for objective probabilities. Around Bear's collapse and after Lehman's default, we observe that P_1 spikes, but maximum values of P_2, P_3 and P_4 do not increase as much. Suppose P_1 was jumping due to an increase in risk premia: agents' marginal utility becomes higher in states of the world when at least one bank defaults. Since events in

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[28]Even Bernanke, in his February 28th 2008 testimony (two weeks before Bear's collapse), remarked: "There will probably be some bank failures. There are some small and in many cases new banks that have heavily invested in real estate in locales where prices have fallen. Among the largest banks, the capital ratios remain good and I don't expect any serious problems among the larger banks." (Feb 28th Senate Banking Committee).

which *many* banks default arguably happen in states of the world with even higher marginal utility, we would then expect P_2, P_3 and P_4 to increase even more. But empirically, the latter do not increase as much in these cases. Therefore these episodes are likely to be driven by movements in the objective probabilities, and not in risk premia: the objective probability that one bank would fail increases while the objective probability that many default does not.

4.2   Probability bounds with different information sets

To understand the importance of using *all* available information (bonds and CDS spreads of all banks), in this Section I compare the optimal bounds with bounds obtained using smaller information sets.

4.2.1   Using only bonds or only CDSs

The top panel of Figure 6 compares the bounds on P_4 obtained using all information available to bounds obtained using *only* bond prices or *only* CDS spreads. In particular, the thin lines in the top panel represent the upper bounds obtained using only bond prices, i.e. discarding the constraints coming from CDS prices (all lower bounds are 0). The dotted lines use only CDS data, ignoring the constraints coming from bond prices (upper bounds on marginal probabilities). Both sets of bounds ignore the information contained in the bond/CDS basis, since in neither case the basis is observed. The shaded bounds represent the full-information bounds.

The bounds on P_4 that do not use information contained in the basis tell quite a different story than the bounds that use all the information available. In particular, they present a sharp increase in systemic risk before March 2008 and a much larger spike after September 2008. In fact, these bounds on P_4 closely resemble the bounds on *idiosyncratic* risk P_1 shown in the top panel of Figure 4. They do not allow to distinguish relative movements of idiosyncratic and systemic risk. This confirms the importance of considering the information in the bond/CDS basis to learn the most about systemic risk.

4.2.2   Using only *cross-sectional averages* of bond and CDS spreads

Another useful exercise is to examine what we can learn about systemic risk if we only look at *average* bond and CDS spreads across banks (essentially the information depicted in Figure 1), rather than using the disaggregated bond and CDS prices of the N banks.

As a consequence of the linearity of the constraints in the marginal and pairwise probabilities (see Section 3.2.1), we can compute the optimal bounds that only use average information

by simply averaging the available constraints across the N banks, obtaining therefore only one constraint for the average bond price and one constraint for the average CDS spread.

This exercise is useful because it allows us to gauge how much information we gain from the *asymmetry* of the probability system. In particular, I prove in Appendix B that:

Proposition 2. *Among all probability systems with the same* average *marginal and pairwise default probabilities, the widest bounds on systemic risk, for any r, are obtained for the symmetric system, in which all marginal probabilities are the same (and equal to the average) and all pairwise probabilities are the same (and equal to the average).*

Proof. See Appendix B. □

This Proposition implies that asymmetry in marginal and pairwise probabilities *always* results in more informative bounds. By comparing the bounds obtained under our full information set to the ones obtained by looking at average bond and CDS spreads we can then gauge how much are we learning due to the asymmetry of the network.

The bottom panel of Figure 6 reports both the full-information bounds and the ones that use average bond and CDS spreads only. The Figure shows that in general the average bond and CDS spreads contain a significant amount of information about systemic risk. However, the Figure also shows that, for some particularly important episodes, considering the full information set – and its asymmetry – is crucial to distinguish between idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk (for example, during the period September-November 2008).

4.3   Individual contributions to systemic risk

Next I study the evolution of the default risk of each bank and its relation with the rest of the financial network. In particular, I study the probability systems that *attain* the upper bound for P_4 under the liquidity calibration to nonfinancial firms. In general, the upper bound is attained by more than one probability system – in the Linear Programming formulation (8) the max is attained by more than one vector p. Across different solutions that attain the upper bound, some default probabilities are always the same (which means that they are uniquely identified at the max, like marginal default probabilities), but some are not, like pairwise default probabilities.

Figure 7 reports a partial snapshot of the network as of August 6th 2008, five weeks before Lehman's collapse. The nodes of the diagram present monthly individual probabilities of default. The segments that connect the nodes report the joint default probability of the two intermediaries. Since pairwise default probabilities are not uniquely identified at the upper bound, I report the range observed within the space of solutions to the maximization problem for P_4.

The pair at highest risk of joint default is Merrill Lynch with Lehman Brothers, followed by Lehman Brothers and Citigroup. The prices of bonds and CDSs were consistent with a high joint default risk of Lehman and Merrill even 5 weeks before the weekend in which both collapsed (September 13-14, 2008). Other segments of the graph show considerable heterogeneity in the marginal and pairwise probabilities of default. I omit from the graph several banks for which the joint default risk with other banks is zero or close to zero, even though their marginal default risk is relatively high – which is consistent with their defaults being approximately independent from the other banks.

Next, for each pair of banks i and j I track the evolution of $P(A_i), P(A_j)$ and $P(A_i \cap A_j)$ over time (for the pairwise probability, I report the midpoint of the range observed across all solutions to the maximization problem). Figure 8 plots these probabilities for three different pairs of banks (all combinations of Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup). The upper panel reports the marginal probabilities, and the lower panel reports the joint probabilities. These graphs confirm the relatively high degree of heterogeneity and variability in marginal and joint default probabilities across banks. Interestingly, pairwise probabilities can behave quite differently than marginal probabilities. The data confirm that the markets anticipated the possibility of joint collapse of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch for the two months prior to that event.

We now turn to study how each institution contributed to systemic risk. I compute the probability that institution i is involved in a multiple default event, $Pr\{at\,least\,4\,default\,\cap\,i\,defaults\}$. This probability is uniquely identified at the upper bound on systemic risk. Figure 9 plots this contribution for four banks (Citigroup, Lehman, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America) as well as the average across the other banks. The Figure shows large heterogeneity across institutions, both in levels and in changes. While the contribution to systemic risk increases for all banks after August 2007, the growth is faster for Lehman, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup than for the other banks. Lehman Brothers – at least at the upper bound of systemic risk – appears to be the most systemic institution at almost all times since March 2008, and particularly so several months before its default. After September 2008, Citigroup and Bank of America become the most systemic institutions.

4.4 Additional Results

In this section I present two additional empirical exercises that can help clarify and interpret the results on systemic risk. First, I show that if the liquidity component λ is calibrated to be *equal* to the non-financial liquidity component λ^* (instead of using λ^* only as a lower bound for λ as in Figure 4), we can obtaining a tighter lower bound (positive though still small). Second, I compare the bounds on systemic risk with a measure of systemic risk obtained by

calibrating a benchmark multivariate normal model.

4.4.1   Adding an upper bound on liquidity (calibrating $\lambda = \lambda^*$)

Throughout the main empirical results presented in the previous sections, the lower bound on the probability that many banks default together was zero (for $r > 1$). This is a consequence of two facts. First, imposing only a *lower* bound on liquidity means that potentially all of the bond-CDS basis could be explained by liquidity, which in turn means that we cannot rule out that joint default probabilities are all zero. Second, we are concerned with the probability that *many* (more than 2) banks default together, and our information covers joint defaults of at most pairs of banks. Therefore, tightening the lower bound is difficult in the present setting (at least without imposing much stronger restrictions on the joint distribution function of defaults, contradicting the purpose of using probability bounds in the first place).

It turns out, however, that by adding one assumption about the liquidity process, we can indirectly tighten the lower bound. So far, I have used the proportional variation in the liquidity process λ^* estimated from non-financial firms as a *lower bound* on financial firm liquidity λ, i.e. I imposed $\lambda \geq \lambda^*$. Instead, we could impose that the proportional variation in the liquidity process over the crisis is actually the *same* for financial and nonfinancial firms, so that $\lambda = \lambda^*$. Imposing this constraint is not straightforward: in some cases, the bond-CDS basis is relatively large; if we impose that a certain fraction of it (determined by λ^*) has to be explained by liquidity, the remaining part *has to* be due to counterparty risk. But in some cases this is not mathematically possible, since there are restrictions between the pairwise and marginal probabilities in the system. For the purpose of this section, in these cases I increase the liquidity λ individually for each bank to the point where the remaining part of the basis can be explained by counterparty risk.

Figure 10 shows the results. The additional assumption on liquidity does help somewhat in tightening the lower bound, though for the reasons discussed above it is hard to significantly tighten the bounds without putting much stronger constraints on the probabilities that *many* banks default.[29]

4.4.2   Calibrating a benchmark multivariate normal model

While a complete comparison of the bounds presented in this paper with the extensive number of existing measures of systemic risk is beyond the scope of this paper, it is useful to

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[29]Note that the bounds tighten not only for P_2, but also for P_3 and P_4. Even though the latter two probabilities don't directly depend on marginal and pairwise probabilities (since they involve default of at least 3 banks), constraining all marginal and pairwise probabilities does put *some* constraints on the probabilities of more than 2 defaults.

compare the results with a benchmark calibration: a model in which the returns of banks are multivariate normal and defaults occur when returns fall below a threshold chosen to match the marginal probabilities.

I calibrate the model by choosing (separately for each day) the return threshold of a standard multivariate normal so that the marginal probability of default for each bank corresponds to the one obtained from bond prices. For simplicity, I impose that all the pairwise correlations are the same and equal to a value ρ. I then compute the probability that at least 4 banks default (P_4) under different values for the pairwise correlation ρ, and plot the results in Figure 11 for values of ρ of 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.99 (higher ρ corresponds to a higher line). The Figure plots, for comparison, the bounds obtained in Figure 4.

The results highlight some interesting similarities and differences between the bounds and the calibrated normal model. First, the order of magnitude of the measure is similar to that of the bounds for high enough values of ρ (starting from 0.7). Second, for each value of ρ, the time series of P_4 obtained from the normal model closely resembles the time series of the average CDS spreads and the time series of P_1 (reported in Figure 4). This is not surprising since the calibration only uses information in the marginal probabilities, ignoring the constraints about the pairwise default probabilities coming from the bond-CDS basis. In particular, notice that the calibration predicts an increase in systemic risk before the default of Bear Stearns, which as explained above is not compatible with the information content in the bond-CDS basis (which is instead taken into account by the bounds). This explains why the normal model measures a probability of systemic event *higher* than the upper bound until March 2008.

Third, from 2009 onward, when the basis becomes much larger, the calibrated probability of a systemic event lies well below the estimated upper bound, *for every value of ρ*: the multivariate normal model is not able to generate levels of joint default probability as high as the upper bound that we compute. The reason is that the multivariate normal model (like other standard calibrated models) imposes a strong structure on the dependence of the defaults and especially on the higher-order dependence (which involves more than 2 banks). This highlights the advantage of looking at the bounds rather than at calibrations based on restrictions on the distribution of defaults, since strong dependence assumptions may lead us to miss an important component of systemic risk.

4.5   Robustness

In this Section I briefly discuss the robustness of the results with respect to several of the assumptions imposed in Section 3. I verify that the evolution of systemic risk over time remains similar to what described in Section 4: very little systemic risk before March 2008, then a jump after Bear Stearn's collapse and an increase until 2009; decomposition between idiosyn-

cratic risk and systemic risk during some episodes. The full derivation and implementation is reported in Appendix D.

With respect to recovery rates, equations (1) and (2) imply that changes in the recovery rate of bonds, R, scale the implied default probabilities from all prices in the same direction. Therefore, these changes *scale* the level of the bounds uniformly for the whole period, without affecting the main empirical conclusions about the evolution of systemic risk. In Appendix D, besides reporting results for different levels of R, I also show that the main conclusions hold if R decreases during periods of high distress, as well as if R follows a simple stochastic process that features lower recovery rates if several banks default.

More interesting is the robustness with respect to the recovery rate in case of double default, S. Appendix D explores the results under different assumptions for S and shows that even when the recovery rate is as high as 90% the main results hold. The effect of changes in S depends on the liquidity-adjusted bond/CDS basis of each bank. For a subset of banks, in some days, after adjusting for liquidity the part of the basis that can be attributed to counterparty risk goes to zero, so that these banks do not contribute to systemic risk for these days (unless S is 100%, in which case the CDS/bond basis becomes uninformative about counterparty risk). For other banks, the basis is positive but small enough that it can be completely explained by counterparty risk: an increase in S then means that the same basis can account for higher counterparty risk. For the remaining banks, the basis is large enough that it cannot be completely explained by counterparty risk, and a part of the basis *must* be explained by liquidity: as S increases, the maximum joint default risk with other banks must decrease. The robustness of the results to changes in S stems from the fact that the effect of changes in S is different and opposite across banks with large and small basis, so that the increase in systemic risk due to one bank is offset by a decrease in risk due to another. Appendix D presents a simple example of this mechanism.

Appendix D also discusses the robustness of the results under an alternative pricing model in which the hazard rates h^i, h^j and h^{ij} are mean-reverting processes. Since we do not observe a full term structure of spreads for CDS contracts, I need to impose several additional assumptions to be able to estimate the bounds; essentially, I impose that the term structure of h^{ij} inherits the properties of the term structure of h^i and h^j, which can be estimated from bond prices. Given that I focus on short-horizon (one month) default rates, the estimates, derived from the term structure of bonds up to 10 years, become less stable and more noisy. While the level of the upper bound generally increases for all periods, the time series results are consistent with those of Figure 4.

The Appendix also shows that the empirical results still hold when the swap rate is used as the risk-free rate, since the difference in the risk-free curve affects at the same time the basis of

financial firms and that of nonfinancial firms, from which the liquidity component is extracted under the baseline calibration. In addition, the Appendix shows that the results hold when I restrict the sample to US banks only, and when I only use bond data from large TRACE transactions. In Appendix D I also discuss under what conditions we can use together bond and CDS prices denominated in different currencies.

Finally, I study the possibility that the CDS quotes reported by Markit for each bank i do not represent an equal-weighted average of the joint default risk with i's counterparties, but instead weigh more some counterparties and less others. This might be the case if some counterparties are more likely to send quotes than others, or if collateral requirements vary by counterparty. I show that the results are robust to various possible weighting schemes.

5   Conclusion

I study the role of counterparty risk in CDS markets for the measurement of systemic risk. Because counterparty risk affects the price of a CDS but not the underlying bond, by combining the information from bond and CDS spreads we can learn about the joint default risk of pairs of financial institutions.

I apply this idea, using a linear programming approach, to calculate upper and lower bounds on the probability that 3, 4 or more banks fail simultaneously, which captures our notion of "systemic risk". The approach allows us to learn about the joint default probability of several banks without making any assumptions about the shape of the joint distribution function of defaults.

The empirical analysis of Section 4 shows using this methodology that until March 2008 the probability that multiple banks default together was consistently low. At the same time, the idiosyncratic risk of one of the banks defaulting started increasing since August 2007, and saw a large spike in early 2008. Only after Bear Stearns' collapse in March 2008 we see an increase in the upper bound on systemic risk as well. In September 2008, after Lehman goes bankrupt, the probability that at least one bank defaults spikes, while the risk of multiple defaults does not spike as much. This seems to indicate that agents expected the government to try not to let multiple banks fail at the same time.

The approach also allows us to estimate how much each bank contributes to systemic risk at the bounds. Months before the weekend in which Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch collapsed, the probability of joint default of the two was estimated to be much higher than any other pair. Lehman Brothers was consistently indicated as the most systemic institution since at least 6 months before its default.

While derived under several modeling assumptions and affected by limitations in the data,

these bounds can be useful to complement other methodologies that make stronger assumptions about the joint distribution function of defaults. A standard calibration of a multivariate normal model shows that standard functional form restrictions may lead to underestimating systemic risk in some periods and overestimating it in others, while the bounds include all possible levels of systemic risk compatible with observed bond and CDS prices.

It is also worth noting that these bounds reflect the beliefs of financial participants about systemic risk. These beliefs incorporate forecasts of policy and economic events, and therefore caution needs to be taken when using these bounds to inform policy decisions. At the same time, since the bounds can be constructed in real time, they are a useful tool for tracking the market's perceptions of systemic risk and identifying the sources of distress in the financial system.

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Tables

Table 1

	Avg valid bonds	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Abn Amro	3.8	1.8	2.2	4.0	4.4	3.3	5.0	7.3
Bank of America	32.6	17.6	25.5	29.4	32.9	35.7	42.8	56.8
Barclays	15.7	3.1	3.0	2.4	2.5	9.5	42.0	82.0
Bear Stearns	11.7	7.2	9.8	13.5	15.5	15.6	-	-
Bnp Paribas	7.6	0.5	2.0	4.5	3.6	4.5	7.1	19.9	24.6
Citigroup	36.5	21.6	24.3	31.7	40.0	43.2	49.5	54.5
Credit Suisse	5.4	1.9	2.3	2.8	2.7	5.0	11.6	17.4
Deutsche Bank	42.8	5.3	10.4	42.3	68.9	54.6	61.8	70.9
Goldman Sachs	42.4	19.3	26.1	34.3	40.4	52.5	67.0	72.9
JP Morgan	20.4	6.6	11.1	14.0	17.4	25.9	38.4	38.9
Lehman Brothers	20.1	10.5	15.2	20.5	26.5	31.4	-	-
Merrill Lynch	37.7	23.6	33.8	41.5	45.8	46.3	-	-
Morgan Stanley	28.4	12.5	14.6	17.5	22.2	33.5	55.0	59.0
UBS	9.1	0.3	0.7	1.0	3.1	8.9	25.5	40.6
Wachovia	6.1	2.9	3.5	5.7	7.4	9.1	7.7	7.3

Note: first column reports average number of bonds for each institution that are used for the estimation of marginal default probabilities. Columns 2-8 break this number down by year.

Table 2

	Avg CDS spread	Std CDS spread	Min spread	Max spread	Avg basis	Std basis	Min basis	Max basis
Abn Amro	45.8	46.1	5.0	190.5	-43.7	43.0	-241.8	38.2
Bank of America	66.5	71.7	7.4	390.7	-69.7	63.3	-405.7	214.3
Barclays	54.2	60.0	5.5	261.9	-38.7	60.0	-318.6	113.7
Bear Stearns	54.2	69.7	18.0	736.9	-52.5	25.0	-291.6	46.6
Bnp Paribas	33.8	32.2	5.4	163.9	-52.6	48.5	-319.8	92.4
Citigroup	100.4	129.7	6.5	638.3	-74.3	87.1	-796.9	59.9
Credit Suisse	53.0	51.3	9.0	261.4	-49.2	43.4	-274.0	58.7
Deutsche Bank	49.8	45.1	8.9	190.0	-20.4	28.1	-169.8	71.2
Goldman Sachs	84.2	86.4	17.2	579.3	-76.2	90.3	-491.8	80.3
JP Morgan	53.1	42.8	10.9	227.3	-73.8	57.0	-316.3	32.3
Lehman Brothers	70.7	86.9	18.0	701.7	-60.4	43.8	-543.1	24.4
Merrill Lynch	59.9	71.9	14.4	447.7	-51.7	41.2	-202.1	26.2
Morgan Stanley	112.5	144.2	16.6	1385.6	-80.6	106.3	-1246.9	220.3
UBS	59.3	72.4	4.2	357.2	-63.7	58.3	-336.7	40.2
Wachovia	73.9	93.5	9.3	1487.7	-84.6	119.4	-2504.5	96.1

Note: the table reports descriptive characteristics on the CDS spread and the bond yield spread for the 15 institutions in the sample, in basis points per year. The bond yield spread is computed as the linearly interpolated yield for a 5-year maturity bond in excess of the corresponding Treasury rate. The basis in the last four columns is computed as the CDS spread minus the bond yield spread. The sample covers January 2004 to June 2010.

Figures

Figure 1: Average 5-year bond yield spread and CDS spread for the 15 financial intermediaries most active in the CDS market, and rescaled difference (basis).

Figure 2: Example of the information content of marginal and pairwise probabilities with 3 banks. The sets in the diagram represent default events, and their areas represent the default probabilities.

**Figure 3:** Construction of the Linear Programming representation (example with 3 banks).

Figure 4: Upper and lower bounds on systemic events under the assumption that liquidity premia of bonds issued by financial firms increased during the crisis by at least as much as those of nonfinancial firms. P_r is the monthly probability of at least r banks defaulting, for $r = 1, 2, 3, 4$. Bounds are smoothed with a 3-day moving average.

Figure 5: Bounds on the monthly probability of at least 1 bank (top panel) and 4 banks (bottom three panels) defaulting under different liquidity assumptions. The top panel shows P_1 with liquidity calibrated to nonfinancials. The bottom three panels show P_4 under the three liquidity assumptions: nonnegative, at least as high as 2004, and calibrated to nonfinancials.

Figure 6: Bounds on P_4 (probability that at least 4 banks default) under different information sets.

Figure 7: Marginal and pairwise average monthly default probabilities for part of the network in the high systemic risk scenario (max P_4) as of 08/06/2008, with the liquidity process calibrated to that of nonfinancial firms. Nodes report the marginal default probabilities of each bank, edges report ranges for the pairwise joint default probabilities.

Figure 8: Marginal and pairwise default probabilities for selected banks, under the calibration of the liquidity process to that of nonfinancial firms, at the upper bound for the probability that at least 4 banks default. A 3-day moving average is plotted.

Figure 9: Individual contributions to systemic risk for selected banks, under the calibration of the liquidity process to that of nonfinancial firms, at the upper bound for the probability that at least 4 banks default. A 2-week moving average is plotted.

Figure 10: Upper and lower bounds on systemic events under the assumption that liquidity premia of bonds issued by financial firms increased during the crisis by *as much* as those of nonfinancial firms. P_r is the monthly probability of at least r banks defaulting, for $r = 1, 2, 3, 4$. Bounds are smoothed with a 3-day moving average.

Figure 11: Bounds on the probability that at least 4 banks default (P_4, shaded) against estimates of P_4 using a multivariate normal model calibrated to match the marginal default probabilities (solid lines). The different solid lines correspond to different values of ρ, the correlation parameter of the multivariate normal distribution (assumed to be the same for all pairs). From the bottom to the top, each solid line represents the calibrated P_4 for $\rho = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.99$ respectively.

Imprint and acknowledgements

Stefano Giglio
University of Chicago, Chicago, United-States; email: **stefano.giglio@chicagobooth.edu**