



## Notification template for Article 131 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) – Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SIIs)

Template for notifying the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of the setting or resetting of an O-SII buffer under Article 131(7) CRD and of the identity of O-SIIs under Article 131(12) CRD

Please send/upload this template to:

- macropru.notifications@ecb.europa.eu when notifying the ECB (under Article 5 of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation¹);
- <u>notifications@esrb.europa.eu</u> when notifying the ESRB.

The ESRB will forward this notification to the European Commission, to the European Banking Authority (EBA) and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay and will publicly disclose the names of the O-SIIs on its website. This notification will be made public by the ESRB once the relevant authorities have adopted and published the notified macroprudential measure<sup>2</sup>.

E-mailing/uploading this template to the above addresses constitutes official notification; no further official letter is required. To facilitate the work of the notified authorities, please send the notification template in a format that allows the information to be read electronically.

| 1. Notifying national aut                           | hority                   |  |                       |  |
|---|--------------------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| 1.1 Name of the notifying authority                 | National Bank of Belgium |  |                       |  |
| 1.2 Country of the notifying authority              | Belgium                  |  |                       |  |
| 2. Description of the me                            | Name of institution      | LEI  | Consolidation level   |  |
| 2.1a Institution or group of institutions concerned | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV | KGCEPHLVVKVRZYO1T6 47                          | Sub-conso, individual |  |
|   | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV | 213800X3Q9LSAKRUWY<br>91<br>6B2PBRV1FCJDMR45RZ | Conso, individual     |  |
|   |                          | 53   |                       |  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> On request by the notifying authority, it may be agreed with the Head of the ESRB Secretariat that this notification, or a part thereof, should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or financial stability.

|  | Dolfing Donama CA /NV  | AECWIEU3KNA7W/35EO                                   | Conso, individual                    |  |
|--|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|
|  | Belfius Banque SA/NV   | A5GWLFH3KM7YV2SFQ<br>L8                              | conce, manuala.                      |  |
|  | Euroclear SA/NV<br>Euroclear Bank SA/NV  | 549300CBNW05DILT68<br>70<br>549300OZ46BRLZ8Y6F6<br>5 | Conso, individual                    |  |
|  | The Bank of New York<br>Mellon SA/NV   | MMYX0N4ZEZ13Z4XCG<br>89                              | Conso, individual                    |  |
|  | Investeringsmaatschappij<br>Argenta<br>Argenta Bank- en<br>Verzekeringsgroep NV/SA<br>Argenta Spaarbank SA/N         | 98<br>5493009ML6YX83YHC8<br><b>A</b> 20              | Conso, individual                    |  |
|  | Axa Bank Belgium SA  | LSGM84136ACA92XCN8<br>76                             | Sub-conso, individual                |  |
| 2.1b Changes to the list of institutions concerned | No change  |  |                                      |  |
|  |  |  | 2000                                 |  |
|  | Name of institution  | New O-SII buffer                                     | Previous O-SII buffer                |  |
|  | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV   | 1.50%  | 1.50 /0                              |  |
|  | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV   | 1.50%  | 1.50%                                |  |
|  | ING België NV  | 1.50%  | 1.50%                                |  |
|  | Belfius Banque SA/NV   | 1.50%  | 1.50%                                |  |
| 2.2 Level of the buffer applied                    | Euroclear SA/NV<br>Euroclear Bank SA/NV  | 0.75%  | 0.75%                                |  |
|  | The Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV  | 0.75%  | 0.75%                                |  |
|  | Investeringsmaatschap<br>pij Argenta<br>Argenta Bank- en<br>Verzekeringsgroep<br>NV/SA<br>Argenta Spaarbank<br>SA/NV | 0.75%  | 0.75%                                |  |
|  | Axa Bank Belgium SA  | 0.75%  | 0.75%                                |  |
|  |  |  | 1                                    |  |
|  | Name of identified O-SII   | Ultimate EU parent institutio                        | n LEI of ultimate parent institution |  |
| 2.3 Name of the ultimate EU parent institution     | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV   | BNP Paribas SA                                       | ROMUWSFPU8MPRO8K5<br>P83             |  |
|  | ING België NV  | ING Groep N.V.                                       | 549300NYKK9MWM7GG<br>W15             |  |

|                             | Axa Bank Belgium SA                                       | Groupe AXA                             |              | F5W<br>E39    | CUMTUM4                  | RKZ1MAI  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------|
|                             | Name of parent O-SII identified                           | Name of O                              | SII subsidia | ry LE         | El of O-SII su           | bsidiary |
|                             | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV                                  | Československá obchodní banka, a.s.    |              | Iní Q5B<br>92 | Q5BP2UEQ48R75BOTCB<br>92 |          |
| 2.4 Names of subsidiaries   | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV                                  | Československá obchodná<br>banka, a.s. |              |               | 52990096Q5LMCH1WU<br>462 |          |
|                             |   |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3. Timing for the measur    | re  |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.1 Timing for the decision | 22/06/2021  |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.2 Timing for publication  | 01/12/2021  |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.3 Disclosure              | Other systemically important institutions buffer   nbb.be |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.4 Timing for application  | 01/01/2022  |  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Name of institution                                       | Date1                                  | Date2        | Date3         | Date4                    | Date5    |
|                             |   | 01/01/2022                             |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV                                  | 1.50%                                  | %            | %             | %                        | %        |
|                             | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV                                  | 1.50%                                  | %            | %             | %                        | %        |
|                             | ING België NV   | 1.50%                                  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Belfius Banque SA/NV                                      | 1.50%                                  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.5 Phasing in              | Euroclear SA/NV<br>Euroclear Bank SA/NV                   | 0.75%                                  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | The Bank of New York                                      | 0.75%                                  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Mellon SA/NV Investeringsmaatschappij                     | 0.75%                                  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Argenta   |  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Argenta Bank- en Verzekeringsgroep NV/SA                  |  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Argenta Spaarbank SA/NV                                   |  |              |               |                          |          |
|                             | Axa Bank Belgium SA                                       |  |              |               |                          |          |
| 3.6 Review of the measure   | The list of O-SIIs and their a                            | associated ca                          | pital buffe  | rs will be re | eviewed ar               | nually.  |
| 4. Reason for O-SII ident   | tification and activation of the                          | he O-SII buffe                         | er           |               |                          |          |

|  | Name of institution  | Size  | Substitut-<br>ability  | Com-<br>plexity   | Intercon-<br>nectedness                                   | Overall<br>Score                |
|--|--|---|--|---|---|---------------------------------|
|  | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV   | 2936  | 2061   | 3284  | 2404  | 2671                            |
|  | KBC Groep<br>KBC Bank NV   | 2475  | 2147   | 3063  | 1972  | 2414                            |
|  | ING België NV  | 1396  | 1772   | 1186  | 1288  | 1410                            |
| 4.1 Scores of institutions or  | Belfius Banque<br>SA/NV  | 1472  | 912  | 1006  | 2058  | 1361                            |
| group of institutions or concerned, as per EBA guidelines on the                 | Euroclear SA/NV<br>Euroclear Bank<br>SA/NV   | 224   | 1974   | 324   | 634   | 789                             |
| assessment of O-SIIs (Article 131.3 CRD)   | The Bank of New<br>York Mellon SA/NV   | 342   | 0  | 676   | 839   | 464                             |
| ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  | Investeringsmaatsch<br>appij Argenta<br>Argenta Bank- en<br>Verzekeringsgroep<br>NV/SA<br>Argenta Spaarbank<br>SA/NV   | 400   | 415  | 242   | 262   | 330                             |
|  | Axa Bank Belgium<br>SA   | 262   | 248  | 64  | 305   | 220                             |
| 4.2 Methodology and indicators used for designation of the O-SII (Article 131.3) | a. O-SII identific<br>assessment of<br>b. Banks with O<br>automatically<br>c. All Belgian bate<br>identification<br>d. The names a<br>identification<br>e. No non-bank | of O-SIIs; -SII score a designated anks reportir process; nd scores o process are institutions  | bove a thresh<br>as O-SIIs;<br>ng in FINREP<br>f all relevant<br>e sent in a sep<br>have been in   | have bee<br>entities no<br>parate Exc                           | of 350 basis per included in the texcluded from the file; | points are<br>the               |
| 4.3 Supervisory judgement  |  | indicators used private seindicators we of domestics signated as on have imposed the control of | sed are privated a | recipients<br>scope are<br>portance;<br>e basis of<br>shares in | in Belgium;<br>more appropr                               | iate for<br>ndicators<br>eposit |

#### The EBA scores provide a case for assigning the identified O-SIIs to two buckets. Several criteria were accounted for in the O-SII buffer calibration, among others: The institution's systemic importance as measured by its size and O-SII 4.4 Calibrating the O-SII Historical losses in the Belgian banking sector. buffer Stress test results. Level playing field and single market considerations (with respect to O-SII buffer levels and total capital requirements for O-SIIs in other EU Domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) are banks whose failure would have an impact on the domestic financial system or real economy. The rationale for imposing capital buffers on systemically important banks (SIBs) is at least twofold. First, capital buffers reduce the probability of failure of SIBs, which may be desirable given the high economic and social cost of their failure. Second, capital buffers require SIBs to internalize externalities they impose on the financial system, and the buffers may provide incentives for SIBs to reduce their systemic importance. The Belgian banking sector is large (almost 260% of GDP) and highly concentrated, with the four largest banks representing more than 80% of total assets and the eight identified O-SIIs over 90%. With sizes ranging from about 5% to over 70% of Belgian GDP as well as their 4.5 Effectiveness and importance in terms of proportionality of measure - credit provision and deposit taking for the Belgian economy - global custodian services (The Bank of New York Mellon) and activities as an International Central Securities Depository (Euroclear) the identified O-SIIs are banks of domestic systemic importance. The O-SII buffers applicable to Belgian banks were calibrated accounting for the banks' systemic importance. Banks with a higher O-SII score need to hold a higher O-SII buffer. To this end, Belgian O-SIIs were allocated to two buckets, to which a unique O-SII buffer will apply. Furthermore, the calibration of the O-SII buffers levels explicitly accounted for level playing field and internal market considerations. Given the above considerations, the imposed level of the O-SII buffer is expected to be both effective and proportionate. 5. Sufficiency, consistency and non-overlap of the policy response The O-SII buffers applicable to Belgian banks were calibrated accounting for the banks' systemic importance. Banks with a higher O-SII score need to hold a higher O-SII buffer. 5.1 Sufficiency of the policy Furthermore, the calibration of the O-SII buffers levels took into consideration response historical losses in the Belgian banking sector and explicitly accounted for level playing field and internal market considerations. The O-SII buffers applicable to Belgian banks were calibrated accounting for the banks' systemic importance. Banks with a higher O-SII score need to hold a higher O-SII buffer. Furthermore, the calibration of the O-SII buffers levels explicitly accounted for level 5.2 Consistency of application of the policy playing field and internal market considerations. response

No other policy instruments are used to address the <u>same</u> systemic risk.

### 5.3 Non-overlap of the policy response

#### 6. Cross-border and cross-sector impact of the measure

Spillover channels operating via risk adjustment/regulatory arbitrage:

There is no evidence that Belgian O-SIIs restricted activities in order to reduce their systemic importance. This may be explained by the fact that the reduction in activities needed for the large Belgian O-SIIs in order to bring their O-SII scores down to a level that would put them in a lower bucket with a lower buffer is very large. Furthermore, possible shifts of activities also have beneficial effects if they are the result of SIBs internalizing externalities they impose on the financial system and reducing their systemic importance.

<u>Cross-border effects and overall impact on the Single Market of implementation of the measure:</u>

As the O-SII buffer is applied to the Belgian systemically relevant institutions at the consolidated level, there may be an impact on individuals or companies outside Belgium through exposures of subsidiaries and branches of Belgian banks in other jurisdictions. However, no major cross-border impact has been observed. There are several potential reasons for this limited impact:

- First, for most banks, FINREP data show that exposures in Member States other than Belgium (both in terms of total assets and loans and advances to non-financial corporations and households) generally amount to only a small fraction of these Member States' GDP.
- Second, to the extent that EU parent companies and/or important subsidiaries in other Member States are subject to local G/O-SII buffer requirements, the Belgian O-SII buffer does not increase capital requirements for these exposures in these Member States.
- Third, the capital levels of the banking groups were already well above the phased-in levels before the buffer implementation. Banks were therefore able to continue developing activities to support the real economy both in Belgium and the rest of the EU.

We have also not witnessed an increase in the share of assets of foreign banks in the Belgian banking sector. The lack of inward and outward spillovers means that there is no overall impact on the Single Market.

#### 6.1 Assessment of crossborder effects and the likely impact on the Internal Market

(Recommendation ESRB/2015/2<sup>3</sup>)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 15 December 2015 on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures (ESRB/2015/3) (OJ C 97, 12.3.2016, p. 9).

The NBB will closely monitor any of these potential cross-border effects.

However, as buffer levels have not changed, we do not expect cross-border effects to occur.

Finally, it should be noted that the higher capital requirements following the implementation of the O-SII buffer structurally increase the resilience of Belgian systemically important banks. This positively affects the stability of the financial system and the real economy in Belgium, and with that, the internal market.

No major leakages have been observed. There is a number of potential reasons for why the scope for leakages is limited:

- First, the O-SII buffer is applied to the Belgian systemically relevant institutions at the (sub-)consolidated level, which avoids (geographical) shifts of activities within groups. Universal banks may shift activities from the bank to the insurance part of the group, but no such effects have been observed.
- Second, Belgian O-SIIs may restrict activities in order to reduce their systemic importance, which may entail a shift to activities to other bank or non-bank entities. There is no evidence that such effects have occurred, which may be explained by the fact that the reduction in activities needed for the large Belgian O-SIIs in order to bring their O-SII scores down to a level that would put them in a lower bucket with a lower buffer is very large. Furthermore, possible shifts of activities also have beneficial effects if they are the result of SIBs internalizing externalities they impose on the financial system and reducing their systemic importance.
- Third, the capital levels of the banking groups were already well above the phased-in levels before the buffer implementation, which reduces incentives for regulatory arbitrage.

The NBB will closely monitor any of these potential leakages. However, as buffer levels have not changed, we do not expect leakages to occur.

#### 7. Combinations and interactions with other measures

#### 7.1 Combinations between G-SII and O-SII buffers (Article 131.14)

6.2 Assessment of leakages

within the notifying Member

and regulatory arbitrage

State

Not applicable

Not applicable

| Name of institution | O-SII buffer | G-SII buffer |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
|                     | %            | %            |
|                     | %            | %            |
|                     | %            | %            |

# 7.2 Combinations with systemic risk buffers (SyRBs)

(Article 131.15 CRD)

| Name of institution | SyRB rate | SyRB<br>application<br>level | Sum of G-SII/O-<br>SII and SyRB<br>rates |
|---------------------|-----------|------------------------------|--|
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |
|                     | %         |                              | %  |

|   | The cap for the subsidiary does not prevent the implementation of a higher O-SI buffer based on the domestic buffer setting methodology. |                                       |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| 7.3 O-SII requirement for a subsidiary (Article 131.8 | Name of O-SII subsidiary  Name of the EU parent of the subsidiary  |                                       | SII Buffer applicable to O-SII EU parent |  |  |  |
| CRD)  | BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV   | BNP Paribas SA                        | 1.50%                                    |  |  |  |
|   | ING België NV  | ING Groep N.V.                        | 2.50%                                    |  |  |  |
|   |  |                                       | %  |  |  |  |
| 8.1 Contact person(s)/mailbox at notifying authority  | +32 2 221 34 59 janet.mitchell@nbb.be  |                                       |  |  |  |  |
| 8.2 Any other relevant information                    | Not applicable   |                                       |  |  |  |  |
|   | <br>   | i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i |  |  |  |  |
| 0.2 Data of the motification                          | ·  | hich this notification was uploaded   | d/sent.                                  |  |  |  |
| 8.3 Date of the notification                          | 29/10/2021   |                                       |  |  |  |  |