





Notification template for Article 131 CRD – Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII)

Please send this template to

- notifications@esrb.europa.eu when notifying the ESRB;
- <u>macropru.notifications@ecb.europa.eu</u> when notifying the ECB;
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Emailing this template to the above-mentioned addresses constitutes an official notification, no further official letter is required. In order to facilitate the work of the notified authorities, please send the notification template in a format that allows electronically copying the information.

1. Notifying national authority			
1.1 Name of the notifying authority	Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein (FMA Liechtenstein)		
2. Description of the mea	asure		
	The following institutions have been identified as O-SIIs (on the highest level of consolidation):		
2.1 Concerned institution or	- LGT Bank AG (LEI code: 7KDSOB6Z0X4S67TMX170)		
group of institutions	- Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG (LEI code: 529900OE1FOAM50XLP72)		
	- VP Bank AG (LEI code: MI3TLH1I0D58ORE24Q14)		
2.2 Level of the buffer applied	The O-SII buffer for all identified institutions (see above, 2.1) has been set to 2%.		
	- LGT Group Foundation (LEI code: 5493009EIBTCB1X12G89)		
2.3 Name of the EU ultimate parent institution	- Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG (LEI code: 529900OE1FOAM50XLP72)		
	- VP Bank AG (LEI code: MI3TLH1I0D58ORE24Q14)		
	n/a		
2.4 Names of subsidiaries			
3. Timing of the measure			
3.1 Timing of the Decision	29 June 2020		
3.2 Timing of the Publication	07 July 2020		
3.3 Disclosure	The results of the O-SII analysis are published on the website of the FMA Liechtenstein.		

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3.4 Timing of Application	1 Janua	un/ 2021					
3.4 Tilling of Application	1 January 2021						
3.5 Phasing in	No phasing in.						
3.6 Review of the measure	The level of the O-SII buffers will be reviewed annually. This analysis has been conducted based on data from 31 December 2019.				has been		
4. Reason for O-SII ident	ification	and activation	of the O-SI	l buffer			
	scores	owing table sho (columns 1 to 4) A guidelines incl	and overal		-		
	a.	size (column 1	1);				
	b.	importance for capturing subs		•			
4.1 Scores of concerned institution or group of	C.	complexity, incactivity (column	-	additional co	mplexities f	rom cross-	border
institutions, as per EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs	d.	interconnected system (column		institution o	r (sub-)gro	up with the	financial
(Article 131.3)			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Overall score (5)
		ank AG	5328	2782	6424	6371	5219
		ensteinische sbank AG	2442	3485	1982	2136	2509
	VP Ba		1444	1478	1157	1158	1308
	Please	ndard methodol refer to the atta	ched Excel t		guidelines)	has been a	applied.
4.2 Methodology and indicators used for designation of the O-SII (Article 131.3)	Please provide information on: a. whether you followed the EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs: The identification of the O-SII follows the EBA guidelines according to EBA/GL/2014/10. b. which threshold score has been set to identify O-SIIs: The standard threshold of 350 basis points has been applied. c. which overall score is attributed to the O-SIIs: In total, the three identified O-SIIs' score sum up to 9036 basis points (see 4.1). d. which of the optional indicators have been used to justify supervisory assessment decisions, if any, and what are the scores: Banks' assets relative to Liechtenstein's GDP ("Total Assets / Member State's GDP") e. why these optional indicators are relevant for the Member State: Liechtenstein's banking sector is very large relative to the size of the economy, i.e. the indicator is appropriate to take into account this specific factor. f. why the bank is systemically important in terms of those particular optional indicators: According to the additional indicator ("Total Assets / Member State's GDP"), the three O-SIIs in Liechtenstein are not only the three largest banks in Liechtenstein, but the three largest banks in the whole EEA. g. whether relevant entities with relative total assets not in excess of 0.02% have been excluded from the identification process: n/a h. names and scores of all relevant entities not excluded from the identification process (could be sent in a separate excel file, see 4.1):						

With regard to the calibration methodology, the FMA has defined three buckets with different buffer rates depending on the score. The categories differentiate the institutions according to their level of systemic importance depending on the respective score. Each identified of systemic importance depending on the respective score. Each identified institution has to hold an O-SII buffer of at least 1 %. Currently, all of the three identified O-SIIs are allocated to Bucket 1, i.e. signalling 'very strong' systemic importance. 4.4 Calibrating the O-SII buffer O-349 No systemic relevance O-350 −674 Bucket 3 − considerable systemic importance 1.0% 675 − 999 Bucket 2 − strong systemic importance 1.5% 675 − 999 Bucket 2 − strong systemic importance 1.5% 675 − 999 Bucket 2 − strong systemic importance 2.0% The impact of the failure of a systemic bank on the domestic financial sector and the real economy is much larger than the impact of the failure of a non-systemic bank. By increasing the loss-absorbing capacity of systemic institutions, the probability of default is significantly reduced. Due to the large size of Liechtenstein's O-SIIs relative to the domestic economy, we assess the applied O-SII buffers as being important for safeguarding financial stability. 5. Cross-border and cross-sector impact of the measure The measure applies to Liechtenstein banks at the consolidated level. Theoretically, there could be an impact on individuals or companies outside of Liechtenstein through cross-border credits or exposures of subsidiaries and branches. However, given the current capitalisation of the identified banks — well above the regulatory requirements, including buffers – the FMA expects the impact to be very low (or even inexistent). 5.2 Assessment of leakages and regulatory arbitrage within the banking groups due to regulatory arbitrage are impossible. Additionally, given the high capitalisation of the identified banks — well above the regulatory arbitrage are impossible. 6. Combinations and interactions with		Dlesse	a and attached Event file	
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SII and O-SII buffers (Article	6. Combinations and inte	ractions with ot	ther measures	
	6.1 Combinations between G- SII and O-SII buffers (Article 131.14)	n/a		

	For the three identified O-SIIs in Liechtenstein, the following requirements apply:
6.2 Combinations with SRB	a. The level of the systemic risk buffer is set to 2% for the three O-SIIs.
buffers	b. Is the systemic risk buffer applied to all exposures located in your
(Article 131.14 + Article 133.5)	Member State only? No, the systemic risk buffer is applied to all exposures.
,	 c. Is the systemic risk buffer applied at the same consolidation level as the O-SII buffer? The systemic risk buffer is applied both at the consolidated and at the individual level.
	In case the O-SII is a subsidiary of an EU parent institution which is subject to a
6.3 O-SII requirement for a	G-SII or O-SII buffer on a consolidated basis, what is the G-SII or O-SII buffer
subsidiary (Article 131.8)	rate on a consolidated basis of the parent institution?
	n/a
	How does the buffer requirement interact with other measures addressing the
6.4 Interaction with other	same risk (e.g. with other supervisory measures)?
measures	The O-SII buffer and the systemic risk buffer do not take effect cumulatively, i.e. only the higher buffer requirement applies. Therefore, we do not see any overlap in this regard.

7. Miscellaneous	
7.1 Contact person(s) at notifying authority	Martin Gächter, Head of Financial Stability / Macroprudential Supervision martin.gaechter@fma-li.li, +423 236 7392
7.2 Any other relevant information	-