Notification template for Article 131 CRD – Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Notifying national authority</th>
<th>De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Description of the measure</th>
<th>ING Bank N.V. (“ING”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(LEI: 3TK20IVIUJ3ZU0QE75);</td>
<td>Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. (“RABO”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEI: DG3RU1DBUFHT4ZF9WN62).;</td>
<td>ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (“ABN”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEI: BFXS5XCH7N0Y05NIXW11);</td>
<td>BNG Bank N.V. (“BNG”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEI: 529900GGYMNGRQTD0093);</td>
<td>De Volksbank N.V. (Volksbank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEI: 724500A1FNCNHSDF2111)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Concerned institution or group of institutions

The buffer requirements are imposed on the aforementioned institutions on the basis of the highest level of consolidation. In the case of ING, the entity referred to above differs from the entity referred to in section 2.3 The reason is that the relevant provisions in Dutch law transposing Article 131 CRD (i.e. Article 3:62a of the Financial Supervision Act and Articles 105c and 105d of the Decree on Prudential Rules) prescribe that –in case of an ultimate EU parent that is not an institution but a (mixed) financial holding company— the buffer requirement applies to the institution (i.e. supervised credit institution and holder of the banking license) that is the subsidiary of the EU (mixed) financial holding company, on the basis of the consolidated financial position of that holding company. Applying the buffer requirement to the institution, does not say anything about how the buffer requirement is calculated. In our case, all five entities referred to above are required to maintain a capital buffer on the basis of the highest level of consolidation, i.e. including the whole supervised group of which either an EU parent institution or an EU parent financial holding company is the ultimate EU parent undertaking. The buffer requirements are in line with the provisions in Dutch law transposing Article 131 CRD and do not differ in (consolidation) scope or level from the ones imposed and notified by DNB in previous years.
2.2 Level of the buffer applied

DNB has decided to impose the following O-SII buffer and SRB to the aforementioned banks:
2% O-SII in case of ING Bank N.V. and Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A.; 1,5% O-SII for ABN AMRO Bank N.V. and 1% for BNG Bank N.V. and De Volksbank N.V.

In addition, the following systemic risk buffers are imposed: ING Bank N.V. (2,5%); Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A (2%). and ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (1,5%). The highest of the buffers is applicable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>O-SII buffer</th>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>Highest buffer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ING</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2,5%</td>
<td>2,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABO</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volksbank</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Name of the EU ultimate parent institution

The 5 aforementioned entities mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2 have the following EU ultimate parent undertaking (either EU parent institution or EU parent financial holding company):

ING: ING Groep N.V.
RABO: Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. (same as under 2.1)
ABN: ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (same as under 2.1)
BNG: BNG Bank N.V. (same as under 2.1)
Volksbank: De Volksbank N.V. (same as under 2.1).

2.4 Names of subsidiaries

For subsidiaries (at publication date of the annual report), see:
ING Groep N.V.: Annual report, page 280
https://www.ing.com/web/file?uuid=cd92e960-46e7-4f48-a2ae-8fb590d30714&owner=b03bc017-e0db-4b5d-abbf-003b12934429&contentid=46311


ABN AMRO Group.: Annual report, page 143 and 144

BNG Bank N.V.: Annual report, page 283

De Volksbank N.V: Annual report, page 198

3. Timing of the measure
3.1 Timing of the Decision
We plan to make our final decision on the 8th of April.

3.2 Timing of the Publication
We plan to publish our decision by April 23rd. Due to extraordinary circumstances the timing of publication is earlier than as per usual.

3.3 Disclosure
DNB will notify the concerned banks of its final decision on April 23rd. An earlier notification of the intention to impose the abovementioned systemic buffers has already been shared and discussed with the Authority for the Financial Markets, the Ministry of Finance and representatives of the Dutch Banking Association and with the public. At the 23rd of April we will disclose our decision on our website.

3.4 Timing of Application
The buffers become effective immediately after the decision is published on the 23rd of April.

3.5 Phasing in
The buffers are fully phased-in as of 2019.

3.6 Review of the measure
The next review is expected to take place at the end of 2020, thereby taking into account changes resulting from the CRD V.

4. Reason for O-SII identification and activation of the O-SII buffer

4.1 Scores of concerned institution or group of institutions, as per EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs (Article 131.3)
The scores of our institutions based on 2018 Q4 data are shown below. These scores did not change since our last assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>O-SII total score</th>
<th>Size score</th>
<th>Importance score</th>
<th>Complexity score</th>
<th>Inter-connectedness score</th>
<th>O-SII buffer</th>
<th>SRB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ING</td>
<td>4,144</td>
<td>3618</td>
<td>4067</td>
<td>5396</td>
<td>3495</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABO</td>
<td>2,328</td>
<td>2408</td>
<td>2286</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>2231</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>2222</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volksbank</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide information on:

a. whether you followed the EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs:
DNB has fully complied with EBA guidelines.

b. which threshold score has been set to identify O-SIIs:
350 basis points

c. which of the optional indicators have been used to justify supervisory assessment decisions, if any, and what are the scores:
(i) total exposure-at-default, (ii) type of customers, (iii) number of deposit accounts — retail, (iv) deposits guaranteed under deposit guarantee system, (v) potential reputational contagion, (vi) potential contagion through shareholders, (vii) potential contagion through entities in conglomerate.

d. why these optional indicators are relevant for the Member State:
(i) Total exposure-at-default: this indicator belongs to the ‘Size’ category. Some banks have a relatively high amount of off-balance activities. For these banks, total assets is not an adequate reflection of their size.

(ii) Type of customers: this indicator belongs to the ‘Substitutability’ category. If banks operate in a niche market that relatively few other parties are active in, the provision of critical functions could (temporarily) be disturbed if the respective bank fails.

(iii) Number of deposit accounts — retail: this indicator belongs to the ‘Substitutability’
category. The impact of problems in banks with many retail clients would be relatively high because it would disrupt the access of many depositors to their funds.

(iv) Deposits guaranteed under national deposit guarantee system: this indicator belongs to the 'Interconnectedness' category. When a bank fails, depositors will be repaid up to €100,000. The other domestic banks have to share the costs, however, since they guarantee one another's deposits. This is, therefore, a direct contagion channel, as we witnessed in the recent financial crisis.

(v) Potential contagion through shareholders: this indicator also belongs to the 'Interconnectedness' category. If banks have a large stake in one another, or if the government is a major shareholder, there could be contagion effects.

(vi) Potential reputational contagion: this indicator belongs to a separate category called 'Behavioural effects'. The failure of one bank with a particular business model may result in a loss of trust in banks with comparable business models.

(vii) Potential contagion through entities in conglomerate: this indicator belongs to the 'Behavioural effects' category. If entities within a conglomerate have the same brand name, there could also be contagion effects.

e. why the bank is systemically important in terms of those particular optional indicators: The abovementioned criteria lead to the classification of one bank as O-SII: De Volksbank. This is based on the criterion deposits guaranteed under deposit guarantee system. For its relevance see the previous response.

f. whether relevant entities with relative total assets not in excess of 0.02% have been excluded from the identification process
n/a

g. names and scores of all relevant entities not excluded from the identification process (could be sent in a separate excel file, see 4.1)
A separate excel file with the scores will be sent to the EBA.

h. whether non-bank institutions have been included in the calculations
n/a

### 4.3 Supervisory judgement

| DNB has used the supervisory overlay, as prescribed in the EBA Guideline, to identify one bank (de Volksbank) as an O-SII. |

### 4.4 Calibrating the O-SII buffer

| See Section 4.2 and section 4.5 |

### 4.5 Effectiveness and proportionality of measure

| The impact of the failure of a systemic bank on the domestic financial sector and the real economy is much larger than the impact of failure of a non-systemic bank. Therefore, the probability of default of systemic banks should be significantly reduced. This can be accomplished by increasing the loss absorption capacity through the imposition of an SRB, G-SII or O-SII buffer requirement. As a bank’s systemic importance rises, it will typically be required to maintain a proportionally higher systemic buffer. The higher buffer requirements will structurally increase the solvency of systemic banks in the Netherlands. This positively affects the stability of the Dutch financial system and with that, the Single Market. |

| As of 2014, DNB has imposed a 3% SRB requirement on the three largest banks. This measure was appropriate since the Dutch banking sector was highly concentrated and large. Additionally, the three banks affected played an imperative role in the provision of credit and other critical functions. The proposed reduction in the SRB to 2.5% for ING, 2% for Rabobank and 1.5% for ABN AMRO (in combination with a reduction of the O-SII buffer of ABN to 1.5%) is prompted by the desire to keep the current level of the capital requirement constant, but modify the composition of the requirement. |
The reduction of the systemic buffers therefore goes hand in hand with DNB’s outspoken intention to build up a 2% countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in the future. This shifts DNB’s current composition – which heavily focusses on structural buffers – to a more balanced mix. This enlarges the amount of releasable capital at DNB’s disposal, which is a valuable addition given the sensitivity/volatility of the Dutch economy to external events as has also become apparent in the still ongoing Corona outbreak. Moreover, DNB is of the opinion that the resulting difference in the systemic buffer requirement between the three largest banks, better reflects the difference in the systemic relevance of these banks as well.

In the short run, the reduction of the systemic buffers for these three banks should also temporarily give banks more leeway to continue business lending and absorb potential losses during the Corona outbreak. Once the situation is back to normal, DNB will gradually increase the CCyB to 2%, which will bring back the capital requirements to the current level.

As such the proposed measure is seen to be effective and proportionate in both the short-run and long-run.

### 5. Cross-border and cross-sector impact of the measure

#### 5.1 Assessment of cross-border effects and the likely impact on the internal market (Recommendation ESRB/2015/2)

As the measure applies to Dutch banks on the basis of the highest level of consolidation, there may be an impact on individuals or companies outside the Netherlands through exposures of subsidiaries and branches. However, given the current capitalisation level of the identified banks and since the buffers are fully phased-in, DNB expects the impact to be limited.

#### 5.2 Assessment of leakages and regulatory arbitrage within the notifying Member State

The O-SII buffer and the SRB are imposed on the supervised institution on the basis of the highest level of consolidation, this avoids (jurisdictional) shifts of activities within groups due to regulatory arbitrage. Systemic banks may take measures to reduce their systemic importance, possibly including a shift of activities to non-regulated entities. However, due to the level of the capital increase and the current capitalisation level of the identified O-SIIs, we expect these incentives to be small. Furthermore, if banks reduce their systemic importance in an orderly manner, this could also be beneficial for financial stability.

### 6. Combinations and interactions with other measures

#### 6.1 Combinations between G-SII and O-SII buffers (Article 131.14)

In case of ING (the only G-SII in NL), the O-SII is higher and also applied on a consolidated basis, and therefore only the O-SII applies.

#### 6.2 Combinations with SRB buffers (Article 131.14 + Article 133.5)

Are any of the institutions subject to a systemic risk buffer?

Yes, ING Bank N.V.; Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. and ABN AMRO Bank N.V are subject to a systemic risk buffer, on the basis of the highest level of consolidation and applicable to all exposures.

If yes, please provide the following information:

a. What is the level of the systemic risk buffer (in %) applied to the concerned institution: ING (2.5%), Rabobank (2%) and ABN AMRO (1.5%).

b. Is the systemic risk buffer applied to all exposures located in your Member State only? No.

c. Is the systemic risk buffer applied at the same consolidation level as the O-SII buffer? Yes.
### 6.3 O-SII requirement for a subsidiary (Article 131.8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6.4 Interaction with other measures</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

We carefully monitor overlap between measures. Apart from the buffers for systemic importance (G-SII, O-SII and SRB), we do not see overlap of measures (e.g. with Pillar 2). Since the highest of the 3 buffers for systemic importance applies, we don’t see overlap in this regard either.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Contact person(s) at notifying authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Any other relevant information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>