



Notification template for Articles 133 and 134(5) of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) – Systemic risk buffer (SyRB)

Template for notifying the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of the setting or resetting of one or more systemic risk buffer rates pursuant to Article 133(9) CRD and to request that the ESRB issue a recommendation to other Member States to reciprocate the measure under Article 134(5) CRD

Please send/upload this template to

- <u>macropru.notifications@ecb.europa.eu</u> when notifying the ECB (under Article 5 of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation¹);
- DARWIN/ASTRA when notifying the ESRB.

The ESRB will forward the notification to the European Commission, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay. This notification will be made public by the ESRB once the relevant authorities have adopted and published the notified macroprudential measure².

E-mailing/uploading this template to the above addresses constitutes official notification; no further official letter is required. To facilitate the work of the notified authorities, please send the notification template in a format that allows the information to be read electronically.

Notifying national authority	and scope of the notification
1.1 Name of the notifying authority	Finansinspektionen (Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, FI).
1.2 Country of the notifying authority	Sweden
	Which SyRB measure do you intend to implement? ☐ Activate a new SyRB ☐ Change the level of an existing SyRB
1.3 Type of measure (also for reviews of existing measures)	☐ Change the level of all existing SyRB (incl. changes to a subset of institutions or exposures)
	□ De-activate an existing SyRB⊠ Reset an existing SyRB (review)

1

Date of template version: 26-11-2021

¹ Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

²On request by the notifying authority, it may be agreed with the Head of the ESRB Secretariat that this notification, or a part thereof, should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or financial stability.

2. Description of the measure					
	Please indicate whether the	SyRB applies to:			
	☐ All institutions author	ised in the Member State)		
	☑ One or more subsets of credit institutions in the sector (please provide the names and identifiers (Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) code) of institutions covered)				
	Name of institution	LEI code	Consolidation level		
	Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB	F3JS33DEI6XQ4ZBPTN86	Consolidated		
	Svenska Handelsbanken AB	NHBDILHZTYCNBV5UYZ31	Consolidated		
	Swedbank AB	M312WZV08Y7LYUC71685	Consolidated		
2.1 Institutions covered by the intended SyRB					
intended SyNB					
	Name of subsidiary	Name of the parent	lished in another Member State. iers (LEI code) of subsidiaries) e parent LEI code of the subsidiary		
	If the Oad Down line to a sub-		describes the emitted of the		
	If the SyRB applies to a sub- selection of the relevant inst	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
	Please indicate the exposure	es to which the SyRB app	olies:		
	⋈ (a) all exposures located	in the Member State tha	t is setting the buffer;		
	☐ (b) the following sectoral exposures located in the Member State that is				
	setting the buffer:				
	 (i) □ all retail exposures to natural persons that are secured by residential property; 				
2.2 Exposures covered by the	(ii) \square all exposures to legal persons that are secured by mortgages on				
SyRB	commercial immov	able property; legal persons excluding t	those specified in point		
(Article 133(5) CRD)	(ii);	legal persons excluding t	mose specifica in point		
	(iv) □ all exposures to(i);	natural persons excludin	g those specified in point		
	☐ (c) subsets of any of the s	sectoral exposures identit	fied in point (b). Please		
	specify the subsets in Section	•			
	⋈ (d) all exposures located	in other Member States;			
	oxtimes (e) exposures located in t	third countries.			
	Where the systemic risk buff		-		
2.3 Subsets of sectoral exposures	exposures identified (see po	int 2.2 (c)), please specif	y:		
·			nensions that were used to		
	identity the subset(s) of sectoral exposures	as iaid down in the EBA		

	Guidelines on the of SyRB:	appropriate s	ubsets of expo	osures in the	application	
	Dimensions/subdimensions			Elements		
	Type of debtor or counterparty	sector				
	1.a Economic activity					
	2. Type of exposure					
	2.a Risk profile					
	3. Type of collateral					
	3.a Geographical area					
	- Assessment cond Guidelines on the subset, taking into (i) size (ii) riskiness (iii) interconnecte - Why it would not hat the level of a se	systemic rele account: dness.	vance of the r	isks stemmir	ng from this	
2.4 Exposures located in other Member States and in third countries	Not applicable as the syste exposures on group level.	mic risk buffe	r applies to all	of the institu	utes'	
	Exposures New SyRB rate Previous SyRB					
	Exposures	New S	yRB rate	Previous	SyRB rate	
	Exposures	All institutions (SyRB rate)	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	All institutions (SyRB rate)	SyRB rate Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting	All institutions (SyRB rate)	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
2.5 Buffer rate	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposures	All institutions (SyRB rate)	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
2.5 Buffer rate (Article 133(9)(e) CRD)	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposuration that is setting the buffer: (i) All retail exposures to natural persons that are	All institutions (SyRB rate)	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates) 3%	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposuration that is setting the buffer: (i) All retail exposures to natural persons that are secured by residential property (ii) All exposures to legal persons that are secured by mortgages on commercial	All institutions (SyRB rate) ures located in the	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates) 3% • Member State % - %	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposuration that is setting the buffer: (i) All retail exposures to natural persons that are secured by residential property (ii) All exposures to legal persons that are secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property (iii) All exposures to legal persons excluding those	All institutions (SyRB rate) ares located in the	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates) 3% Member State % - %	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposuration that is setting the buffer: (i) All retail exposures to natural persons that are secured by residential property (ii) All exposures to legal persons that are secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property (iii) All exposures to legal persons excluding those specified in point (ii) (iv) All exposures to natural persons excluding those	All institutions (SyRB rate) ures located in the %	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates) 3% Member State % - %	All institutions	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	
	(a) All exposures located in the Member State that is setting the buffer (b) The following sectoral exposurable that is setting the buffer: (i) All retail exposures to natural persons that are secured by residential property (ii) All exposures to legal persons that are secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property (iii) All exposures to legal persons excluding those specified in point (ii) (iv) All exposures to natural persons excluding those specified in point (i) (c) All exposures located in	All institutions (SyRB rate) Ires located in the % %	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates) 3% Member State % - % % - %	All institutions (SyRB rate)	Set of institutions (range of SyRB rates)	

	(i) Please specify [Dimension/subd	·	%	% - %	
	If different buffer requirements apply to different subsets of institutions, please specify for each institution mentioned under 2.1.				
	Set of institutions				
	Exposures Name of LEI code New SyRB Previous SyRB institution rate rate				
				%	
				%	
				70	
3. Timing for the measure					
3.1 Timing for the decision	15/12/2022				
3.2 Timing for publication	15/12/2022				
3.3 Disclosure	The outcome of	of the review will	be published o	n FI:s website t	the same day.
3.4 Timing for application	The previous decision was applicable from 29 December 2020. Since the current review will not change the level of the SRB, or which credit institutions it applies to, the previous application date is still effective.				
3.5 Phasing in	No phase-in. The above-mentioned credit institutions are already subject to systemic risk buffers of 3 %.				
3.6 Review/deactivation of the measure	The systemic risk buffer will be reviewed at least every two years.				
4. Reasons for the notified Sy	rRB				
4.1 Description of the macroprudential or systemic risk	Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB, Svenska Handelsbanken AB and Swedbank AB ("the three credit institutions") shall be subject to a SRB of 3 %. The primary reason is to mitigate the structural systemic risk that arises due these three groups having large similarities. Consequently, the risk of a problem in one major bank coinciding with problems in the other two is appreciably greater than for the other banks in the marketplace. Because the three banks also constitute a large share of the market, the repercussions are much more serious if problems were to arise. The Swedish banking system is large in relation to the size of the economy.				to a SRB of 3 %. that arises due to he risk of a her two is ce. Because these epercussions are f the economy. On
in your Member State (Article 133(9)(a) of the CRD)	top of this, the banking system is characterised by a high degree of market financing, including a substantial element of financing in foreign currencies				
	system is characterised by a high level of market concentration. ee major Swedish banks, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB, delsbanken AB and Swedbank AB (all of them are identified as conduct business in a major part of Sweden. They hold around anking system's lending to the public and around 52 % of the				
	Unlike the smaller Swedish banks, the three major banks are similar to one another in that they have substantial operations outside of Sweden, primarily in				

northern Europe. Furthermore, they are to a greater extent active on the international financial markets. These international operations make the three credit institutions more vulnerable to international economic problems and international financial stress These banks' combined market share, in combination with their similarities, means that there is a structural systemic risk that increases the vulnerability of the Swedish banking system. The risk of a problem with one major bank coinciding with problems that also arise in the other two is thus appreciably greater than for the other banks in the marketplace. The similarities between the major banks also means that the market may, to a greater extent, presuppose that a problem in one major bank is also present in the other two, further exacerbating the structural risk. Consequently, there is a dependency of confidence between the three of them. Major shocks in the financial system risk leading to serious and negative repercussions for the real economy, and it may be difficult to alleviate a crisis without substantial cost to society. Because of the way the Swedish banking system is structured there is a concentration of risk and clear links between the major banks. There is thus a risk that a crisis will affect the system as a whole. The risk of a financial crisis is not necessarily greater in Sweden than in other countries, but there is a risk that the consequences of a banking crisis would be substantial if it were to happen here. One contributory factor in this respect is the central role played by the major banks in the supply of credit to the real economy. The banks' ability to continue lending is especially important during periods of crisis 4.2 Reasons why the dimension of the macroprudential or systemic risks threatens the stability of the Please see 4.1. financial system in your Member State (Article 133(9)(b) CRD) The above-mentioned three credit institutions are already subject to a systemic risk buffer of 3 %. The decision to maintain the buffer is based on a number of 4.3 Indicators used for activation different indicators relating to the size of the above-mentioned credit of the measure institutions in relation to the Swedish economy as well as their similarities, large market shares etc. (as described further under 4.1). The purpose of the buffer is to ensure that the above-mentioned three credit institutions hold more capital and are thereby more resilient towards stressed 4.4 Effectiveness and events. FI believes it is important for banks that are of systemic importance to proportionality of the measure have more usable capital in order to make them better equipped to manage any problems and be able to continue lending during periods of financial (Article 133(9)(c) CRD) stress. Based on the previously mentioned risks FI considers the measure both to be effective and proportionate. The two buffers complement each other. The purpose of the SRB is to 4.5 Reason why the systemic risk counteract the structural systemic risk arising from similarities of the three buffer is not duplicating the above-mentioned banking groups, while the O-SII buffer manages the risk that functioning of the O-SII buffer each individual O-SII constitutes for the system. The fact that there are three provided for in Article 131 CRD banks with similar risk profiles, which together account for a large portion of the operations in the banking market, creates structural systemic risks that are (Article 133(9)(f) CRD) covered by the systemic risk buffer, but not by the O-SII buffer.

5. Sufficiency, consistency ar	nd non-overlap of the policy response
5.1 Sufficiency of the policy response	FI believes that a 3 % systemic risk buffer, together with the additional capital requirements, are sufficient in order to mitigate the individual and aggregate risks that have been identified (see also section 4.1).
5.2 Consistency of application of the policy response	The application of the systemic risk buffer is consistent with the applicable articles in CRD as well as Swedish law. It is also consistent with the objectives as outlined in ESRB/2013/1 since the application of the SRB is ultimately aimed at strengthening the resilience of the Swedish financial sector (recommendation A, policy objective (e)).
5.3 Non-overlap of the policy response	FI has not introduced any other policy instruments to address the same systemic risk. The above-mentioned three credit institutions are subject to a systemic risk buffer, an O-SII buffer and a risk weight floor for mortgages via article 458. The measures cover different risks and complement each other. If a reciprocated systemic risk buffer covers the same risk as the Swedish systemic risk buffer the highest of them will be applied in accordance with CRD and Swedish law.
6. Cross-border and cross-se	ctor impact of the measure
6.1 Assessment of cross-border effects and the likely impact on the Internal Market (Article 133(9)(d) of the CRD and Recommendation ESRB/2015/2³)	FI does not expect the measure to have any negative consequences for the internal market. The systemic risk buffer is placed on the three major bank's total exposures; thus no difference is made based on the domicile of the exposures. The above-mentioned credit institutions have been subject to a systemic risk buffer of 3 % since 1 January 2015. FI has not noted any negative consequences for the internal market.
6.2 Assessment of leakages and regulatory arbitrage within the notifying Member State	FI does not expect the measure to have any negative consequences for leakages and regulatory arbitrage. The systemic risk buffer is placed on the above-mentioned credit institution's total exposures, thus no difference is made based on the domicile or type of exposures. FI will monitor closely any impact of the measure on other sectors of the Swedish financial system.
6.3 Request for reciprocation by other Member States (Article 134(5) CRD and Recommendation ESRB/2015/2)	No, FI will not request for reciprocation by other Member States since the systemic risk buffer will only apply on group level.

³ Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 15 December 2015 on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures (ESRB/2015/3) (OJ C 97, 12.3.2016, p. 9).

6.4 Justification for the request for reciprocation by other Member States (Article 134(5) CRD and Recommendation ESRB/2015/2)	N/A			
7. Combination of the SyRB w	rith other buffers			
	Name of institution	G-SII/O-SII buffer rate	O-SII consolidation level	Sum of G-SII/O- SII and SyRB rates
7.1 Combination with G-SII and/or O-SII buffers	Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB	1%	Consolidated	4%
(Article 131(15) CRD)	Svenska Handelsbanken AB	1%	Consolidated	4%
	Swedbank AB	1%	Consolidated	4%
	Nordea Hypotek	1%	Subsidiary	1%
		%		%
7.2 Combination with other systemic risk buffers (Article 133(11) and (12) CRD) 8. Miscellaneous	The two buffers that Swede systemic risk buffer at 3%. (see also table above in 7.	Combined no		
8.1 Contact person(s)/mailbox at notifying authority	Amelie Stierna Sillén, Senior analyst, Bank Analysis and Policy, +46 8 408 985 13 amelie.stiernasillen@fi.se Frida Alvarsson, Junior analyst, Bank Analysis and Policy, +46 8 408 980 19 frida.alvarsson@fi.se			
8.2 Any other relevant information	-			
8.3 Date of the notification	15/11/2022			