ESRB Annual Conference 21/22 September 2017 European Central Bank Frankfurt am Main Legal Perspectives on Macroprudential Regulation Professor Dr Kern Alexander

kern.alexander@rwi.uzh.ch

### Main points

- Macro prudential policy the contours
- Legal dimension
- Institutional design
  - 'Strong-form' of Independence v Accountability
- ECB's limitations as a macro-prudential supervisor

#### Fixing international financial regulation:

A cure for crises requires a comprehensive and consistent framework



Macroprudential policy

- ✓ Introduce macro-prudential policy
  - ✓ Create counter-cyclical buffer in banks
  - Direct derivatives transactions to central counterparties or clearing houses
  - ✓ Leverage limits/SIFIs
  - ✓ Bank resolution frameworks
  - ? Develop other macro-prudential tools

? Limits on loan to value ratios and loan to income ratios – UK Financial Policy Committee

- ✓ Introduce systemic risk boards
  - ✓ In US
  - ✓ In UK
  - 🗸 In EU
- ? Tasks: systemic risk boards identify and mitigate systemic risks in a timely fashion, including those risks that emanate from policymakers themselves?

### Legal dimension of supervisory authority

- Competences
- Powers
- Responsibilities
- Tasks

#### As an illustration, Article 4 SSMR (exclusive competence)

• ECB

"exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, [a <u>number of specific</u>] tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States".

- Supervisory competence depends on the identification by the Council of its tasks (ie., assignments).
- licensing, monitoring and enforcing prudential regulations, Art. 4(1)(k): ex-ante supervision
- No actual resolution and crisis management powers

# Discharge of legal powers in macro/micro supervision –

- Six main regulatory policy principles
  - Tasks carried out *effectively* by supervisor, without reputational risks
  - Independence of supervisor to take proportional and necessary measures to regulate/restructure property rights. Principle 2 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 2012)
  - Strict *separation* between monetary policy & supervisory tasks
  - Harmonisation and consistency to promote level playing field
  - Accountability of supervisor liability, as per Core Principle 2(9)): should remain limited to reporting obligations and preserve the supervisor's independence

**Independence v accountabiliy in macroprudential supervision: Implications of CB Independence for Macroprudential Policy** 

- Usual model for monetary authorities: independence from political pressures, clear mandate for price stability
- Strengthen credibility of central banks → increases success of monetary policy
- Independence however also means less democratic legitimacy and control
- SSM Art. 16(1): "When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall act independently."
- Application of independence model for *microprudential* (or even *macroprudential*) regulation?

### Macroprudential Supervision and the ECB

- Twofold involvement of ECB in macroprudential tasks
  - > Role as Secretariat of the ESRB
  - > Macroprudential tools under Art 5 SSMR
- Risk of accumulation of responsibilities/liabilities
- ESRB has no legal powers only warning and recommendations. *Effectiveness as a Macroprudential Supervisor?*

## Monetary policy and supervisory decisionmaking separation?

- Monetary policy and supervisory mandates are concentrated on ECB (accumulation of functions/liabilities)
- Creation of Single Supervisory Board intended to ensure separation. Separate staffs and assessments
- But cannot modify decision-making processes of ECB under which Governing Council must be ultimate decision-maker (Art 12.1 ESCB Statute)
- Supervisory Board & Administrative Board of Review can carry out preparatory tasks and make recommendations but Governing Council must be ultimate decision-maker.

#### SSM and SRM coordination via Resolution/bail-in

intervention



Subsequent "month"



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Prof. Dr. Kern Alexander

# kern.alexander@rwi.uzh.ch