



Notification template for Article 131 CRD – Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SIIs)

Template for notifying the ECB and the ESRB on setting or resetting on O-SII buffer under Article 131(7) CRD and on the identification of O-SIIs under Article 131(12) CRD

Please send/upload this template to

- macropru.notifications@ecb.europa.eu when notifying the ECB (under Article 5 of the SSM Regulation¹);
- [DARWIN/ASTRA link] when notifying the ESRB.

The ESRB will forward this notification to the European Commission, to EBA and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay and will publicly disclose the names of the O-SIIs on its website. This notification will be made public by the ESRB after the relevant authorities have adopted and published the notified macroprudential measure².

Uploading/emailing this template to the above-mentioned addresses constitutes an official notification, no further official letter is required. In order to facilitate the work of the notified authorities, please send the notification template in a format that allows electronically copying the information.

1.1 Name of the notifying	If several designated authorities, please mention all of them.			
authority	Banka Slovenije			
1.2 Country of the notifying	Please provide the country	of the notifying authority	/.	
authority	Slovenia			
	On which institution(s) is the measure applied (name and LEI code)? Is the measure applied on:			
	Is the measure applied on:			
	- The highest leve	l of consolidation		
	The highest leveA sub-consolidate			
2.1a Concerned institution or		ted level		
2.1a Concerned institution or group of institutions	- A sub-consolida	ted level	Consolidation level	
	- A sub-consolida - An individual lev	ted level	Consolidation level Consolidated level	
	- A sub-consolida - An individual lev Name of institution NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA	ted level el LEI		

¹ Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (*OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63*).

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² The notifying authority may request, and the Head of the ESRB Secretariat may approve, that for reasons of confidentiality or financial stability this notification or part of it should not be published.

	SKB BANKA D.D. LJUBLJANA	549300H7CCQ6BSQBGG72	Sub-consolidated level			
	(SKB)					
	Banka Intesa Sanpaolo d.d. (Intes Sanpaolo)	549300ECJDDLOVWWL932	Individual level			
	UNICREDIT BANKA SLOVENIJA d.d. (UniCredit)	549300O2UN9JLME31F08	Individual level			
	Please indicate any changes in the list under 2.1a compared to the last					
	notification, and provide a	an explanation, if applicable	e.			
2.1b Changes in the list of	Selling its UC Leasing of	company in July this year	r. Unicredit banka has			
concerned institutions	Selling its UC Leasing company in July this year, Unicredit banka has undergone a status change. Thereafter the bank is obliged to comply with					
	the requirements on an individual basis instead a consolidated one.					
	What is the level of the buffer (in %) applied to the institution(s)?					
	Name of institution	Fully phased in buffer lev	el Change compared to last notification			
2.2 Level of the buffer	NLB	1.25%				
applied	NKBM	0.75%				
	SID	0.50%				
	UniCredit	0.50%				
	SKB	0.25%				
	Banka Intesa Sanpaolo	0.25%				
	Please provide the name	and the LEI code of the E	U ultimate parent institution of			
		dentified O-SIIs, in case th	-			
	institution is not the conce	erned institution itself.				
	Name of identified O-SII					
2.3 Name of the EU ultimate parent institution		•	institution			
parent institution	NKBM	Biser Topco S.A R.L.	222100ZXZ9BRGDMKXL75			
	SKB	SKB OTP Bank Nyrt.				
	Unicredit	UniCredit S.p.a.	549300TRUWO2CD2G5692			
	Intesa Sanpaolo	Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.a.	2W8N8UU78PMDQKZENC08			
	If any of the identified O-S	SIIs is a parent institution a	and the buffer is applied on a			
	(sub)consolidated level, please name the subsidiaries of the institution that are					
	notified as O-SIIs (please	give name and LEI code)				
	Not applicable					
	Name of identified parent O	- Name of O-SII subsidiar	y LEI of O-SII subsidiary			
	SII	- Name of O-Sil subsidial	y LEI OI O-SII SUDSICIAI y			
2.4 Names of subsidiaries						
3. Timing of the measure						
	What is the date of the of	ficial decision? For SSM c	ountries when notifying the			
	What is the date of the official decision? For SSM countries when notifying the ECB: provide the date when the decision referred to in Article 5 of the SSMR					
3.1 Timing of the decision	shall be taken.					
	19/10/2023					
	What is the date of publication of the notified measure?					
3.2 Timing of the publication	01/12/2023					
	VI/ILILULU					

	Information about the communication strategy of the notified measure to the market.					
3.3 Disclosure	The Bank of Slovenia will publish the list of designated institutions and the applicable O-SII buffer requirement on its website.					
	If available, please pro	vide a link t	to the public	announcen	nent.	
	The list of designated Slovenije in the first v				<u>rebsite</u> of Bar	nka
3.4 Timing of application	What is the intended date of activation (i.e. as of which date shall the measur applicable)?					neasure be
	01/01/2024					
	What is the intended tip	meline for t	he phase-in	of the mea	sure?	
3.5 Phasing in	What is the intended timeline for the phase-in of the measure? This year's O-SII identification and buffer calibration process resulted increase of the buffer rate for three banks (NKBM, SID and Unicredit) for 0.25 p.p. The banks will be given 12-months phase-in period to meet the new capital requirements. They are expected to hold the fully phased in O-SII buffers rate on 1st January 2025.				dit) for et the	
	Name of institution	01/	01/2025			
	NKBM		0.75%			
	SID		0.50%			
	Unicredit banka		0.50%			
4. Reason for O-SII ider	Please list here the na			category so	cores of the ide	entified O-
	SIIs related to					
	a. size;					
	 importance for the economy of the relevant Member State or the Union, capturing substitutability/financial institution infrastructure; 					
	 c. complexity, including the additional complexities from cross-border activity; 					
4.1 Scores of concerned institution or group of	 d. interconnectedness of the institution or (sub-)group with the financial system. 					nancial
institutions, as per EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs	Name of institution	Size	Substitut- ability	Com- plexity	Intercon- nectedness	Overall Score
	NLB	1024	707	1382	762	3875
(Article 131.3)	NKBM	439	493	193	554	1678
	SID	109	45	146	493	793
	Unicredit Banka	140	243	410	72	864
	SKB	186	262	146	110	705
	Intesa Sanpaolo	158	178	93	119	548
	Please provide other re calculations and formu in a separate Excel file	las, data so	-		-	

Please provide information on:				
4.2 Methodology and indicators used for designation of the O-SII (Article 131.3)	b. which threshold Banka Sloven process of ide scores above measure will I Slovenia (dep solo, subcons c. whether relevative have been exconocered it instored the solo process of identification pounds.	the EBA methodology for cores. The analysis includes some has been set to in the property of t	of 500 basis points in the his year six institutions with been identified as O-SIIs. The st level of consolidation in ank whether this indicates ed level). It is assets not in excess of 0.02% ion process uded from the assessment. It is entire Slovene banking the mandatory indicators set (EBA/GL/2014/10).	
4.3 Supervisory judgement	Has any of the institutions listed in 2.1 been identified through supervisory judgement as laid down in EBA guidelines on the assessment of O-SIIs? If yes, please list the respective institutions and provide information on: a. which of the optional indicators have been used to justify supervisory assessment decisions, if any, and what are the scores b. why these optional indicators are relevant for the Member State c. why the bank is systemically important in terms of those particular optional indicators No institution has been identified as an O-SII through supervisory judgement.			
4.4 Calibrating the O-SII buffer	Please provide information on the criteria and indicators used to calibrate the level of the O-SII buffer requirement and the mapping to institution-specific buffer requirements. At its 707th meeting on 18 July 2023, the Governing Council of Banka Slovenije adopted a new Regulation on Determining the capital buffer for other systemically important banks, which was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the RS No 79/23 of 21 July 2023). As of the date of the entry into force of the new Regulation, the previous Regulation on Determining the capital buffer for other systemically important banks (Official Gazette of the RS No 96/15 and 68/17) will cease to be in force. Banka Slovenije applies the new framework for setting O-SII buffer rates (table below) in this year's annual exercise of O-SIIs identification and calibration of O-SII buffer rates. Score			

	4450	1.50%				
	Please provide a justification for why the O-SII buffer is considered likely to be					
	effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk. The failure of a systemic institution could have severe negative impact on the financial system and the real economy. To prevent such events, a capital surcharge is applied to institutions that bear a significant systemic importance and can therefore create higher risks to financial stability. More precisely, the aim of the O-SII buffer is to increase the loss-absorbing capacity of such institutions. In the Slovenian banking system, the six identified O-SIIs represent 82% of the system's total assets.					
4.5 Effectiveness and proportionality of measure						
5 Sufficiency, consistency a	and non-overlap of the po	olicy response				
5.1 Sufficiency of the policy response	responses are expected	to significantly mitiga	idered as 'sufficient', the policy te, or reduce the build-up of, risks d unintended impact on the general			
	relevant input for assess Member States. Please	sing the sufficiency of provide any additiona	of the macroprudential stance as the macroprudential policy in the I information that the ESRB should acy of the policy response.			
	In the context of policy sufficiency, the measure is calibrated in a way that it meets the policy objective (to limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard and to additionally reduce externalities caused by interconnectedness) and that it ensures that benefits exceed costs (see 4.4. for calibration approach).					
	identify O-SIIs and to reason for the special financial stability, which the financial system systemically less significantly important importance, complexity The capital buffer for the Bank of Slovenial macroprudential stan	assess their importa treatment of O-SIIs ch may lead to signi and the entire ec gnificant institution nt institutions are y and, cross-border each identified O-S is currently develo ce that would furt	EBA methodology to regularly ance to the financial system. The is that their failure may endanger ificantly larger adverse effects on conomy compared to failure of (please also see 4.5). Other identified based on the size, activity, and interconnectedness. It is set accordingly. In addition, ping a framework for assessing ther provide additional insights			
	regarding the sufficien					
5.2 Consistency of the application of the policy	instruments should follo	w their relevant object nted in accordance wi	idered as 'consistent', the policy rive as outlined in ESRB/2013/1 and th the common principles detailed			
response	same systemic risks are Member States over tim ESRB should consider of	addressed in a simila e. Please provide any	cy will incorporate whether the ar way both across and within the additional information that the of the consistency of the policy			
	response.	nte an additional car	pital buffer requirement for banks			
	The O-Sil buller prese	iiis aii auuliionai Ca	pital buller requirement for banks			

that are designated as O-SIIs. The objective of the surcharge is to enhance these institutions' loss-absorption capacity. This reduces both the probability of stress events and their potential impact. The main channel that the transmission works through is through reduction of the moral hazard in O-SIIs and the implicit subsidy they may enjoy by helping to ensure that creditors, rather than third parties such as national governments, bear losses in the event of a bank's failure (see also 5.1).

5.3 Non-overlap of the policy response

In order for a policy instrument to be considered as 'non-overlapping', it should aim to address a systemic risk that either differs to the risk addressed by other active tools in the same Member State, or to be complementary to another tool in that Member State which addresses the same systemic risk.

- Are other policy instruments used to address the <u>same</u> systemic risk?
- If yes, please explain the necessity to use more than one instrument to address the same systemic risk and how the different instruments interact with each other.

No other policy instruments used to address the same systemic risk.

6 Cross-border and cross-sector impact of the measure

Assessment of the cross-border effects of the implementation of the measure.

- a. Assessment of the spillover channels operating via risk adjustment and regulatory arbitrage. The relevant indicators provided in Chapter 11 of the ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector³ and the <u>Framework to assess cross-border spillover effects of</u> <u>macroprudential policies</u> of the ECB Task Force on cross-border Spillover Effects of macroprudential measures can be used.
 - a.1. (cross-border) risk adjustment: in order to avoid being designated as an O-SII, financial service providers might reduce their exposures outside Slovenia.
 - a.2. regulatory arbitrage: in order to avoid the O-SII buffer requirement, foreign financial service providers might:
 - a.2.1. convert their subsidiaries in Slovenia into branches: the probability of this to happen is small as long as the size of exposures to Slovenia of these foreign financial service providers remains small compared to their total exposures;
 - a.2.2. transfer capital-intensive activities (like derivatives) to special purpose vehicles: in our case, since the measure applies to the highest level of consolidation, the risk of cross-border effects through this channel is assessed as non-material.

b. Assessment of:

- b.1. cross-border effects of the implementation of the measure in your own jurisdiction (inward spillovers);
 - b.1.1. Since a higher capital buffer means a higher cost of lending for banks, an O-SII might transfer this higher cost to borrowers, who in turn might redirect their borrowing request abroad. Should this happens, the inward effect for Slovenia would be positive, because it contributes towards

6.1 Assessment of crossborder effects and the likely impact on the internal market

(Recommendation ESRB/2015/2)

³ Available on the ESRB's website at www.esrb.europa.eu.

- the reduction of the systemic importance of that O-SII. Consequently, the measure becomes more effective at limiting moral hazard by too-big-to-fail institutions.
- b.1.2. An O-SII might (want to) countervail a potential contraction in lending (see point b.1.1 above) by increasing other (and maybe riskier and more complex) types of exposures, like riskier foreign exposures with higher expected profits. However, the criteria for O-SII designation take into account the bank's increase in complexity and expansion of cross-border activity. Therefore, we can overall expect that the described cross-border effect would be non-material.
- b.1.3. The measure creates incentives for capital regulatory arbitrage, i.e. conversion of subsidiaries of foreign financial service providers into branches. As mentioned in point a.2.1 above, the probability that foreign financial service providers will convert their subsidiaries in Slovenia into branches is assessed to be currently negligible.
- b.2. cross-border effects on other Member States and on the Single Market of the measure (outward spillovers);
 - b.2.1. The introduced O-SII buffer will bring about positive outward effects as the reduced risk of financial instability in Slovenia will also reduce the risk of possible contagion to other countries, whose financial systems or economies are, for any reason, connected.
 - b.2.2. In order to avoid the O-SII buffer requirement, foreign financial service providers might transfer capital-intensive activities (like derivatives) to special purpose vehicles: in our case, since the measure applies to the highest level of consolidation, the risk of cross-border effects through this channel is assessed as non-material.
- b.3. overall impact on the Single Market of the implementation of the measure.
 - b.3.1. Summing up the information provided in the previous bullet points, the overall impact on the Single Market of the implementation of the measure is positive. The measure helps reduce the issues related to moral hazard by too-big-to-fail institutions, direct and indirect contagion (by restraining O-SIIs' foreign and riskier exposures) and to increase the O-SIIs' resilience.
 - b.3.2. Finally, the Bank of Slovenia monitors regularly whether there is any significant change in cross-border exposures that could constitute or signal negative inward or outward effects of the considered measure. In particular, in light of the criteria and expert judgement described above, the amount of borrowing from abroad by households and NFCs is monitored as an indicator of cross-border effects of the OSII buffer. The following table shows no significant change in this indicator that would signal the existence of negative cross-border effects.

	millions
date	EUR
2015-Q4	2665.52
2016-Q4	2458.22
2017-Q4	2377.6

		2018-Q4 208	32.01		
		_	79.57		
			18.24		
		-	55.59		
			38.52		
_	Referring to your Member Sta			is the scope for	
	"leakages and regulatory arbi				
6.2 Assessment of leakages	the measure/leakages to other	-	-		
and regulatory arbitrage	Is there scope for "leakages a	and regulatory arb	itrage" in other j	urisdictions?	
within the notifying Member State	Some of the banks identified as O-SIIs are subsidiaries of parent institutions from other countries. The measure will be applied at the highest level of consolidation in Slovenia in order to prevent circumvention i.e. shifting of business activities within the group. Leakages are therefore not expected. Moreover, as explained in section 6.1, the risk of regulatory arbitrage is deemed negligible.				
7 Combinations and interac	tions with other measures				
7.1 Combinations between G- SII and O-SII buffers	In case both G-SII and O-SII consolidated level, which of the			tion at the	
(Article 131.14)	Not applicable, as no bank in Slovenia is subject to both an O-SII and G-SII buffer on a consolidated basis.				
	Are any of the institutions, identified as O-SIIs, subject to a systemic risk buffer?				
	If yes, please provide the follo	owing information:			
		•			
	a. What is the size of the systemic risk buffer rates(s)?				
	b. What is the level of application on the systemic risk buffer rate(s) (i.e.				
	level of consolidation		•	0.011 h# +-	
	c. Is the sum of the systemic risk buffer rate(s) and the O-SII buffer rate to which the same institution is subject to higher than 5 %?				
	The requirement to maintain	n a sectoral syste	emic risk buffe	r is introduced	
	for all banks in relation to s	-			
	referred to in the first and second indents of point 4 of the first paragraph				
	of Article 247 of the Bankin	g Act, in the follo	wing amount:		
	• 1.0 % for all retail e	ynosures to nati	ıral nersons se	cured by	
7.2 Combinations with SyRB	residential immova	-	a. a. po. coc co		
-	0.5 % for all other e		ural persons.		
(Article 131.15)		•	-	rick huffar from	
	Banks comply with the requirement to maintain a systemic risk buffer from 1 January 2023.				
	The measure is applied at the highest level of consolidation in Slovenia (dependant on individual bank whether this indicates solo, subconsolidated				
	or consolidated level). There is no case where the sum of the systemic risk buffer rate(s) and the O-SII buffer rate to which the same institution is subject to exceeds 5 %				
	(please refer to the table be	low).			
	Name of institution	SyRB rate	SyRB level of	Sum of O-SII	
	Name of Institution	Syndiale	application	and SyRB rates	
	NLB	1.0 % and 0.5 %		2.75 %	
	NKBM	1.0 % and 0.5 %		2.25 %	
	I	1.2 /0 a.i.d 0.0 /0		,,	

	SID	1.0 % and 0.5 %	2.00 %		
	SKB	1.0 % and 0.5 %	1.75 %		
	Intesa Sanpaolo	1.0 % and 0.5 %	2.00 %		
	Unicredit Banka	1.0 % and 0.5 %	1.75 %		
7.3 O-SII requirement for a	In case the O-SII is a subsidiary of an EU parent institution which is subject to a G-SII or O-SII buffer on a consolidated basis, what is the G-SII or O-SII buffer rate on a consolidated basis of the parent institution? Is the subsidiary cap preventing the implementation of a higher O-SII buffer according to the domestic buffer setting methodology? There are no obstacles to the implementation of the set buffer rates for the O-SII in the table				
subsidiary (Article 131.8)	Name of O-SII subsidiary	Name of the EU parent of the O-SII subsidiary	Buffer applicable to O- SII EU parent		
	NKBM	Biser Topco S.A R.L.	N/A		
	SKB	OTP Bank Nyrt.	1.00%		
	Unicredit	UniCredit S.p.a.	1.00%		
	Intesa Sanpaolo	Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.a.	0.75%		
8 Miscellaneous		hone number and e-mail addres	s) and mailbox fo		
8.1 Contact	further inquiries.				
person(s)/mailbox at	Meta Ahtik, tel.: +386 1 47 1	9 350, email: meta.ahtik@bsi.si			
notifying authority	Monika Tepina, tel.: +386 1 47 19 369, email: monika.tepina@bsi.si				
	Marija Drenkovska, tel.: +386 1 47 19 678, email: marija.drenkovska@bsi.si				
8.2 Any other relevant information	1				
	Please provide the date whe	n this notification was uploaded/se	ent.		
8.3 Date of the notification	05/10/2023				
	33, 13, 23, 23				